


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


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


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THE PATHWAY TO REALITY

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THE PATHWAY TO REALITY

STAGE THE SECOND

BEING THE GIFFORD LECTURES
DELIVERED IN THE UNIVERSITY
OF ST ANDREWS IN THE SESSION
1903-1904

BY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
RICHARD BURDON HALDANE
M.P., LL.D., K.C.

NEW YORK
E. P. DUTTON AND COMPANY
1905

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PREFACE

THE lectures which this volume contains were delivered consecutively, the first six in October 1903, and the last four in the following January. As in the case of the earlier series, published last year, they were, for the most part, not written. It had been suggested to me from the first that the plan of talking instead of reading, with the aid of a note just sufficient to fix the general sequence, was likely to prove less burdensome to the audience than an endeavour to rivet their attention to written and therefore rigid discourses on topics which were largely technical. The proposal suited my own circumstances, and, at least in the case of a layman, seemed admissible. The scheme of the lectures I had for some time past been thinking out, in the intervals of different avocations. But binding engagements, public and private, did not facilitate writing. Indeed, the delivery of the lectures contained in this volume had to take place in the intervals of utterances of other kinds. Possibly there has, as a consequence, been carried into what follows something of an atmosphere which is not strictly academic. At all events, by the terms of my

engagement to the Gifford Trustees, I was bound to publish the lectures as I gave them, and on reading over the transcript I felt that it contained things which I wanted to say, and which I was not likely to have another opportunity of saying. What is here printed is simply a carefully corrected copy of what a most competent shorthand writer took down day by day. To the lady who undertook this duty I must here express my gratitude for the skill with which she spared me much of what is often a wearisome burden of correction. Here and there I wrote out passages, and these I used where I could. But in the main I relied on the capacity of the reporter, even where the points were technical and obscure. The only exception to this was in the last part of the first lecture, and in the whole of that which comes seventh in order. These were written during a holiday in Germany.

Such a method of producing a metaphysical book has defects. Stern critics may say that no man has the right to publish anything of this kind put together in such a fashion. I admit the weight of the criticism, and I throw myself on the mercy of the critics. I also plead that the Gifford Trustees insisted, somewhat against my will, on my accepting their Lectureship, and then bound me to publish what I should say. I am not by profession a philosopher, and as I had no reputation to lose, I agreed to do what they wished. They allowed me time—and time, as has been observed by persons of great authority, is infinitely long. Then there

were some things to be considered on the other side. I had spent in these investigations a good deal of my life, and it seemed to be permissible for me, finding myself in such a situation, to try to say how the world seemed to one whose occupations necessitated his living in it. Again, my plan, the only possible one for a busy person, was not wholly without its advantages. In the first place, he who is going to speak *ex tempore* has to make a determined effort not to allow the trees to prevent him from seeing the wood as a whole. I think I may say that I have not spared myself in the effort to do this. The writer who shuts himself up with his lamp in his study is sometimes in peril of getting lost in his details. He is tempted to think as he expresses himself, instead of thinking before he expresses himself. He does not easily, such is the force of habit, reflect as he walks through the market place. And yet the market place has its own kind of stimulus for those who have to be constantly striving to pull themselves together, a stimulus which is not to be felt to the same extent either in the pulpit or the chair. Moreover, upon the whole, experience shows that the spoken word is better for teaching purposes than the written manuscript. It leaves the lecturer free to follow into their perplexities the minds of those who are his hearers. Finally, the circumstance that he has but talked, leaves the talker with a sense of liberty remaining to him. It was, I think, Renan who

somewhere declared that to write a book was to limit oneself. If, however, the author has but expressed his thought in language which owed its form to the audience and the hour, the sense of self-limitation is less oppressive.

In my earlier volume the chief topic was the complete relativity of our knowledge, in everyday life and in physical science. The nature of reality was subjected to a scrutiny which ended in the recognition of a boundary line to such knowledge. Beyond that boundary line it appeared to be impossible to pass in the absence of an interpretation of mind, and of its relation to the Universe, more definite and more extensive than that which is current in everyday usage. In this volume I have done what I could to find the interpretation needed, and, with its aid, to cross the line. I have tried to find the answer to the question what we are really striving to express when we speak of God and of Freedom and of Immortality. It has seemed to me that, in the two thousand years which have passed since Aristotle taught on these topics, progress in our knowledge has been made, but progress in the main on certain lines which he laid down.

The first volume of this book had a reception more generous than one who is to be reckoned with laymen was entitled to look for. Only of two criticisms which were made on it, do I wish to say anything. One was that the book was a mere reproduction in modern form of what had

before been taught by Aristotle and by Hegel. On this I will merely observe that the criticism cannot carry the critic far. I believe it to be true, and have already said so. But my assertion depends for its validity on the accuracy of my interpretation of the doctrine of these great men. Now of what is a very difficult doctrine the interpreters have been many, and as various as they were many. They have not seldom reproached each other with liberties taken with their gospel. Accordingly I will endeavour to disarm hostility by frankly confessing here that in both volumes I have freely used the method of what theologians call exegesis. Some, for whose judgment and authority I have the deepest respect, have shaken their heads, and have told me that, whether or not I have interpreted Aristotle aright, I have not truly followed the teaching of Hegel. I have laid, as they think, too little stress on the abstract element in knowledge and on the dialectical character of knowledge as a system of universals. I can only answer that what I have done has been done after deliberation, and that in the present volume I have sought to justify it. I have thought for long that metaphysical investigation has had its credit seriously impaired, not only in Germany but in this country, by a too narrow view taken of the nature of mind. This word has been used by certain writers as meaning either the process of relational or discursive thought, in its essence of the character of what is universal, or else something—no one seems quite to know

what—considered somehow to exist apart from time, and to be that of which thought is the activity. The next step has been to put the process (or the activity, as the case may be) in contrast with feeling. Thereupon has come the splitting of the philosophers into camps, in some of which it is sought to reduce feeling to thought, and in others to reduce thought to feeling. In short, people have fallen into the way of insisting on construing the concrete riches of the world of the actual, as if they must be reduced either to universals of reflection or to particulars of sense. To me the dilemma appears to rest on too narrow a view of the nature of mind. With mind, if there be any truth in the doctrine of these lectures, *we must begin*. It is the actual, what lies nearest to hand, and it is also the ultimate, beyond which we cannot get, and which can only be described in terms of itself. Universal and particular seem to me, following Aristotle, to be but abstractions, made in the process in which it is actual by the subject which has before and within it its experience and itself. That subject, with its experience and its self-consciousness, is the actual concrete fact in which all knowledge has its starting point. Such a starting point is concerned with what is singular and individual, and it is within what is thus in its actuality singular and individual that the universal and particular, which can emerge only as abstractions, have reality. The grounds for this opinion, which appears to me to have been that of Aristotle and Hegel, and to have been

dropped out of sight by some of their interpreters, I partly set forth in the earlier lectures. In this series I have returned to the attack from another side. I am unable to assent to a narrow use of the word which would confine thought to a particular mode of thinking that is itself the mere outcome of abstraction. Yet this identification seems to me to be frequently made by writers whose aim it is to interpret from the standpoint of idealism. That Hegel himself (of Aristotle it is hardly necessary to speak) would have repudiated this form of idealism, appears from his express declarations.* The warnings have been disregarded, and the result has been something of a breach and much of confusion in the camp of the idealists. A striking incident has been the departure of Mr F. H. Bradley from the headquarters of orthodox idealism, and his adoption of a separate position. He has intimated his decision that thought, relational and discursive as, in the sense in which the late Mr Green and others have used the word, he finds it to be, has no capacity to reach final truth or to penetrate beyond appearance. Yet is Mr Bradley's view of thought sufficiently wide? One asks how, if thought be merely what he takes it to be, he gets as far as he does. Is not his scepticism self-destructive! And is his Absolute any better than "the night in which all cows look black"; an unknowable *substance* of which we may say,

* See *Werke*, Band vi., p. 5, and also the final part of his *Religions-Philosophie*, *passim*.

"De non apparentibus et de non existentibus, eadem est ratio?" Mr Green himself seems to have had misgivings about this use of the word thought. In one passage he even protests against it, blaming Hegel, as I think, not quite justly.* For myself I prefer to believe, what the facts seem to me to demonstrate, that the scope of the activity which is of the essence of mind, is wider than the limits of relational or discursive thinking. It follows that abstract reason has no monopoly of the means of access to reality, although I hold it to be the only competent guardian of the pathway. It seems to me that relational thought and feeling are alike aspects which arise by distinctions which are really abstract, within the ultimate reality which we call Self-consciousness or Mind or Spirit, and which is in its nature singular and all-embracing. In this volume I have accordingly pressed the point that if by the word thought we wish to indicate the activity in which mind consists, we must interpret it as extending to every form of that activity, and not in the contracted sense in which it is sometimes used.

For these and other reasons which are set out in the lectures that follow, I have assigned to Art and to Religion parts as important as that of Philosophy in the search after truth. That, like Philosophy, Art and Religion can aim at reaching nothing short of the reality that is ultimate, I cannot doubt. The difference is one of method and

* See Works of T. H. Green, vol. iii., p. 142.

of symbol. It is no function of Art or of Religion to bring us to scientific results. It is just because the scientific aspect of the truth is the aim of Philosophy that its language is abstract and that its methods have the defect of their quality. Its results can never be for our minds wholly sufficing. At our plane of intelligence the tendency to frame abstractions, and so to separate what are but aspects in a single reality, the Beautiful, the Good, and the True, is too powerful. Yet the content of our minds will not the less on this account always be more than abstract thought. And this leads me to add a final observation to this preface.

If any one should say that the name of Goethe occurs too frequently in the pages of what purports to be a metaphysical book, my answer will be, that my way of looking at things made it impossible not to turn frequently, in the course of an investigation such as this, to the greatest critic of life that has spoken in modern times. Should I, in the course of these lectures, have succeeded in helping any one to realise more fully the depth of meaning in the precept of that great genius :—

“ . . . Im Ganzen, Guten, Schönen
Resolut zu leben,”

I shall feel that I have been well repaid for the little that I have been capable of doing.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

BOOK III.

ABSOLUTE MIND

LECTURE I.	- - - - -	<i>Pages 3 to 38</i>
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RETROSPECT

Throughout these Lectures what has been meant by the word "God" is nothing short of the Highest and most Real. The images and metaphors of everyday theology are inadequate in an inquiry of the character prescribed by Lord Gifford. Ultimate Reality was, as the result of the first series of lectures, found to be Mind, and within Mind the whole of experience, possible as well as actual, was found to fall. In the course of the first part of the inquiry three things became apparent:— (1) Peril of going off the track through the use of metaphors; (2) the necessity for careful criticism of the limits and validity of categories; (3) the absurdity and self-contradiction of the notion that abstract thought could either be a product of things, or itself create them. Neither Aristotle nor Hegel sought to deduce nature from logical forms, though it is a common superstition to believe that they did. They held that self-consciousness was the ultimate fact behind which it was logically impossible to go; that it was no net-work of abstract universals, but concrete and living subject, not substance; that within it arose and were contained, as the outcome of its own distinctions, the entire universe of thought and things. For them this ultimate reality was individual, unique, and singular, as an ultimate fact must be. Outside of it nothing could, with any intelligible meaning, be said to exist, and within it the two

aspects or moments of its nature as Intelligence, the universals of thought and the particulars of feeling, were separable in logical analysis but not in fact. Among the further topics which must engage our attention are the question in what sense mind so conceived can be described as a Person, and what is the relation to such mind of the finite forms in which self-consciousness appears—*e.g.*, in man.

LECTURE II. - - - - - Pages 39 to 70

Further examination of what is implied in self-conscious mind. Metaphors more than usually out of place here. To call mind a "thing" is utterly wrong. To call it "subject" is better, but is still misleading, for the distinction from the object, though essential for self-consciousness, is made by and falls within it. Again, to look upon mind as resolvable into feeling, out of which what is higher has become evolved by differentiation, is for the purpose of a metaphysical inquiry quite insufficient, for such evolution presupposes time, and time has itself to be accounted for. Nor, as we have already seen, can it be described as a system of universals, for, as Aristotle showed, such a system is nothing apart from the particulars in which it realises itself. It must be described in terms of itself, as a final and unique fact, the nature of which is to be disclosed only by the study of its own movement. The meaning of "finiteness" in relation to the self. Comparison with Berkeleyanism. With the rejection of the conception of mind as substance, solipsism becomes meaningless, for it is apparent that to try to think of a finite self as the ultimate form of reality is to try to think what is self-contradictory. The forms of finitude are the outcome of the limited ends and purposes by which our intelligence is in everyday life dominated. Meaning of Understanding as distinguished from Reason. Illustration from space and time. The categories of thought are the forms of Reason, and they constitute a system in which each link logically implies every other link. The whole system is implicit in and presupposed by the earliest link. From the days of Plato onwards the method of the greatest thinkers has more or less explicitly been to try to comprehend and set out the nature and interrelation of categories. Meaning and nature of Dialectic. The Hegelian "Notion" and "Idea."

The nature of mind is to posit itself in distinction, and to comprehend and pass beyond the distinctions. What is called Pantheism is a misunderstanding of the nature of God.

LECTURE III. - - - - - - *Pages 71 to 94*

The result of the inquiry so far has been to insist, with Bradley and Royce, as against Green, that stress must not be laid exclusively on intelligible relations. But Bradley holds thought to be at once capable of raising the problem of reality and incapable of adequately solving it. His reason is that to him thought appears to be relational or finite. It is difficult to see how his scepticism can escape from the reproach of inconsistency. For if thought is adequate to the comprehension of its own limits, it must be able to go beyond these limits. Royce's work is valuable because of his insistence on the concrete and ethical character of the activity of intelligence. But it is open to the criticism that it is only in the *systematic* exposition of its own forms that intelligence can at all adequately set forth its nature as the ultimate reality. Notwithstanding the freshness of Royce's method, it therefore appears to be unsatisfying. One is driven back to the Hegelian system, not because one believes that it contains the final word, but because of its unflinching thoroughness. The value of Hegel's attempt at a dialectical explanation of the relationship of the distinctions which self-consciousness makes is that it leaves no gaps. He declared that all that is actual is rational, and all that is rational is actual, and, again, that the spiritual alone is the real, but he certainly did not mean that nature could be displayed in terms of intelligible relations. He insisted, on the contrary, that the appearances which make up the realm of nature have the characteristic of contingency and foreignness to reason, and he explains that this is so because the system of these appearances is a system of abstract separations, made by intelligence dominated by purposes which do not lead to full comprehension, and which operate under finite forms of thought. So far from being rational, nature is rather for him unreal, excepting as comprehended at a higher level than that of thinking under finite forms of self-consciousness, a comprehension which would change its appearance. Such a line of criticism leads back to the conception of God as the mind of

which ours is a manifestation on a lower plane. The Hegelian Logic is no ordinary logic, but the system of categories in which the notion, the characteristic movement of thought, displays itself. This system, as exhibited in the Logic, is but one aspect of Ultimate Reality, of the Absolute Mind, and it is reached by abstraction. The philosophy of nature deals with another aspect which is abstract in another way, and is the outcome of intelligence operating after the fashion of the understanding, which separates and isolates, as in the forms of sense perception, in space and time. The standpoint of such particularism is the outcome of abstraction, and, like that of the Logic, finds its correction and completion in the self-consciousness of concrete spirit, which is described in the Philosophy of Mind.

LECTURE IV. - - - - - Pages 95 to 116

It is the elusiveness of the subject-matter that makes philosophy difficult. Hard thinking is the only instrument with which we can break through the misleading images and metaphors of daily use, misleading because they furnish views which, while sufficient for the purpose in hand, and in that sense representative of truth, are inadequate for those who want light on the nature of Ultimate Reality. Art and religion demonstrate the fact of this inadequacy, and, after all, the difficulty appears in the same fashion in other studies—for example, those of the higher mathematics. Having found that the apparently hidden nature of Reality is self-conscious mind which contains within itself all the appearances which go to make up the world as it seems, we have now to ascertain how and why it is that the distinctions exist to which these appearances at their various grades are due. That self-consciousness is the final form of mind cannot be doubted, for the very doubt really implies the principle as its basis. To speak of absolute mind as unconscious is to use words without meaning. In some sense, accordingly, God is a Person, and we have to inquire in what sense! The fact of self-consciousness implies a distinction of subject from object, of self from not self. The nature of mind is to make distinctions and to exist in and through them. It is no inert *simultaneum*, but, as Aristotle long ago pointed out, is active reason, life and more than life, intelligence which com-

prehends, and in its comprehension is present in every form of the content of its self-consciousness. The end which determines its activity is the end of making itself explicit to itself, and this end seems to be implicit even in the lowest forms of mind. In its lower forms, as mere understanding, mind lays stress on the reality of its distinctions and the self-subsistence and isolation of what is distinguished. In its higher forms, as reason, mind interprets and comprehends what is distinguished and the acts of distinction as having meaning only as links or moments in a series. Examination of the nature of time. Time is continuous just as much as it is discrete, and, when taken as a final form of reality, proves to be self-contradictory in its conception, and unreal in appearance. The meaning of the expression "*comprehension sub specie æternitatis*." The world as it must appear in the mind of God. The degrees of reality in appearance.

LECTURE V. - - - - - Pages 117 to 142

In this lecture we must not pass by the next problem that confronts the inquirer, that of the nature of finite mind. The ground of finiteness lies in distinctions made within the Absolute Mind, whereby it appears as object to and other than itself. But these distinctions and what results from them presuppose, as their logical foundation, the notion of a mind that is absolute. It is a misconception of the teaching of Hegel to imagine that he identified the Absolute Mind with mind as it appears in History. For there the forms in which mind displays itself are never more than finite, *i.e.*, relative to what has gone before or is to come after. What we are dealing with is not the relations of substances derived from substance, but stages or planes in the comprehension of its own appearances by all-embracing mind. Indeed there may well be higher planes of comprehension than that which characterises the mind of man or the world-spirit, and such planes may yet be finite. Man is at once in separation from and in union with God, because the foundation of his existence is Intelligence, the essential characteristic of which is Dialectic, difference in unity and unity in difference. Thus man has a double nature, out of which arises for him, on the one hand, the consciousness of separation from God, or evil; and, on the other hand, the consciousness of potential union with God, or religion. Though finite spirit, man is none

the less spirit, consequently he is essentially free, and therefore *responsible*. The relational character of the finite, insistence on which is the mark of the understanding, and the quality of dialectic, because of which spirit, even though it be finite, has to distinguish itself from what is other than it, and yet to find itself in that other, is the explanation of man's relation to nature. It is also the reason why he appears to himself as emerging out of nature, and as one among many others. The doctrine of degrees of reality in appearance is important in this connection. It is because man, though spirit, is finite spirit, and because what is typical of his knowledge of his every-day world is the separation and isolation which the understanding seeks to make, that for his plane of comprehension the universe with himself in it appears as it does. As Hegel points out, nature cannot be taken as appearing to God in the abstract externalities of space and time, and indeed stands to Him in no direct relation, for the plane of appearance which is distinctive of it pertains merely to the finite mind of man. Nature is in the mind of God only in as much as the mind of man is comprehended as a degree in the absolute mind of God. Bosanquet's analysis of the relation of the "universal self" to the actual individual consciousness.

LECTURE VI. - - - - - *Pages 143 to 170*

The problem of the nature of God. Retrospect. In His nature there can be conceived no difference between Thought and Thinker, for we have passed beyond the category of substance. With Him to create must mean to think, and to think to create. Thus intelligence and volition fall together. Because self-consciousness turns out to be the highest of all categories, and to be the basis of all intelligence and therefore the presupposition of our reasoning about the nature of ultimate reality, God must be self-conscious. He must have ends which are realised in the mere fact of their being proposed. The character of His activity cannot be represented in images drawn from the world of appearance in space and time. Yet because His nature is to posit and realise Himself in forms which are the forms of otherness, in difference, and yet be self-identical, that nature cannot resemble the Spinozistic *simultaneum* of Pantheism, which lands us in a lifeless identity without difference. Here it is more than usually necessary to study

critically the categories we employ, and to guard against the anthropomorphism which is natural and comparatively harmless in other spheres of inquiry. Inasmuch as mind conceived as Absolute must be self-conscious, it must have an object through distinction of itself from which it is so. As it is all-embracing that object can be no other than itself, distinguished by itself from itself. It must be *for* itself, and comprehend itself in the utmost fulness—compare the *νόησις νοήσεως* of Aristotle, and his doctrine of the Active Reason. Because what appears for the mind of God as its other is just itself, that other is self-conscious, and because its essential characteristic is to be *for* God, to stand in relation to and depend on Him, it is *finite*, and the forms of its knowledge are throughout marked by finiteness. While potentially those of reason, they are actually those of understanding. Thus in the mind of man, which, like the mind of God, seeks to distinguish itself from its other or not-self, as the very condition of self-consciousness, there arises a world of appearances in relations of isolation. Space and time are fundamental among such forms, but nature presents many others less strikingly characterised by apparent irrationality and contingency, and these forms of knowledge ultimately turn out to be comprehended and to have their truth in self-knowledge, in which mind, having found nature to be only *for* itself, and thus its not-self to be really itself, is at a higher plane of comprehension than that in which nature is given. The forms of finite mind and the differences which are thus created have their value, meaning, and justification as stages in the dialectical movement in which Absolute Mind is conscious of, and so realises and enriches, itself. Without them God were not perfect. In Him they are comprehended and transformed. Only by the free choice of finite Spirit in selecting its ends have they assumed the aspect of hard-and-fast separation from God, and in the spirit that knows itself as one with Him and His ends this aspect is comprehended and put past. For the scope of the Divine Intelligence is not contracted by finite ends as is ours. Yet even in man such ends and purposes are not the only ones, nor are his comprehension and nature wholly limited by them. In Art and in Religion he passes beyond his finiteness. This is what is meant to be illustrated by such phrases as “Dying to Live.” The medium of Religion is, like that of Art, not abstract thought. Religion is a practical matter; it belongs to the will and it expresses

itself emotionally, as a "new heart." It is the consciousness of a direct relation to God, but in forms that belong to the region of feeling, and are consequently describable only symbolically. Under its own forms it grasps the presence of God as here and now in the object world ; it is the sense that He is immediately manifested, and this feeling is expressed in the symbols and pictorial manifestations of the creeds. The metaphysical theory is that Absolute Mind is conscious of itself in Another which is just itself, and that these, its two aspects, are only distinguishable by abstraction in the entirety of self-conscious Spirit of which they are the moments. This Christianity expresses in the well-known symbolical form of a Father who sends His Only Begotten Son into otherness, the world, to return to Him with the otherness overcome and the redemption of the world accomplished. Thus the doctrine of the Trinity, which is by no means peculiar to Christianity, embodies a profound truth. It is an analysis in symbolical form of the three aspects or moments in the self-consciousness of God, in Hegelian terminology, Logic, Finite Intelligence (including Nature and Finite Spirit), and Absolute Spirit ; the realisation of the Universal and the Particular in the Individual. We are neither to confound Persons nor divide Substances. The Athanasian Creed, which owed its origin to the influence of Neo-Platonic metaphysics in the Church of Alexandria, has been too little appreciated. The analysis also throws light on the origin of evil, the responsibility for which rests with the finite spirit which is free to prefer the good. Because man can transcend his separation from God he is responsible. In order to be finite man he must be separated, and his duty is to overcome his separation. The choice of a higher plane implies the surrender of the self, with its particularism. Thus evil arises and is a necessary moment in the Universe. But it is in finite spirit that it arises, and, like nature generally, it stands in no direct relation with God. Because man is thus separate from God, and must surrender his finite nature in order to gain union with Him, he worships. The love of God is just the consciousness of the potential unity of the finite and the absolute self.

This completes the examination in outline of the theoretical aspect of the nature of Ultimate Reality. The succeeding lectures will deal with concrete questions which arise out of the relation of man to God.

BOOK IV.

FINITE MIND

LECTURE I. - - - - - Pages 173 to 200

As we have seen, the mind as human is finite ; knows itself as known, and as known yet knows. It comprehends itself in time-distinctions, the characteristic of which is relativity. But even in presentation knowledge is aware of its own limits, and in comprehending transcends them. The recognition of beauty, however, is not abstract knowledge. It is in the immediacy of feeling that we are conscious of beauty, although it *is* only for the mind that is capable of thought. The object of Art must be *expressive*. The beautiful in Art is higher in its kind than the beautiful in Nature. Schopenhauer's view of music. The true meaning of poetry. Goethe on the study of Art. Art never really expounds abstract conceptions, yet the world as it is for Art is what it is in virtue of Reason, which shines, as it were, through a sensuous garment. The difference between the artist and the man of science. Kant's *Critique of Judgment*. Schiller and Carlyle. Beauty is the middle term between sense and thought.

LECTURE II. - - - - - Pages 201 to 225

In Art mind stands revealed to itself in sensuous form, but as freed from the trammels of finitude. In Religion we have a similar deliverance. Religion is a phase of the will, and belongs to the region of practice. As in the case of Art its certainty is immediate, and assumes the form of feeling. In Philosophy also the mind transcends the limits of the finite in comprehending them. But its medium is not concrete, as in the case of the other two. Its procedure is like that of the sciences, for it concentrates on that aspect of mind in which mind appears as an abstract system, and thus Philosophy gets

beyond the limits of what is immediate. One of its problems is the deeper meaning of the contrast between life and death. The aspects in which the self presents itself as body and soul belong to time, and are in their nature transitory. Explanation of this. For these aspects death is a necessary and natural part of their history. Illustrations of how death is natural in the case of animals and human beings. But this is only a part of the meaning of death. It has been said to be superseded in a higher stage of the reality of self-consciousness; consideration of this opinion. The antithesis between life and death is the work of understanding, and is not a final view. The real significance of what is called eternal life. Is it for us more than an abstraction? Consideration of this question.

LECTURE III. - - - - - *Pages 226 to 253*

It is clear that as subject the mind is directly conscious of possessing an infinite and non-sensuous character, and is continuously yielding up the particularity of its forms. This infinite quality cannot be exhaustively given in any temporal present, and hence, as expressive of the limit of that temporal present, the mind determines itself as realised in a future. In this attempt to present as a temporal picture the infinite quality of the mind, an antinomy arises, which, like other antinomies, can only be solved by a deeper and more thinking consideration. Reason why the difficulty does not arise in Art or Religion. The pictures of Art are symbolical. The faith which characterises the self-surrender of the will in Religion is a sense of reality above and beyond what is seen. In its doctrines of the eternal nature of the self and of degrees in reality Metaphysics teaches the same truth in scientific form. The true relation of spirit to spirit, and the meaning of Love in its highest and most general sense. The understanding can never solve the problem of another life, for it is hampered by a dilemma based on the finality of the idea of duration. A direct presentation of the unreality of death can never be accomplished in our picture world, and yet the recognition of that unreality is necessitated. For a higher degree of knowledge, though short of absolute knowledge, such recognition may present no difficulty. For ordinary knowledge it appears only in the symbolical representations of Art and Religion.

LECTURE IV.	- - - - -	<i>Pages 254 to 272</i>
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Characteristics of the doctrine of the mind of man as set out in the preceding lectures. The teaching of what is called "Spiritualism" has no bearing on it. Place of Spiritualism, as expounded by Mr Myers and others, in anthropology.

Survey of the ground covered in the twenty Gifford Lectures now delivered, and of the results reached. CONCLUSION.

BOOK III
ABSOLUTE MIND

LECTURE I

I HAVE to resume these lectures at the point at which I laid down the thread in January last. My task, as prescribed by Lord Gifford, is to inquire into the nature of God. For that task he also prescribed the spirit in which its execution was to be carried out. It was to be executed impartially, and in a scientific fashion, without fear and without favour. I have endeavoured in the course of the lectures which I have already delivered to look to the truth and the truth only as my goal, and I shall seek in the course which I have now to commence to observe the same principle.

In the last series I began by pointing out that to inquire into the nature of God must be to inquire into the nature of Reality, and I examined at some length the meaning of such words as *Reality* and *Truth*. These lectures, which have since been published, were of necessity critical rather than constructive. I had to prepare to build, and for that purpose it was necessary that I should clear the ground before I could endeavour to place upon it a structure. I have now to try to carry out the constructive portion of my undertaking ; but before

I enter upon it I wish to remind you of the substance of what has already been done.

We were confronted in the beginning of our inquiry into the nature and meaning of Reality with this fact, a fact which looked formidable, that the world as it seems around us presents an aspect which is apparently alien to mind and impenetrable by thought. We had to consider what I called the hard-and-fastness of that world as it is presented to us, and to endeavour to trace to its source the reason of that characteristic. You will recall that I traced that characteristic back to its source in the limited ends and purposes which govern us men and women in *thinking* our experience. I pointed out to you that this hard-and-fastness, this impenetrability of the object world, owed its significance to a certain "setting" in which our knowledge was placed by the dominating influence upon that knowledge of ends and purposes of a limited character, necessary for our social lives, but which yet were not of a nature sufficiently far-reaching to guide us in the search after ultimate truth. Analysis showed that these ends and purposes were neither final nor exhaustive, and in this conclusion we found ourselves in the company of a number of people who had approached the subject from different points of view, but who had converged on something like the same result! Men so different as Berkeley, Mill, Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and the later Germans, had all pointed out that it is the way in which we think things that gives rise to

much of what we take to be the objective universe in which we live.

Put shortly, it may be said that it is ends and not causes which fashion that universe, and thus we get to the conclusion that knowledge is, in a deeper sense than that in which the expression is commonly used, relative. The relativity of all our knowledge is a relativity which depends, not upon the fact that there is something hidden behind, for there is no warrant for the belief in any hidden thing-in-itself, but upon this, that the ends and purposes which dominate and control our thinking are not final or ultimate ends and purposes.

Now the inquiry which I have summarised, and which occupied the last ten lectures, led us to take warning against certain perils which beset the searcher after truth. One of these perils arises from the habit into which we readily fall of using, in such an investigation as we are engaged in, metaphors and similes which are appropriate for everyday purposes, but which are wholly out of place in regions which are not akin to the regions from which they are drawn. Thus men and women have been led to torture themselves and to cause themselves endless perplexity by trying to conceive the mind as a *thing*. If it be a thing, how natural to look upon it as operated upon by mechanical causes, and as incapable of freedom, in any sense in which meaning can be given to the word ! Yet we found that the notion of the mind being a thing, was a notion which rested upon metaphors which

were wholly inapplicable when we were treating of the nature of the mind.

Let me take a second danger which the last course of lectures was designed to illustrate. We are, as I have just said, prone to bring to bear upon the subject matter into which we are inquiring conceptions or categories which are wholly out of place, and that is a danger which besets not only philosophers but people whose work is, in the special sense of the word, scientific. For example, as we saw in the last series, in physiology the insistence upon a mechanical way of looking at things has affected the researches which from time to time have been undertaken, in such a fashion as to lead, not only to confusion of thought, but to a good deal of deflection of experiment into channels which are not the natural channels.

And this carries with it further consequences which arise from the misuse of categories. We are very apt, when we get a view of experience and fix it as a particular aspect, to take that view, that aspect, as exhaustive of the whole. But such a conclusion speedily carries Nemesis in its train, because we find, as I showed you in detail in the last four lectures of the former course, that we fall into endless contradictions when we do anything of the sort. Therefore a criticism of categories is essential in philosophy. We must know what is the relation to one another of the conceptions of which we make use, and what is the limit of their validity.

Then there is a third peril to which I had to allude in some detail before, and which is of quite a different character, although in its source it is akin to the two others. Philosophy has got into disrepute by the carelessness of philosophers in the use of language. It is not possible to be always accurate in language, especially when you are carrying into a region of research which is quite different from other regions of research, words and phrases which are taken from the usages of everyday life. But still it was not necessary for thinkers—and even very great thinkers have been to blame here—to have led the world to suppose that philosophy tries to do what it ought never to try to do. For example, it has been common to suppose that idealism meant that somehow the professor of idealism would show how thought *made* a thing, instead of simply showing what the meaning of being a thing is, and in what its reality consists. Even the great Kant has not been wholly free from this reproach. But I pointed out to you that thought cannot properly be said to *make* things.

The word “make” is a metaphor, drawn from the regions of space and time, and is wholly inadequate to express the relation of thought to its object. None of the great thinkers have really preached the heresy in question, particularly not those whose names are, in the popular imagination, most associated with the doctrine. Aristotle and Hegel are really wholly free from the imputation,

nor does their language, when properly scanned, lend countenance to the notion that they taught the heresy.

Well, so much for the negative part of the earlier set of lectures. The conclusion at which I asked you to arrive with me was this, that God's nature could not be of a quality less than the quality of Ultimate Reality, and that the metaphors and images of ordinary theology are wholly inadequate as a description of God's nature. Now it is useless to do what a considerable, and, I fancy, for the moment, a growing school of theologians are seeking to accomplish. They are trying to bring us back to an everyday view of the nature of God, away from the regions in which metaphysics has taught us to search. Those who imagine that they are rendering a service to the permanent character of theology by going back to feeling, by limiting what ought to be accurate description to the ordinary metaphors of everyday life, are really rendering no service. They are sowing no seed. They can expect no fruit. They are ploughing the sands. If the nature of God is to be investigated, it must be investigated in the light of a searching criticism of the categories implied, otherwise we shall encounter the danger expressed in the now trite saying of Goethe, "Man never knows how anthropomorphic he is."

While the analysis of the last set of lectures began with the view of things which we traced to the domination of those various limited purposes of

which I have spoken as the source of a considerable amount of error, I pointed out that the ends and purposes which dominate have their origin in the necessities of everyday life; that they come from this, that we men and women, in our intercourse with one another, must speak on the basis of a common foundation. That common foundation comes to be largely expressed in phrases which owe their origin to the social ends which we have in view, ends which by degrees pass in our minds into the appearance of being the only ends with which we are concerned. I pointed out that this was so in the sciences, just as much as in everyday life, only that in the sciences what is done is done consciously. In the sciences what we do is to take an aspect of things, a particular aspect; to concentrate on it to the exclusion of other aspects, and, by the clearness of thought which we thus obtain, to get, by means of reasoning, beyond what is immediately present to the senses. In geometry, for example, we abstract from everything excepting the relations of space, and we construct figures with a clearness and a concentration of mind which enables us to get far beyond what the senses could tell us. But these figures are ideal. The concrete riches of the universe have, for the purposes of the inquiry of the geometer, been put out of account—rightly put out of account—for they are not relevant to that inquiry, but yet put out of account in a fashion which makes the investigations of geometry a guide to only a partial aspect of the truth. Now,

what is true of the abstract conceptions of geometry is true in a varying degree of every other science. We traced the process, in our account of the special sciences, down to the abstractions of psychology in the method of what is called Presentationism. It is the procedure of science to exclude those aspects which are not germane to the ends which the man of science has in view, in order to concentrate with greater clearness and greater insight on the particular aspect which *does* concern him. In that fashion the man of science reminds one of the procedure of everyday life, where the ends and purposes which guide us in thinking our experience are ends and purposes which often shut us out from what may prove to be a deeper insight into its character.

As the result we found that all that is or can be conceived has meaning only as expressing distinctions which fall within the mind itself. Even space and time are distinctions, have meaning and existence only as distinctions, which fall within self-consciousness. These distinctions are distinctions which are before or for the mind, and in them phenomena get their setting and their significance. The Ultimate Reality we therefore found to be mind and nothing else, to be subject rather than substance, although even the expression "subject" is one which we cannot use without a certain amount of explanation. For the word "subject" suggests what is called subjective idealism, suggests the return to the notion of the mind as a thing

constructing or building up its experience—a view which got some countenance in Kant's division of the mind into faculties, a division which suggested that the mind could be put, as it were, upon the table, and dissected into component elements.

Now, there is no *making* of things by thought in that sense. The "window" theory of the mind represents one extreme of untruth, the theory, namely, that things have an independent existence, and that somehow knowledge is a streaming from them into the interior of the mind as into a vacant chamber. On the other hand, it is equally untrue, as I showed you, to try to exhibit experience as a piecing or putting together by the mind of what is to be thought of as a magic lantern picture which the mind projects, and which, compared with what projects it, is unreal. My self-consciousness is not a thing that makes its object, for object and subject equally fall within it. My self-consciousness is feeling just as much as thought, and thought just as much as feeling, and the separation of the two arises from a distinction which falls within it. Self-consciousness is in form reflection, within which the whole meaning of existence falls, and within which all existence emerges. Later on in these lectures we shall have to consider what is the meaning of the word "my" in this connection, and to ask whether it is not true that there too we have a distinction which falls within self-consciousness. But feeling and thought—this is the point of my observation—are not two elements which exist separately, the one

from the other. They are rather related as the particular and the universal which have no independent existences, but are merely moments of concrete reality in the individual, actual, and concrete singular of direct experience, within which they are only separable by abstraction. Behind consciousness I can neither go nor find meaning in trying to go. That consciousness is before itself as *my* consciousness is a fact which, as we shall find later on, makes no difference.

If one has to characterise reality one must characterise it as, in the sense I have indicated, individual. The real is always something singular, unique, having nothing else like it. It is always a "this." So is self-consciousness itself. And it is equally true that self-consciousness, when I reflect that time is itself but a relation or distinction falling within self-consciousness, may be characterised as having for the form of its existence an eternal "now." There is a great phrase of Hegel: "Dem Begriffe nach einmal ist allemal," "In the notion once is always," and that is a saying on the significance of which I shall have to dwell a good deal in the course of these lectures. My point is just now that, as all existence falls within self-consciousness, and as all existence emerges within self-consciousness, a thesis which I developed at length in the earlier course of lectures, so self-consciousness is not in the nature of a set of abstract universals, nor yet in the nature of any particular of feeling, but is itself just an indi-

vidual "this," the centre to which all else falls, unique and singular in its character, and eternal in the sense of being that for which time is. All knowledge is accordingly nothing else in its real nature than the making explicit what is implicit. It is true that when we think in time distinctions, as the ends which fashion our intelligence force us men and women to think, sense seems to come first, and completed knowledge last. But when you scrutinise reflectively and more deeply the nature of what you there have, you find that in the earlier and simpler stages of knowledge, even in the particulars of sense, there is implicit the whole of what comes into clear consciousness later on in time, but is in reality implied from the first. That is the necessary consequence of the nature of self-consciousness.

The Ultimate Reality is Mind, and the nature of God cannot be less than that of the Ultimate Reality. God must be Mind. Is He personal? What is His relation to the finite forms in which self-consciousness appears, for example, in man? These are questions which I shall have to consider with you in what follows.

Well, I have sketched the idea of the ten lectures on which I am now entering, and I have summarised what has already been accomplished. I fear that many of you have found the pathway to reality, so far as we have yet trodden it, hard and stony. It is beset with many difficulties, and in the region upon which we are now entering, as we

cross the borderland, we shall find the pathway that lies before us not less hard and not less stony. We have to ascend precipitous places; we have to go along the very brink of abysses of thought; but yet, if we have faith in the great teachers, the half-dozen great teachers who, in the two thousand years which embrace what is greatest in the history of the human mind, have trodden the road before us, we shall find that they have cut steps in the rock which are of an enduring character, footholds which will enable us to get from point to point. As the outcome of their work, they have left us certain great results which form their common contribution, results which they have expressed in varying language, and which are our inheritance and our strength and our guide in our toil.

I have so far brought you to a point at which it is evident that what we have to do is to build upon the ground which we have cleared, to get some definite notion of the nature of Mind. For if God be the Ultimate Reality, and if the Ultimate Reality be Mind, the problem with which we have to deal is obviously, What is the nature of Mind? Now the great difficulty in lecturing upon a topic of this kind is not a difficulty which applies only to the lecturer. There is a difficulty which rests with the audience. There are many of the points in an inquiry of this kind which have not emerged in the minds of some of you, and yet, until these points emerge, until you become conscious that there are problems that have to be solved, and realise the

nature of these problems, it is hard for you to make progress. That is why we read a book so much better when it deals with some topic on which we have reflected and about which we have much concerned ourselves, until the book has, so to speak, come to our rescue. And so it is in the most pre-eminent degree with the study of metaphysics. It seems barren, it seems in the air, unless you have realised the intensity of the difficulty with which the metaphysician sets himself to grapple, and this has always been so in the history of philosophical teaching. That is what the Greeks meant when they used to talk two thousand years ago of *wonder* as a necessity for the beginner in philosophy. He must have learned to ponder over the difficulties which beset him, and, before he has learned that, he must have become conscious of these difficulties. And it is not merely wonder as to abstract theory, but it is *moral* wonder which is essential in the undertaking. There is a saying of Erdmann which I will quote, making the preliminary observation that it is not until we have passed a certain point in the evolution of the spiritual as well as the moral nature of man, that such an inquiry as is the subject of the Gifford Lectures attains the fascination that is characteristic of it. "The task," writes Erdmann at the beginning of his *History of Philosophy*, "of apprehending its own nature in thought can only tempt the human mind, and, indeed, it is then only equal to it, when it is conscious of its intrinsic dignity." We may add that it was only

after Christianity had raised humanity to the full consciousness of the infinite worth and importance of the individual that these inquiries attained their deepest meaning, and that the old commandment "Know thyself" got its full significance.

Well, we have to try to find light upon a problem that is of supreme importance to all of us, and our conclusions about which must profoundly influence our conduct. I cannot undertake always to succeed in using the language which is most apt, or to be always clear and lucid. That will be partly my fault, but it will be in a yet greater measure the fault of the topic with which I have to deal.

It is, indeed, a reproach often directed against those who speak about philosophy that their language is obscure. The complaint is almost invariably directed at some supposed shortcoming of the speaker. Those who make it rarely pause to ask whether it be not possible that the nature of the subject is the real reason of the obscurity. Philosophy has to deal with the meaning and nature of Ultimate Reality, and what is ultimate is rarely easy to get at. You and I can readily see through the water of a babbling brook when we cannot see to the bottom of the lake into which the waters flow. If the waters of philosophic reflection had resembled those of the brook we should have long ago known what underlay them. Lord Gifford would not have founded a Trust; libraries would not have been filled with volumes of controversy.

The obscurity lies really in the topic of discourse. Feeble as may be the capacity of the lecturer, it is not his feebleness that is the chief head of offending. There have been those who have attempted, with the aid of great gifts of exposition, to set forth solutions of the problems of metaphysics in language that was apparently clear as noonday. But one after another their attempts have failed. The language was clear, because it was the language of everyday life where the problems in question had simply been ignored. The pictorial images of this language were admirably adapted for the display of that which they resembled. But the region of philosophy is not a region of pictorial images. Rather, as I showed you in the lectures of the last series, is it a region where such similes and metaphors have sadly misled those who have set out on the search after truth in its deeper meaning. It is just because it has to get rid of the misleading associations of language which belongs to a plane of reflection other than that at which it has to place itself, that philosophy requires its own special and technical terminology. Therein it resembles mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, and, indeed, every science which has to try to get beyond appearances to their significations. Why these other sciences should escape the reproach in question, and philosophy have to encounter it, is not apparent. Yet the reproach against philosophy is common even from the lips of educated people. "It is," observes Hegel in the Introduction to the

Encyclopædia, "the generally accepted view that to make a shoe requires study and experience, notwithstanding that every man has a model in the shape of his own foot, and has in his hands the natural instruments for the work which he has to do. It is only in the case of philosophy that learning and study and hard work are taken to be unnecessary. This comfortable opinion has, in recent times, been strengthened by doctrines about immediate or intuitive knowledge." Had Hegel lived to-day he would have added to these strengthening causes the easy avenues to truth, which our popular writers on science and on theology seem never to tire of describing.

But in point of fact there are no royal roads to this kind of learning any more than to other kinds. If philosophy is to be studied to any purpose, and especially to the purpose of enabling the student to work out his own intellectual salvation, it must be studied in systematic form. The pathway is hard and stony. Lectures like the present may help you over the slough of preliminary despond and through the wicket gate. They may lead you to a place from which you may have some view of new regions. But more than this they cannot do. When you reach these regions you must pursue your own way, and nothing short of hard toil will bring you any distance into these unfamiliar places. When you get to them the only guides that can help you are the great thinkers, those who have been great, not merely in the history of speculative

philosophy, but in the history of science, of literature, of art, of religion, of all that has raised the intellectual level of mankind. There is no short cut. There is no epigram in which it is practicable to shut up what can be set forth only in a system. The language, too, must be language which has expressions for metaphysical conceptions. That is why French is a poor medium for this kind of science, and English not very much better. There is a story which is sometimes told of Cousin and Hegel, but, I think, it is properly told of Madame de Stäel and Fichte. The brilliant lady is said to have called on Fichte in Berlin, and asked that he should sum up for her his system succinctly and in French. "*Ces choses ne se laissent pas dire succinctement, surtout en français,*" is said to have been Fichte's response.

But our generation is not the only one that has suffered from a widespread desire to take short cuts in philosophy. The Greeks had to protest against the same illusion. In the Seventh Book of the Republic, Glaucon says to Socrates, "Say then what is the nature and what are the divisions of dialectic, and what are the paths which lead thither; for these paths will also lead to our final rest."

"Dear Glaucon," I said, "you will not be able to follow me here, though I would do my best, and you should behold, not an image only, but the absolute truth, according to my notion. Although I am not confident that I could tell you the exact

truth, I am certain that you would behold something like the truth."

"Doubtless," he replied.

"But I must add that the power of dialectic alone can reveal this, and only to one who is a disciple of the previous sciences."

"Of that assertion you may be as certain as of the last."

"And certainly no one will argue that there is any other method or way of comprehending all true existence; for the arts in general are concerned with the wants or opinions of men, or are cultivated for the sake of production and construction; and, as to the mathematical arts which, as we were saying, have some apprehension of true being—geometry and the like—they only dream about being, but never can they behold the waking reality so long as they leave the hypotheses which they use unexamined, and are unable to give an account of them. For when a man knows not his own first principle, and when the conclusion and intermediate steps are constructed out of he knows not what, how can he imagine that such a conventional statement will ever become science?"

"Impossible," he said.

"Then dialectic, and dialectic alone, goes directly to the first principle, and so the only science which does away with hypotheses in order to make certain of them; the eye of the soul, which is literally buried in an outlandish slough, is by her taught to look upwards; and she uses as hand-

maids, in the work of conversion, the sciences we have been discussing. Custom terms them sciences, but they ought to have some other name, implying greater clearness than opinion, and less clearness than science." . . .

"Dialectic, then, as you will agree, is the coping-stone of the sciences, and is placed over them ; no other science can be placed higher—the nature of knowledge can no further go."

Glancon then asks who ought to study dialectic, which in this context means just philosophy, and what qualifications he should have. Socrates replies, "Such gifts as keenness and ready powers of acquisition ; for the mind more often faints from the severity of study, than from the severity of gymnastics." "Further, he of whom we are in search should have a good memory, and be an unwearied solid man who is a lover of labour in any line, or he will never be able to undergo the double toil and trouble of body and mind. The mistake at present is, that those who study philosophy have no vocation, and this, as I was saying before, is the reason why she has fallen into disrepute ; her true sons should study her, and not bastards. Her votary should not have a lame or one-legged industry—I mean that he should not be half industrious and half idle ; as, for example, when a man is a lover of gymnastic and hunting and all other bodily exercises, but a hater, rather than a lover, of the labour of learning, or hearing, or inquiring."

It seems, then, as though it had been recognised since Plato's time, that philosophy must remain the most difficult of sciences, and as though the fact were one which it were useless to try to disguise by using language which lacks in precision and meaning, in proportion as it gains in popularity. Such language is no help but rather a hindrance. It is not really lucid. It is better to keep boldly and without apology to the well-worn terminology, clumsy as much of it is. As Seneca says: "*Mira in quibusdam rebus verborum proprietates est, et consuetudo sermonis antiqui quædam efficacissimis notis signat.*" Bearing this in mind let us once more, before recommencing our journey, take stock of our equipment for it.

I will begin by summing up, in fresh language, the conclusion of the first set of lectures. From the point at which they concluded I have to try to carry you yet a stage further, a stage which we must travel if we are to get a clear grasp of the theory, not merely of knowledge, but of practice. And this we cannot get unless we keep before our minds the result of the analysis of Ultimate Reality. That analysis brings us to the conception of Mind, present to itself in changing aspects, but, under whatever aspect, as the sole reality within which distinctions fall and change takes place, as singular, as individual, as unique, as all-embracing.

Knowledge is a supreme and ultimate fact. It is not to be explained as a phenomenon brought about by physical and physiological causes. The

facts of physics and physiology arise through distinctions drawn in knowledge. We ascend from matter to mind only to discover that it was in mind that matter first of all attained to meaning and existence.

The real world within and without me is individual, is always the unique, singular "this," and the individual, in which thought rests, is reality. Thought never passes beyond the singular, all-containing fact of reality, however it may transform it. Even when I pronounce one fact in experience to be different from that other, what I have done is to make a distinction *within* the subject of my judgment. The individual immediacy has been so far transformed by reflection that *within* it has been established a numerical distinction, and the true individual, the subject to which my next judgment will attach a predicate, of which it will proclaim a fresh "what," is the whole of that reality inside which a separation of a really abstract character has been established as a qualification of the original aspect of reality. If my experience is of myself as contrasted with what is not self, in like manner it is within the unique, all-inclusive, self-sustaining totality of the presentation by the mind of itself to itself that the contrast is established. A new aspect has emerged, that is all. Because the individual of experience is mind, and its nature is to be activity, it is never still, and the only fashion in which the varying aspects are fixed and held still is, as philosophers from the time of

Heraclitus to that of Mill have pointed out, through the abstractions of reflection. So only is the system evolved in which we must think our experience—so only does our Universe rise before us. It is not in so-called causes, but in the ends or purposes which the mind has before it in so reflecting, and in nothing short of these, that the reason is to be sought of the fixity of the appearance of the world as it seems, and of us as part of it. We are what we are in virtue of ends set before it by the Mind in which we live and move and have our being. Therein lies the reason why reality presents itself as set in just these and no other aspects. With the ends the aspects vary. As each end is real for mind, so does each aspect equally belong to reality. If ends co-exist, so must aspects co-exist. Every aspect of the world as it seems is real, if and so far as the end which is realised in it is real. The degrees of reality depend on the relation of the ends. If an end is superseded by a deeper purpose, the aspect to which the former gave being sinks to the level of mere appearance.

I know how hard all this is to grasp, and those of you who find it unintelligible I must refer back to the first six of the old lectures, where you have it worked out up to the point to which I now come. This point is that just as when we want to find out the nature of a particular science and the meaning of what it teaches, we must inquire into its method and categories, so it is in the

case of practice also. If we would know what the artist really says and does, or the good man, or the godly man, we must find out what his method is, and what are his dominating conceptions, and the ends which move him to act under them. Beauty, goodness, godliness, are all aspects in the world as it seems, aspects under which mind presents itself, aspects forming varying phases in which its individuality discloses itself to itself in what we call experience. The beautiful, for example, is an aspect in which experience comes to us, an aspect which we fix and preserve in universals of reflection. Can we then hope to be able to resolve it into such universals? Certainly not! Beauty is an aspect in which reality, always in form individual, discloses itself, and this unique individuality cannot be resolved into the universals which exist only in it and are separated out merely in abstraction. Beauty is one of the forms in which Mind recognises itself, and it belongs to the region of fact. Before reflection had played its part in isolating and fixing it, beauty was without meaning. A pig or a dog seems to know nothing of beauty. As Hegel has pointed out, it is only in so far as we *think* that we are capable of art, or morality, or religion. The extent to which each of us is capable of appreciating beauty depends on our capacity for conceptions and for the ends which lead us to choose them. The height to which mankind in general can rise in grasping the true, the beautiful, the good, depends on what

are the ends and capacity for conceptions of mankind. That is why the Universe appears as it does to us human beings, and not otherwise. The limited character of the ends which, in practice as in theory, our nature leads us to choose, divides us not only from God but from the world as it is for God. If we would get as near as we can to Him we must seek the highest forms of which human experience is capable. For these will point us beyond themselves, not to other human forms, for of these there will be none beyond, but to reality that lies beyond and gives them deeper meaning as stages towards such reality. We may be satisfied if we find that, in the light of a deeper understanding, what has troubled us, what has separated us from God, has been nothing that separated us wholly from Him, nothing with a self-subsisting and independent nature, but a set of distinctions which fall within our own selves, which have their hard-and-fast appearance because of our mental and spiritual limits, and which, whether they assume the aspect of our weakness or that of the grave that closes on us, are but appearance relatively to the reality which comprehension of the deeper meaning discloses. In the Ultimate Reality such appearances can be but transient, and it is only the finiteness of our powers of reflection that has made us fix them into a system from which we see no escape. This system is the system of what we call the actual. What is actual is experience. Experience is neither the universal nor the particular, but the combination

of the two in the individual presentation. Presentation gives us the actual. Now in presentation, and therefore in the actual, the transforming work of reflection, without which the individual presentation cannot be fixed for thought, operates in varying degrees. At times, as when we see colour or feel pleasure, the particular element of sensation predominates. At other times, as when we recognise as facts confronting us the institutions of the family or the state, the element of sense recedes, and what gives its meaning to reality is the dominating conception. Objectivity is here very plainly what we are forced to think. It is the feeling which is highly qualified through reflection that binds the parent to the child, and the citizen to the state. A family and a state may be objects in experience, actual individuals in direct presentation, but it is only for a thinking being that they are so. For a low type of intelligence and among low types of intelligence they are meaningless and do not exist. A cow may conceivably have some sort of self-consciousness, but watch the expression of its face and you will readily satisfy yourself that it has no religion, no sense of citizenship. The higher the capacity for thought, the wider the limits of what is actual, and the more apparently is it rational.

There appears to be also a varying limit at the other boundary, in the region of feeling. The capacity of our senses, the field of consciousness, may be much enlarged by sufficient suggestion to the subliminal self. Many of the phenomena of

hypnotism illustrate this. Such experiences as those of telepathy and thought-reading seem to depend on the relaxation of the normal inhibitions which restrain the capacity of the self for sensation. Yet the records of these phenomena and the little they assist us towards knowledge of the higher kinds, strikingly suggest that what we are overstepping is only the lower limit of feeling, within which the normal inhibitions of the self confine it, and not the upper limit of capacity to think. It is the shortcoming of mysticism that it takes feeling as such, with its barrenness of intellectual effort, to be sufficient as a form of reality. The strength of mysticism is its directly present particular of feeling. But this yields at best but the emotion which is no guide to truth, which has no basis in reflection or justification in reason. Mysticism has the defects of its qualities. Its power lies in its simplicity, the readiness to hand of its material. But valuable as is the sense of reality which that material brings, it is wanting in the depth and solidity which only a systematic form can give. And a systematic form can be the outcome of reason alone. The great fact of family life has its foundation in passion, passion transfigured, but yet in its origin sexual and sensual. It develops on a basis that is largely one of feeling and of instinct. But its deeper meaning, the form which pervades and moulds it, is one which depends upon a dominating end and conception, the organisation of the family in which parents and children alike

realise their lives in a social whole that is itself individual, as real as the individuals which are the members, as real as the cells for which the body forms the organic whole. To the eye which possesses sight, as well as to the eye of faith, the family is just as real a phenomenon as is the human body. Both are directly presented. When I say that I have met the *Fairchild* family, I mean something that I have seen, and not a mere succession or group of particular people. In the same way, when I say I have seen a living body, I mean more than a mere aggregate of cells. It is only relatively that the one is less directly presented than the other. The senses of a gnat might see in a human body only an aggregate of cells appearing to work in mechanical harmony of purpose. The coarse senses of the inhabitants of Brobdignag, directed upon Lilliput, might find the family more difficult to break up into its constituent members than a gnat may find the human body. Here, as in an infinity of other instances, the distinctions which occur in the field of perception, and which separate what appears as immediately given from what appears otherwise, depend on our particular measure of space and time. There is no hard-and-fast line of demarcation between what is directly and what is indirectly given. Nevertheless, there is for each of us a practical working line. Taking two phenomena, both of which lie on one side of it, the human family and the human body, while both are presented directly, they are presented with differing

degrees of distinctness. The former owes most to reflection, the latter most to sense, for beings at the same plane of intelligence.

There comes, indeed, not a definite point, for that never comes, but a region where we get from feeling the merest with which we start, to abstract universals of reflection which are never themselves presented as individual wholes, or as single or unique facts of experience. Such, as we saw before, are atoms and energy at the one end of the scale, and the Universe as a totality at the other end. Such are the past and the future by contrast with which the present is made definite in reflection. We become conscious even of our limits as individuals, and we thereby transcend them, by contrasting our presentation of ourselves as objects for ourselves with what we can construct in thought, but cannot directly experience. That which is so constructed is constructed abstractly, in universals only. Never does it present for us the universal combining with the particular to form the fact that is individual, unless, indeed, our inhibitions have been in some fashion and measure removed, and the region within which our faculty of presentation is confined has been extended. Why we are limited as we are we cannot tell further than this, that it is in virtue of our occupying just this definite plane in the self-comprehension of the absolute mind which is the foundation and final form of our reality. The ends which are in course of realising themselves, and in the self-realisation of which the plane of our intelligence

is a stage, are ends which our finite methods always hold out as lying beyond us, as to be reached by inference only, and when we do reach them thus inferentially we can describe what we reach only in either the abstract universals of speculative philosophy, or halting metaphors drawn from a lower sphere. We are what we are, and it is only at a level of intelligence that is incrustated with limitations arising from the finiteness of the purposes of our everyday life as men and women, that we reason at all. And yet reason takes us beyond ourselves, and in the highest phases of human self-consciousness tells us of much that lies beyond. Could we directly view the Universe *sub specie æternitatis* we should see beyond these limits. But if we could so view we should have become as God is.

Such is the conception, to which philosophy seems to have brought man, of the inmost nature of the content of his self-consciousness, of the world as it seems. That world lies between two limits, neither of which is, for man, reality. At the one extreme is what comes earliest in the time-history of our intelligence—feeling, feeling that cannot be defined, that is but material for the activity of intelligence to further fashion into the individual of sense. At the other extreme is what seems to be a sphere of mere reflection, the creatures of which exist only for abstract thought. Between these two limits lies the individual world of reality, never still and ever self-transforming, just because its

reality is mind the essence of which is spontaneous and self-originating activity. The aspects under which this world discloses itself vary in character according as they approach to the one limit or the other. But just because they are not self-subsisting things, numerically distinct, like marbles in a heap, but are aspects under which the real presents itself, they fall actually or potentially within the complex standpoint of human experience. Every phase of the world as it seems is real, though relatively to each other these phases are graded and possess degrees of reality. In the next five lectures we shall try to see something of their nature in such detail as space permits. To set out that nature fully would require a book no less great than the entire book of Life. But the outlines must disclose themselves, if the task of these lectures is to be accomplished. It is for Philosophy to pursue her narrow path to the summit, and there to join hands with Art, and Morality, and Religion. The accomplishment of this is for her the test of success. It is only when he finds that the world as it seems to the artist, to the good man, to the godly man, seems real to him also, that the philosopher has done his work.

In the first and second books of these lectures I showed you how the various ends after which knowledge in its different forms is striving, transform the real world. I carried the account down to the process of selective attention in the conscious human being. Now, just as in our consciousness

the appearance of our world is determined by our ends, so are we determined in our characters and actions as individuals by the ends which we seek to realise. The artist, the good man, the religious man, are what they are in virtue of the purposes which are constantly being embodied in their practice. On the distinction between these purposes depends the distinction between the worlds of these men. Just as when we know, what we know is fashioned by the conceptions under which we have organised our knowledge, so, when we act, what we do takes its character and significance from the ends which we have striven to realise in our actions.

Mind which is free in its choice *acts* under conceptions which it freely chooses, just as it *reflects* under such conceptions. "By their works ye shall know them." It is in works that Faith attains to life. It is in action that the spirit realises itself. In such action man may be an intelligent being as completely as in his thinking. Just in so far as his action is the embodiment of thought does it disclose itself as the individual in which reality is attained in the union of what is universal, so long as it remains in the region of mere purpose, with what is particular in the concrete execution of that purpose. Conduct which is moral embodies both end and means. It is not the having an idea that is wrong, it is the giving effect to it, even if such giving effect assumes only the form of allowing the mind to dwell on it.

It is of the nature of man as a thinking being to realise himself in a twofold fashion. The first of these fashions is theoretical. He seeks to organise the world of experience, as we saw in the first series of lectures, under conceptions in such a fashion as in the end to abolish its foreignness. He endeavours to find its reality in the *law*, which lies behind and gives meaning to phenomena, by dragging to light the universal which gives the individual its meaning and existence, and enables the mind to find itself even in the apparent externality of nature. The second fashion is that in which he alters his surroundings by what he *does*, and so stamps on them the impression of his personality. He may do this by making his surroundings, including his fellow-men, subordinate to his purpose of accumulating riches. He does it when he turns the material that is to his hand into clothes for himself, or makes others clothe him. Or he may do it, as the artist does, by making marble, or colour, or musical sound, or language the medium in which his self bodies itself forth. In all such cases the essential feature which gives its character to reality is the embodiment of purpose, the realisation of mind in the transformation of its material, its object world, into forms which are its own. In practice as in theory the task of mind is to find itself. In practice as in theory the completeness with which this is done depends on the capacity for thinking. It is, therefore, in their purposes, or the ends which they seek to realise,

that the distinctions between the various forms of practical activity must be sought. And these purposes or ends must be investigated, and their relations to each other established, by reference to the conceptions which govern them. In the world of action, no less than in the world of science, a criticism of categories is essential for clear knowledge.

We have an illustration of this truth in Art. The artist is essentially practical. What he wills and what he accomplishes is just a transformation of experience. His mastery over the sensuous forms, whether of sound, or of outline and colour, or of bronze and marble, or of language, enables him to set individual reality before us in new aspects. In these aspects we have the work of his will. He gives us an experience which he has himself fashioned, and its importance is that in it he enables us to have before us the individual as it is presented at the plane of his own mind. A scene in nature has in it an infinity of detail which is far beyond the reach of the brush, even of a Turner. But the artist does not copy nature. He presents nature as *he* has comprehended and set it in his own mind, and thereby he lifts us for the moment to his own level, a level at which the greatness of his mind becomes apparent to us.

Again, in a moral action we are conscious, as before us, of a plane of purpose which goes beyond that of the brute—purpose, it may be, which goes beyond that of the brute just in so far as it inspires

man to act on the footing of being more than a mere isolated and self-regarding individual, and as finding reality in a social whole of which he is a member.

So again in religion attention is concentrated on the relation of man to God, and the religious man is he whose will is constantly striving to give effect to purposes which are fashioned by this relationship. It is the old problem that confronts us, the problem of how the various aspects of life as it seems stand to one another. Just as in the earlier lectures I had, after defining the nature of Ultimate Reality, to set forth its phases as they appeared in the various sciences, so, later on, I shall have to try to touch upon its phases as they appear in the region of practice. But, as was pointed out in the tenth of the earlier lectures, the distinction between theory and practice is only a relative one, and its importance becomes less the deeper we penetrate into the meaning and nature of reality. For certain practical purposes we contrast thinking and willing, knowing and being. But the contrast exists for practical purposes only. That is to say, in thought as in action, the essence of what we do is to alter the individual fact of experience from which we start by giving it a new form, by introducing through the judgment, of which, in practice as well as theory, it is always the subject, a new qualification within its limits.

The task of philosophy, in this stage of the search after truth, is to express in language which

is as nearly as possible scientific what is implicitly present to the mind that reflects, but has been obscured by the incrustations that arise from habitual immersion in the language and metaphors of a lower plane. Even at that lower plane the man of the world finds himself confronted by :—

“Those obstinate questionings

Of sense and outward things,
 Fallings from us, vanishings,
 Blank misgivings of a Creature,
 Moving about in worlds not realised,
 High instincts before which our mortal nature
 Did tremble like a guilty thing surprised.
 But for those first affections,
 Those shadowy recollections,
 Which, be they what they may,
 Are yet the fountain light of all our day,
 Are yet a master light of all our seeing,
 Uphold us, cherish, and have power to make
 Our noisy years seem moments in the being
 Of the eternal Silence ; truths that wake,
 To perish never ;
 Which neither listlessness, nor mad endeavour,
 Nor man nor boy, nor all that is at enmity with joy,
 Can utterly abolish or destroy.”

Deep down in the hearts and brains of even those who seem to be most of all of the earth earthy, lie the impulses that make them men and women in a higher sense than any they express in words. In the surroundings that have slowly but surely grown up about us, in the manifestations of our corporate life as a nation, in the institutions without which no race of human beings counts itself civilised, we have the intimations of the existence that is more than one of rivalry in the assertion of

the individual will to live. The picture galleries, the schools, the hospitals, the Courts of Justice, the Parliament Houses, these and the like bear witness to the larger meaning of the life that is ours, and the deeper meaning that gives form to its experience. It is the Mind which is the foundation of that experience, and the various forms which that experience assumes under control by categories of thought which we have not yet examined, that must be the subject of the next five lectures.

LECTURE II

TO-DAY I have to start from the position that the Ultimate Reality is mind, and I have to ask you to go with me in an investigation of what the nature of mind is. Now this is perhaps the very hardest part of our task, and this lecture may prove the most difficult to follow. But it is a part of the undertaking which must be faced, and through which I must carry you as well as I can. Let us try to get together our materials, and let us begin by doing, what is always a useful thing when you want to find the meaning of a word, by trying to see what mind is not. Now mind is not—this is perfectly clear if the reasoning up to this stage be right—a *thing*. It is not a thing that is somewhere in the brain and is worked by the nerves or works the nerves. It is nothing with a locality, because it is that to which everything, not excepting the forms of space and time, presents itself. If we were to assume that mind was a thing having a locality in space and a place in time we should be driven to one of two conclusions. We should either end in materialism, or, at the other extreme, we should fall into what is even more difficult to

get out of than materialism, that which is called solipsism, the doctrine that existence is merely the being a set of the impressions or ideas of a particular individual object called the self. Bishop Berkeley, as Hume afterwards showed, got very near to this position. For him the mind was something which was acted upon by God, a mechanical God really, who operated upon it *ab extra*, and produced the impressions which made up the Universe of which the self was conscious. Well, it is clear that mind cannot be a thing with a locality in space and time.

Again an equally imperfect account of it is to describe it as a subject with an object of a foreign nature confronting it. By an object of a foreign nature I mean an object which does not fall within the mind itself. If you take that point of view, you will find it wholly impossible to explain how mind and its object ever get together, or how the object can have any meaning excepting in virtue of distinctions which obviously are the work of the mind itself. The characteristic of the mind is to be self-conscious, is to be active, is to be more like a life than like an inert substance. Its nature is self-conscious activity, and it is within that activity that all that is and all that can be falls.

Now, another misapprehension which we have to avoid is the exclusive identification of mind with any particular phase of mind, for instance, feeling. It is only by abstraction that feeling is put on one side and thought is put on the other. Mind is just

as much feeling as it is thought, and it is just as much thought as it is feeling, because thought and feeling, as here distinguished, are merely two of the aspects in which the living self-conscious individual mind manifests itself as activity. It is in reflection only and for purposes that are special that we break up the activity in which mind consists, activity that is final and ultimate, into the contrasted aspects of the discursive thought which relates terms, and the supposed immediacy of particular feeling. Idealism has been brought at times into disrepute by want of attention to the fact that the distinction is an artificial one.

Now we come to another point. All the phenomena which are before the mind appear before it as successive and so in time, and many of them appear also as in space. But it is plain that these phenomena present that aspect only *for* the mind. In our everyday conversation we ignore the relation of the mind as subject to its object. We speak of the object world as if it were something self-subsisting, and that is how we come to talk of time and space as if they were self-subsisting and finite forms of reality. It is quite right that we should do that for everyday practical purposes. You and I live in this world, and we have to deal with each other as human beings, as citizens of a state, as members of a family, as lecturer and audience. In these relations we have to contemplate ourselves from a standpoint where it is necessary to make clear the distinction between our personalities, and

so it is that for social purposes we come to make distinctions which lead us to treat ourselves as if we were so many different minds and so many different living things. That is a standpoint which represents truth, measured by the purposes which we have in view, but it is not a standpoint from which the final word can be said about the nature of reality. The phenomena of the mind are phenomena which are there *for* the mind, and the general relations in which they appear, space and time, are just relations of what comes before the mind, and are therefore themselves distinctions which the mind itself makes, and which exist only in so far as the mind presents things to itself.

Now, to some extent we see that this is so when we look at even very familiar illustrations. What is called the "tempo" of different kinds of mind, the measure of time, is different. We can conceive beings for whom a thousand years is as one day, and beings for whom one day is as a thousand years. Take an animal with very fine senses; for example, a gnat in all probability possesses such senses. To a gnat an explosion may seem to occupy a definite time, whereas to a creature with a less finely organised sense of hearing the explosion may seem to occupy but an instant. There are some ingenious calculations by Von Baer on the effect of differences in the amount of duration felt, and in the fineness of the events that may fill it. If we were able, within the length of a second, to note ten thousand events distinctly instead of ten as

now; if our life were then destined to hold the same number of impressions, it might be one thousand times as short. We should live less than a month, and personally know nothing of the change of seasons. If born in winter, we should believe in summer as we now believe in the heats of our carboniferous era. The motions of organic beings would be so slow to our senses as to be inferred, not seen. The sun would stand still in the sky, the moon be almost free from change, and so on. And now reverse the hypothesis, and suppose a being to get only 1000th part of the sensations that we get in a given time, and consequently to live 1000th times as long. Winters and summers will be to him like quarters of an hour. Mushrooms and the swifter growing plants will shoot into being so rapidly as to appear instantaneous creations; annual shrubs will rise and fall from the earth like restlessly boiling water springs; the motions of animals will be as invisible as are to us the movements of bullets and cannon balls; the sun will scour through the sky like a meteor, leaving a fiery trail behind him.*

Now I come to another point. If time be a relation in which things are presented for the mind, if it be, as it were, just the form of such presentation, then thought must take account of another relation in which the contents of the mind stand to one another. It is conceivable, for instance, that what is first in time may, in a deeper view of

* See James' *Principles of Psychology* vol. i., p. 639.

reality, become logically last, and conversely that what is logically last may become, in the deeper sense, first in time. Take the notion of the mind in comprehending phenomena as successive. One phenomenon comes after another, and we trace the connection, and if we are psychologists we trace the succession of forms back to their origin as suggestions of the senses and as constructions of the intelligence. But it is plain that, although in this way we get last of all to the mind, the mind must have been presupposed as the very condition without which that succession of phenomena, which are there as its object, could not have taken place. Our very psychological analysis leads us to see that the mind must be presupposed before there can be any possibility of such succession ; and, therefore, in the deeper meaning of things, in the fuller view of truth, the mind must come logically first, although it is reached last as a presentation in the psychological analysis which only takes account of the history in time. In that way there comes to be a fuller view of things, and a view of things in which we see mind as the ultimate truth, and the ultimate truth in the sense that things presuppose mind instead of mind presupposing things. If the activity of thought be the condition without which it is impossible to attach any meaning to the notion of the object world of phenomena, presented as arranged in space and as successive in time, then mind must be logically first, whatever the nature of the time series, and the final view of things must be the

view in which they owe the very meaning of their reality to the mind.

In the course of these lectures I have tried from time to time to illustrate to you metaphysical truths from the insight—and often it is very great—of the poets and the artists, and I have quoted to you various illustrations of how the poets in particular have seen, as it were by an intuition of genius, into the very metaphysical conclusions which we have been straining after with so much difficulty. This is true of the topic with which I am now engaged. I am going to quote to you, not a poet in the technical sense, but one who was a poet in a very real sense, I mean Carlyle. In *Sartor Resartus*, in his chapter on “Clothes,” Carlyle makes Teufelsdröckh say:—“With men of a speculative turn there come seasons, meditative, sweet, yet awful hours, when in wonder and fear you ask yourself that unanswerable question: Who am I; the thing that can say ‘I’ (*Das Wesen das sich Ich nennt*)? The world with its loud trafficking retires into the distance; and through the paper-hangings and stone walls, and thick plied tissues of Commerce and Polity, and all the living and lifeless integuments (of Society and a Body) wherewith your existence sits surrounded—the sight reaches forth into the void Deep, and you are alone with the Universe, and commune with it, as one mysterious Presence with another.”

“Who am I; what is this Me! A Voice, a Motion, an Appearance;—some embodied visualised

Idea in the Eternal Mind? *Cogito ergo sum*. . . .
 Has not a deeper meditation taught certain, of
 every climate and age, that the Where and the
 When, so mysteriously inseparable from all our
 thoughts, are but superficial terrestrial adhesions
 to thought; that the Seer may discern them where
 they mount up out of the celestial Everywhere and
 Forever; have not all nations conceived their God
 as Omnipresent and Eternal; as existing in a
 universal Here and everlasting Now? I think,
 well, thou too wilt find that Space is but a mode
 of an human sense, so likewise Time; there is no
 Space and no Time; we are—we know not what;
 —like sparkles floating in the æther of Deity.

“So that this so solid-seeming World, after all,
 were but an air image, our Me the only reality;
 and nature, with its thousand-fold production and
 destruction, but the reflex of our own inward Force,
 the ‘phantasy of our Dream’; or what the Earth
 Spirit in *Faust* names it, *the living visible Garment*
of God:

‘In Beings floods, in Actions storm
 I walk and work, above, beneath,
 Work and weave in endless motion!
 Birth and Death
 An infinite Ocean;
 A seizing and giving
 The fire of the Living;
 ’Tis thus at the roaring Loom of Time I ply,
 And weave for *God the Garment* thou see’st Him by.’

Of twenty millions that have read and spouted
 this thunder-speech of the Erdgeist, are there yet

twenty units of us that have learned the meaning thereof!"

Well, if Mind be that into which all these distinctions, including the distinctions which go to the making of presentation in space and time, fall, there is a deeper view of evolution than any with which people are ordinarily familiar. If the process of succession in time be but a process that falls within the sphere of presentation by the mind to the mind, and if the last in time be nevertheless the first in logic, then if we would comprehend the true meaning of evolution we must seek it in the ends which the mind realises in its processes. We must seek it in the stages of comprehension, or rather of self-comprehension, of the mind. It is only another way of stating all this to say that it is just as set in the universals of reflection, as Aristotle long ago showed, that the particulars of feeling have existence. I quoted to you in the first lecture last year Mill's analysis of existence into the permanent possibilities of sensation, an analysis which he extended to the mind just as he had applied it to the external world. It is these permanent possibilities, the universals in which the particulars are set, and in union with which, they alone come to reality, that give its true meaning to existence. Not that the universals and the particulars can be separated — Aristotle long ago showed that they have no existence independent of one another—but they are moments, factors in the ultimate reality, and it is only in reflection that we come to dis-

tinguish them. Yet in reflection we *do* distinguish them ; we do distinguish feeling, for instance, from thought. The psychologist Münsterberg, in a book which I quoted to you last year, shows that the method, or one of the methods of his science, is what he calls Presentationism, the seizing upon feeling and by a sort of abstraction converting it into a self-subsisting phenomenon divorced from the movement of reflection which gives it its meaning. Just as you may hypostatise feeling by abstraction, so you may hypostatise thought by abstraction. Hegel points out that it is the doing this which has caused one of the chief difficulties which people experience in trying to understand the method of philosophy. They *will* imagine, following the tendency to make hard and abstract distinctions which is so prevalent in everyday life, that thought is something which can be taken apart from its content, that thought and feeling, for instance, can be separated as two different existences, whereas the truth is that it is only in reflection that the distinction emerges. The objective system in which we perceive reality is neither the one nor the other, but the reality in which both attain their meaning, and it is not possible to separate the one from the other except in abstract reflection.

Now, another conclusion to which one comes in this connection is that mind as the ultimate factor, the ultimate reality within which all these distinctions fall because it has itself made them, can only be described in terms of itself. That is one of the

difficulties we have in trying to give an account of mind. We are dealing with what is the ultimately real and cannot be expressed in terms of anything lying beyond itself, and therefore it is that we must go back and simply set our own mind to observe itself and record its observations in a fashion which is free from the hypostatised abstractions and metaphors which pass current in everyday life. The mind is obviously that which makes its own distinctions, and it is its essential character to make these distinctions. It must make its own distinctions, and make them, not as a mere movement of universals, but as a concrete living reality, whose very nature is to be active, and whose characteristic it is to be always setting, as it were, its own forms, its own activities, and so giving them an air of having an existence fixed in independence of each other; while, at the same time, it comprehends them in a larger whole in which they are seen to be there only as factors or moments. I shall get to that point presently, and I wish merely to make it at the present stage.

Now let us see how this fact has been recognised, not only by the metaphysicians, but again by the poets. I have quoted to you Carlyle, as showing how a person of great imaginative insight had come to the conclusion, not as matter of speculation but as matter of direct insight, that the ultimate reality of existence was to be sought in mind, and therefore had not that hard-and-fast character which is so baffling to the persons who

want to penetrate beneath the hard crust of this world of appearances. But you have got the same truth set forth by those who are in the stricter sense the poets. I quoted to you once before Wordsworth's Sonnet on the River Duddon. I will quote it again, because it shows how Wordsworth, who had a fine metaphysical insight, saw that what was real and distinctive in his vision of the stream, was not the particular particles of water which floated by—the actual water was always changing—but the form in which the stream was comprehended as a whole :

“For, backward, Duddon, as I cast my eyes,
I see what was, and is, and will abide.
Still glides the stream, and shall for ever glide;
The Form remains, the Function never dies.”

It is only for the mind that is capable of contemplating the stream as a whole that it can present that form and function. But there is a poet who has had a finer insight even than Wordsworth into the deeper nature of phenomena, that nature which discloses them as constantly changing and as presenting their continuity only in the wholes into which thought binds them. Goethe in his poem, “Eins und Alles,” says :

“Nur scheinbar steht's momente still,
Das Ewig'regt sich fort in allen;
Denn Alles muss in nichts zerfallen,
Wenn es im Sein beharren will.”

“Only in seeming stands the moment still,
In all the Eternal is in motion,
For all that is must change to nothing,
If to existence it would hold and be.”

Well, the poets and the philosophers have come to the same conclusion about this matter. There is no more difficulty in rising to the conception of the real nature of things as falling within the mind, and as possessing its characteristics, than there is in topics which we have to examine every day. For instance, I have already discussed the difference between life and mechanism. You cannot express the nature of a living body in mechanical terms. You must speak of it in words which recognise a whole that controls its parts, not as from without, but as what determines the behaviour of the parts from within, and makes the cells of which the organism is composed more like soldiers in an army with a common purpose, than like the wheels and cranks of a machine which are external to one another and only held together by outside compulsion. In the organism you are lifted into a new set of conceptions which were wholly foreign when you were dealing with mere mechanism, and so, when in mind you are lifted to the conception of that which presents itself to itself, to what has meaning only in terms of distinctions which it makes for itself, you are not really dealing with anything more extraordinary than you were dealing with when you made the transition from the machine to the living organism.

We found in the last set of lectures that the old chase after the meaning of the self proved a hopeless one, so far as the method of psychology was concerned. We found that in the pursuit of the

self we baled out part after part of the content until we could find nothing that we could say really belonged to the self. Where we emerged nearest to it, where we seemed to get something which expressed the self although it was not the self or even what was popularly called the self, was in the soul. But, when we came to examine the nature of the soul, we found that the soul was nothing but what we had before regarded as the body, though in a different aspect. That did not cause us apprehension of being landed in materialism, because we had got away from the notion of these two things as substances, of the one depending upon the other for its existence in some mechanical fashion. We found in the soul, first an aspect of that which in a different aspect was called the body, and then we discovered that it implied body just as much as body implied soul. These two presentations rather seemed to be two elements or factors which were required in order that in comprehending them we might get to the notion of a self of which they were the expression, and which was their truth. The self, in so far as we can get near it psychologically, that is to say, by looking into our own bosoms, seems to imply a soul and a body, and yet these two, the one of which hampers the other—for the body is never adequate to the soul—get into a sort of contradiction and prove difficult to harmonise. The body is more than a mere living organism. There is something more that is characteristic of it as a body than there is in a mere external living

thing. It is a living organism that feels, that behaves intelligently, and when we say that it feels and behaves intelligently we mean that it is the manifestation of a self. The soul is just that aspect of the body in which it feels and behaves intelligently. The body and the soul are of course in time, the body at least in space also, and that means that they are presentations made by the mind. But the mind does more than merely present them to itself. In so far as it recognises them as sentient and as intelligent it recognises them as its own, as aspects of the individual of reality within which emerge all the distinctions which are made within self-consciousness.

Now this conception arises really as the result of the deeper kind of evolution of which I spoke before, the logical chain in which the first in time is the last in thought. The order in time is here the inverse of the order in Logic. It may well be, and analysis shows that it is so, that the distinction of soul from body and the distinction of the self from the not-self are distinctions which exist only for the mind, and because they are *for* the mind are made by the mind. As self-consciousness is discovered to be the larger whole in which these are moments, we get a view of things in which we see that the relation of our own soul and body is a relation which perplexes and puzzles us merely because we have grasped it in abstractions and distinctions which we have made hard, because for practical purposes it was necessary that we should make them hard.

Now this point is worth spending a moment or two in elaborating. The soul seems to be that aspect of our experience as persons in which we do not yet fully contemplate the content of the mind from the standpoint of self-consciousness, and in which we have abstracted from the freedom and power of detachment which are the characteristics of self-consciousness. It seems to be distinctive of full self-consciousness that it should be recognised as able to extrude and exclude any particular part of its content. That is why it was that we found that we could never get psychologically at the notion of the self. In the soul we have the body on its ideal side, separable from the body only in abstract reflection. The body as such is its vehicle, and it may be said to be in a sense a function of the body. They are factors, each of them, or moments, which go to the making of the conscious self, since they are only *for* that self. The more they are made the expression of that self-consciousness the more they disclose themselves as inadequate, as lacking in that quality of being above and beyond change which belongs only to the self as subject, as no more than presentations destined to be superseded in a larger comprehension by the consciousness *for* which space and time, and body and soul as in space and time, are. Death is inherent in them just because their nature is to be transient, to belong to a world of phenomena where birth and growth and decay and dying, are not only the natural but the necessary features of an existence

that more and more exemplifies the contradiction that discloses itself, wherever mere life as object in a space and time world is taken to be the ultimate aspect of reality. The real existence out of time begins not beyond the grave but on this side of it. The self, conscious of itself as the subject for which the world exists, solves the contradiction, the want of harmony between the soul and its imperfect vehicle, body, in that it is aware that both exist merely as relational and as forms within its own object world.

Now this process of soul and body, existing in change and always working out, as it were, the contradiction between them, is exemplified in the course of life. A child starts with a sense of something that is foreign to it, that resists it. As reflection dawns in its soul, it begins more and more to exercise self-control and to act rationally. More and more it makes its body conform to and express the purposes of its mind. As it grows up it becomes aware of itself as a rational being in rational society and with rational surroundings. But although the course of life is just, as it were, the equation of the child's body to its soul, and of both to the surroundings, you find that, as the result of the habit into which the struggle and the victory over obstacles crystallise, a certain deadening inevitably ensues. And the course of life is just that the activity of the child more and more assumes the form of habit, until in middle age and still more in old age, soul and body tend to become inert. The sense of

foreignness which was the spring of exertion is gone, with the consequence that there is less vitality, less activity, than there was in the period of the early struggle. Thus we pass through middle age and old age to our natural end as objects in a world of change.

In a fine passage in his *Philosophy of Mind* Hegel shows how the process is exemplified in the life of man, and how that life works out under the governance of an end. "He begins with *childhood*, the mind wrapped up in itself. His next step is the fully developed antithesis, the strain and struggle of a universality which is still subjective (as seen in ideals, fancies, hopes, ambitions) against his immediate individuality. And that individuality marks both the world which, as it exists, fails to meet his ideal requirements, and the position of the individual himself, who is still short of independence and not fully equipped for the part he has to play (that is to say, *Youth*). Thirdly, we see Man in his true relation to his environment, recognising the objective necessity and reasonableness of the world as he finds it—a world no longer incomplete, but able in the work which it collectively achieves to afford the individual a place and a security for his performance. By his share in this collective work he is first, is *somebody*, gaining an effective existence and an objective value (that is to say, *Manhood*). Last of all comes the finishing touch to his unity with objectivity; a unity which, while on its realist side it passes into the inertia

of deadening habit, on its idealist side gains freedom from the limited interests and entanglements of the outward present (that is to say, *Old Age*).” *

You will find in connection with this matter a great deal of literature which belongs to the province of anthropology, and I will not follow it out further at this stage, but the point is illustrative of the main topic of this particular lecture.

Well, as the outcome of that way of looking at things, one is driven to the conclusion that self-consciousness is the larger whole in which body and soul are what I have called moments. In other words, it is in the union of these two aspects in the reality which they attain in the mind which is more than mere soul, because mind is that *for* which soul and body are, that you get to reality. And the question which arises is whether, if it is of the nature of self-consciousness that it should be something more than mere soul, just as it is something more than mere body, if it is the *truth* of the two, these moments are or are not so preserved in it that self-consciousness itself bears the impress of the particular human personality which the body and soul expressed? Now, in the relationship of two notions such as *being* and *not-being* you find that the one implies the other; and further, that, as we shall see presently, the whole out of which they are

* Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind*; Wallace's Translation, p. 17. See also Erdmann, *Leib und Seele*; and Bosanquet, *Psychology of the Moral Self*; the *Natur-Philosophie* of Hegel contains in its final section a discussion of this point.

broken up, and in which they attain reality, is *becoming*. Becoming, which assumes the form of qualified being or *there-being*, is a notion which has not wholly destroyed and got rid of these two earlier moments, but preserves them as factors or moments in itself and shows the traces of them. Well, upon that there turned at one time a tremendous controversy. Do not the two moments of our individuality, what make us just *this* particular person in the world, do not the particular body and soul, that seem to be essential moments in the self just as being and not-being are preserved in becoming, show themselves as implied and as kept alive in that larger whole of the conscious self which is their truth? Now this controversy is a very important one. A modern writer, Professor Royce, puts it that no meaning which has once been in the mind of God can ever be lost. He says that it is only when you are dealing with the sphere of space and time that you can talk of loss, of perishing, of passing away, and that when you are talking of what is out of time, of mind as the eternal, even the moments which are implied in its self-expression, and which give particularity to its meaning, are moments which must be said to be, not preserved by, for that is no better than to speak of them as having a beginning in time, but essential elements in the mind which is presupposed as the very condition of the beginning and is independent of the end.

As Royce puts it, "Can any meaning which has once been in the eternal mind be otherwise than

eternal?" Can any mode of self-consciousness which enters into the truth and reality of the self be otherwise than of the nature of the eternal? Now, all I wish to say at the moment on this is that it recalls a long-forgotten battlefield. After the death of Hegel there was a tremendous controversy between the Hegelians of the Right, the theological Hegelians, and the Hegelians of the Left, over this very point. Those of you who are curious about it—and it has, as we shall see better later on, a bearing upon the question of immortality—will find an account of it in the last part of Strauss's *Dogmatik*.^{*} As far as I can judge, Hegel himself regarded the controversy as really irrelevant and founded on failure to grasp the subject in its full bearing. He seems to have looked upon the problem as based upon dilemmas arising out of a too narrow standpoint. For him the whole controversy apparently had its origin in mistaken metaphors drawn from the sphere where there are beginnings and ends, the sphere of time.

Well, we come back to consider further what we mean by the self. Another characteristic of the self to which I must now pass is this, that it is undoubtedly presented for us men and women as finite. By finite I mean limited by or confronted with something else. When in thinking we fix an object in thought and try to preserve a clear view of the distinction which has been made, we effect

^{*} Published under the title, *Die Christliche Glaubens-lehré*, in 1841; see vol. ii., pp. 727-739.

an abstraction, that is to say, we regard our object as if it were something self-subsisting and distinguished from what is not itself. The finite is that which is confronted by another which is conceived as having existence only relatively to yet another, and it is this mode of thinking, really abstract in character, which gives us the notion of the finite self, the notion namely, that we can talk of self as we do for practical purposes, and regard it as something which has a fixed and immovable nature, and which is different and distinct from the not-self.

But you will notice that it is always *my* not-self that I distinguish myself from. It is a not-self which is determined in its conception by the marks by which I characterise it for the social purposes of everyday life. We, of course, must make these distinctions, but they are really abstract and they are the outcome of reflection which might theoretically have been of a nature quite different. And it is the self looked upon in this finite fashion, that is to say, as confronted with another, that gives rise to the notion of the self as a substance, and so to the Berkeleian notion of a thinking thing. Now this notion of the mind as a substance brings us into solipsism. There is no escape from it if the mind is really a thing in space and time. But, to make these abstract distinctions, as we undoubtedly must do, is only one side of the activity of thought. What it divides it also puts together. If it recognises a limit and fixes a limit, it also transcends

that limit. If you watch the movement of thought it is always fixing something in reference to something else, and yet, in recognising it as distinguished from something else, it implies that there is a higher standpoint from which the two may be contemplated. It posits, as it were, in distinction, and then the distinction which it has made it recognises as having its truth in a deeper meaning, and the distinction comes in that way to be put past or sublated.

Now thought can combine these two functions, because its nature, the very essence of its nature, is to be active. The mind, which is neither abstract thought nor bare feeling, but which is just concrete living mind, is never still. It is always producing by the contrasts it establishes some aspect of what is actual within itself, and it has its very existence in making these distinctions, overcoming them, and presenting the whole in a further series of aspects. The illustration which I gave you before of the inseparability, save in abstraction, of being and not-being, is a good one on this point. A great many people, like the late Mr G. H. Lewes, fell foul of Hegel for saying that being and not-being were the same thing, and, of course, they are, *for practical purposes*, different things. But when you are investigating the nature of the movement of thought in the distinctions which it makes, it is pretty evident that the conception of the thing only has meaning in contradistinction to the alternative that the thing is not. When you take the process of

growth, of change, of what is called becoming, it is plain that you have just these two notions in combination. In every definite kind or form of being you have got these two conceptions of being and not-being implied. All distinctive quality involves them. The reality of the mind is its activity, and the activity is an activity which posits or sets these distinctions and then overcomes them.

Now that brings me to what I must say a word about, the distinction between what have been called reason and understanding. Reason is the way of looking at things which *comprehends*, while understanding merely *apprehends*. They are not two different faculties. It is only darkening counsel to speak of them as though they were. They are two different modes of thinking about things, determined in their differences by the purposes which we have in view. If I want to make a hard-and-fast distinction it is, of course, natural that I should express myself in a way that makes the distinction very definite, hypostatizes it, if I may use the expression. But if, upon the other hand, what I want to do is really to see how this distinction looks from the point of view of the mind which made it, and which, just because it made it, is capable of expressing it, then I look from the standpoint of the comprehension which seeks to resolve the differences. Reason is, therefore, a way of looking at things which is larger than the mere understanding which made and set fast the differentiation. Reason and understanding are not thoughts of two

different natures, two faculties. They are thought pursuing different ends. We make our own experience present different appearances according as our ends differ. That is a very familiar observation. Long ago Montaigne put it in one of his Essays, that on Democritus and Heraclitus, in very simple language. "Wherefore," he says, "let us no longer excuse ourselves by laying the blame on the quality of external things. It belongs to us to give ourselves an account of them. Our good and our evil had no dependency except from ourselves. To ourselves let us make our offerings and our vows, and not to fortune. She hath no power over our character. On the contrary, character draws fortune in its train, and moulds her to its own form." In other words, what to the man whose spirit is cast in a narrow mould seems final and irresolvable in ill-fortune, may seem to the man of larger comprehension a very different thing. It depends on our end and purpose, it depends on whether we are at the standpoint of comprehension or merely of apprehension in difference, how the things present themselves.

Well, the essence of understanding is to separate. If I look at marbles in a row my purpose is to count them, to enumerate them, and therefore I am seeking to apprehend them, each in its difference from the other. If I am trying to comprehend I do not dwell upon the distinctions, but I search for the larger whole, the unity in which the differences are comprehended. Now for apprehension, for

understanding, the leading mode of operation is distinction in space and in time. Between space and time there is a considerable difference. In space things are regarded as just as completely independent of one another as they can possibly be. The very essence of space is mutual exclusion of parts. You have got the very hardest of distinctions there. But in time the now only has meaning as distinguished from a past and from a future. These never co-exist. The essence of them is that the one should be actual and real in contrast with the other two, the past and the future, which are not actual. Therefore in time you have got a stage on towards comprehension, towards the comprehension of the past, the present, and the future as in a unity in which they are not independent but related, and which is more than any one of them. Just so in a piece of music you have the notes, no doubt capable of being taken in their separation, but also getting their meaning, and each one getting its meaning, from the musical whole which is the form in which full comprehension appears.

Now the truth about space and time is that they are modes in which the mind presents phenomena, space the hardest and most abstract form of distinction, time the form in which that distinction is less hard and abstract, but is still one in which separations are made. But it is plain, if the view of thought which I have been presenting to you is right, that thought not only must have, but actually has, other and higher forms, from the

standpoint of which presentation in space and time is deficient and inadequate to the truth. Such a view of space as one among a multitude of other relations in reality contrasts a good deal with that with which those of you who have read Kant are familiar. Kant looked upon space and time as two forms which had an existence independent of the matter of sensation, the raw material of sensation, which was fitted into them by reflection. The raw material, and the space and time, and the thought which operated in the arranging raw material in space and time, he at least spoke of as if they were separable elements. But if the true view be, not that the mind thinks things as though arranging them *ab extra* in the forms of space and time, but that the forms of space and time are merely stages or aspects in the mode of self-comprehension by the mind within which the whole of reality falls, then it is plain that it is not quite accurate to talk of space and time as specially forms. They are not separable from the other modes in which the mind arranges its contents. Their position is just like that of other modes of presentation in the mind. In the mind, understood as mind, taken from the standpoint of comprehension, we cannot fail to be struck with this, that it is present in everything it does, and yet that everything it does, the whole of its activity, only has meaning as part of the entirety of the mind. Whole and parts are not separate, as they are even in the organism, where the realisation of the whole in the parts is

never quite complete ; but in the mind its activity in any particular mode is an activity which implies the entire mind. Look, for instance, at the thinking of things as cause and effect. You cannot separate these two. If you apply the match to the gunpowder it seems as if there were two separate things, one cause and the other effect, but it is not so when you come to scrutinise closely. What you have done in applying the match is to release the potential energy which is stored up in the gunpowder, and if it is said that the match is the true cause of the explosion, the answer is that the dryness of the powder and a host of other indispensable conditions might, with equal truth and untruth, be selected for the distinction of being pronounced the cause.

Cause and effect, as I showed you in detail in the earlier lectures, are conceptions which are separable only in abstraction. The cause in point of fact passes into the effect, and the effect is just the cause in another form ; that is to say, the mind makes a distinction which turns out to be a vanishing one as the purpose changes. The conceptions in which the mind works are always in a sense vanishing. They are never really separate from one another in a hard-and-fast fashion. The nature of the mind is to be active, to posit its distinctions and then to resolve them, and the result is that every one of its conceptions involves every other. If I say that a thing is, I mean that it is in contrast to the possi-

bility that it is not. If I say that a thing is growing or becoming, I imply that not-being has become superseded in a higher stage of its being. The essence of the mind is a form of activity in which each conception implies the other, and in which the conceptions or categories under which the mind arranges and gives meaning to its experiences, the universals in which the particulars are grasped in the individual, are a logical chain in which the first presupposes the last and the last is its presupposition and its truth. Therefore a great task of theoretical philosophy, when dealing with the meaning of these conceptions of the mind, must be to set them out in a system.

Now the relation to each other of these conceptions, when they are set out in such a system, is, as I have pointed out to you, not the relation of dead inert separation, but the relation of conceptions each of which implies the other, and, as we are dealing with thought and the distinctions made by thought, each of which in that sense passes into the other. We find that thought never stands still. It is always active, even its fixing of distinctions is activity. Its characteristic has, therefore, been said to be *dialectical*. Dialectic is just the movement which thought exhibits in the passing from one position to another. Plato's *Parmenides* is the Dialogue in which he sets out the nature of thought, and pronounces it to be dialectical in the sense I have indicated, but just, because he is dealing there with perhaps the most difficult part of philosophy,

the *Parmenides* is the Dialogue which it is hardest to summarise or give a short account of. Hegel does the same work much more closely in his *Logic*. He is not trying in his *Logic* to set out a picture of the world; he is not trying to show the world as rising out of thought, as people have wrongly supposed. He is isolating the abstract side of the actual. He is taking the modes in which thought operates in comprehending, and he is showing their relation the one to the other. He is really starting from the individual of reality and by abstraction exhibiting it upon its universal side. He does not mean that in his *Logic* you have got a series of logical forms, a sort of "ballet of bloodless categories" as Mr Bradley has named them, which exist by themselves and which give us, as self-subsistent, what, to use a phrase of his, is God as He was before the creation of the world. What he means is to take one aspect of reality, of the concrete individual entirety of reality, to separate it out by abstraction, and to exhibit mind in the aspect in which, just because it is the aspect of pure thought that he is here dealing with, the activity of the dialectic is most apparent. Hegel's categories are not, like Plato's, to be conceived as in some sense apart from our experiences. They are just what gives meaning to our experience, and it is only in reflection that they can be separated out from the concrete reality of experience. The linking of one to the other by the inherent dialectic of which they are the manifestation, Hegel calls the Notion,

and the entire system the Idea. This is the purest type of an abstract treatment of the movement of thought, and it forms the subject of the Hegelian Logic.

Hegel has been blamed by many people because they say he has not shown how he got from Logic to Nature. But the categories of his Logic do not form one thing, with Nature as another thing independent of it. Hegel was not trying to show a process of creation. He was exhibiting two partial and therefore abstract views of a deeper and fuller reality; he was setting out on its abstract side the ultimate reality which for him was mind in its concrete actuality. The element that pertains to Nature, the element that corresponds to the particular in its relation to the universal, is got at in another abstract way of looking at the real. To this he accords a separate treatment in his systematic account of the place of nature in mind, in the same way as he had separated out the antithetical abstract side in the Logic. Neither is actual independently of the other, and, therefore, to talk of a transition in time from one to the other, is simply to show that you have not understood the elementary meaning of the Hegelian system.

The nature of thought is, as I have several times said, to make distinctions and to reconcile them in a higher meaning. If we dwell on the distinctions abstractly, we get the finite. If we dwell upon the self in its distinction from other selves in this world, as we must do for our own

social purposes, we get the notion of the finite self. But the true notion of infinity is not an infinity which is numerically different from the finite self, but it is the self conceived as higher than the distinctions which go to the making of its finiteness, distinctions which therefore really fall within it. That view of infinity, the view of the self as that within which all distinctions emerge — that view leads us to the conception of mind as the ultimately real, and of the finite self as one only of the stages at which mind comprehends its own content. It leads us to a view of mind in which we are beyond the category of substance, and are therefore delivered from the perils of solipsism. It brings us to living, concrete, self-conscious mind. The more exact relation of this to finite mind is what I shall have to deal with in the next lecture.

LECTURE III

To those of you who listened to my last lecture it will be apparent that I am not satisfied with a view of reality which would reduce it to intelligible relations. For it must seek its ultimate character in a form fuller than the finite form of relational or discursive reflection. It is only in the abstraction of such reflection that these intelligible relations, as they have been called, get isolated from the moment of the particular, the particular in combination with which they form the concrete living singular, which appears as the content of mind or as the self-comprehension of mind, according to the fashion in which we are approaching it. The activity of mind which is disclosed in the actual is one and indivisible. If we would arrive at the nature and character of mind we must therefore start with this activity as being not only the final truth about the mind, but as being that which in reality is the first, the *prius*. The contrary view is a view which is associated in the history of philosophy with the great name of Kant, because more and more people are coming to see that what Kant really did was to set the actual

upon the rack, so to speak, and tear it to pieces. If the view of things which I have been putting before you is the true one, all mind can do is, starting with what is in reality itself, to make explicit what is implicit. Now according to Kant knowledge was a process which could be dissected and broken up. He took the unity of ultimate reality and he sought to resolve it into constituent elements. He seems to have put the wrong question. It should not have been the question, "What is the process of perception in which reality is put together," but rather "What is the meaning of reality?"

Well, the result has been a very considerable reaction from the standpoint of ordinary Idealism within our time, and I think that it is not too much to say that this reaction has been due to the repellent influence of Kant on some who are not Kantians. In this country one of the most strenuous of those who have advocated what is a view inconsistent with that of Kant is Mr F. H. Bradley, a very great thinker. In Mr Bradley's view mind is the final form of reality, but he is unable to come to the conclusion that its nature can be comprehended by thought—thought being for him, as he holds, relational only, that is, its function being to establish relations between terms that are not in themselves reducible to mere thought. He holds that it is impossible that thought should tell us the final truth about reality. He apparently believes that it is conceivable that there should be other

elements in the activity of mind besides thought—for example, feeling. Now if I am right in what I have been saying to you, feeling is nothing apart from thinking, just as thinking is nothing apart from feeling. In each you certainly have the dialectical character of the activity of mind bodying itself forth. The dialectical *nisus* is apparent whichever aspect you take, and that is owing to the fact that this dialectical *nisus* or activity is of the very essence, the very inmost nature of mind itself. It is possible that the scepticism of Mr Bradley is the outcome of the splendidly thorough piece of work he has done in subjecting the notion of thought, as it is treated in *ordinary* logic, to a complete revisal and overhaul. But it seems as if the scepticism—for scepticism it is—in which he apparently ends is hardly more consistent with itself than was the scepticism of the Greeks and of Hume. For after all what question, even about the limits of the capacity of thought, can be raised excepting upon the basis of thought itself? It would seem as though Mr Bradley's view of thought was too narrow, as though his conception of it was that limited conception which Hegel, in a passage which I referred to yesterday, points out. Hegel says that much of our difficulty arises from taking thought to mean merely the "reflective thinking which has to deal with thoughts *as thoughts*, and brings them into consciousness."* A few sentences further on in the same book, Hegel sums up the

* Hegel's *Logic* ; Wallace's Translation, p. 5.

substance of the matter by declaring that the contents of our consciousness "remain one and the same, whether they are felt, seen, represented or willed, and whether they are merely felt, or felt with an admixture of thoughts, or merely and simply thought." Feeling, perception, thought itself, are for him merely the *forms* into which the mind throws itself in making itself its own content or object.

Mr Bradley's Absolute is, therefore, that of which he can give no direct account. The ultimate reality it must be. But it is got at in a fashion which seems to imply a gap in the capacity of reason, and consequently it comes to us rather suddenly. To use two metaphors which Hegel applied to the Absolute of Schelling, Mr Bradley's Absolute seems as though it were "shot out of a pistol," or, in the language of the other metaphor, "like the night in which all cows look black." We know very little about it save that all disappears in it. But we owe a great debt to Mr Bradley. He has done the work of the great metaphysicians over again in a fashion which is unparalleled in recent times for its thoroughness and acuteness, and he stands at the very head of the philosophical world. He has been fortunate in finding a colleague in the leadership of that peculiar movement away from Kant with which his name is associated, a colleague who is, perhaps, less of a sceptic than himself, and whose work has been, what his own really is, not only critical but constructive.

When I see your new Professor of Moral Philosophy* sitting before me in the audience which I now am addressing, I confess I feel a little like an evangelical preacher who stands in front of a congregation containing an archbishop. I can only say that a study of his books has made me feel nearer to what I think is his standpoint than to that of any other living thinker, and I commend those of you who have listened to these elementary lectures on Idealism to a study of his great books on Logic, on *Æsthetics*, and on the State.

Well, there is another modern thinker who is the very antithesis of Bradley, I mean Professor Royce of Harvard. Now, Royce does not commit himself upon the point of his exact historical position. He may be, for aught that appears—and I rather think he is—a disciple of the school which in its broad significance I have endeavoured to put before you as founded by Aristotle and carried to its full development by Hegel. In Royce the dominant note is ethical. The will and its purposes bulk largely. The real with Royce is that in which purpose rests satisfied, with a sense of no further incompleteness left. The criterion of reality in his view may therefore, in a sense, be said to be ethical. But with him, of course, the will and the intelligence, and this is necessitated by his standpoint, are not separated as they are separated, for example, by Schopenhauer. With Royce the Absolute is conceived as an individual living Self, expressing itself

* Professor Bosanquet.

in particular forms, particular meanings, living forms of its intelligence, which are the foundations of finite personalities that have the basis of their Reality in the Absolute Mind. There are some things in Professor Royce's work which seem to me to be of great value. There is his investigation of the nature of time in relation to the will, and, as the outcome of this, his investigation of the nature of the general forms of time-series.

Now, the notion of a series is one which has always given rise to a considerable amount of discussion. You have the series in music, in the sonata, for example, in which you have a succession of musical sounds which is a great deal more than a succession of isolated units unconnected with one another. The meaning of each arises from its relation to the whole of the conception, and the musical whole is present in every part of the sonata.

Take, again, a more purely mathematical series. Suppose I start with unity and add to it a half, and then a fourth, and then an eighth, and then a sixteenth, and so on. I am making an addition, I am extending in a series which has no end; that is to say, I can go on for ever doing this without coming to a termination at any particular point. But at the same time, taking a fuller view of the relation of the members of the series, I find that they embody a law which points to a limit. Further than that limit they cannot go, and the limit is, of course, in this case the number two. And that is because each member of the series is something else

than a mere isolated unit. It is something that embodies in itself the law of the series. By the study of this conception of series Royce has been brought to certain views, which must have attention, of the nature of infinity. He appears to have been greatly influenced in his work by a German mathematician, Dedekind, who in 1887 published an Essay which came into my hands several years ago, before I had seen Royce's book, and I noticed its metaphysical character at the time. Dedekind investigated the nature of series as Royce has investigated it, and referred it back to the peculiar character of the mind which is to be wholly present in its expressions or manifestations. In the mind there is no externality of the whole to the parts or of the parts to the whole. The activity of the mind is constantly comprehending its whole self in its expressions.

Dedekind got hold of that in his little book, "*Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen*," and treated it in a way that almost anybody who has reflected on these things at all can understand, because there is really much more of what is metaphysical in it than there is of mathematical technicality. Now Dedekind seems to have suggested to Royce what the latter insists upon as the true nature of series, and what he has since developed. It is very interesting to contrast the *perfervidum ingenium* with which Royce goes into the matter, with the sceptical way in which one could picture to oneself Bradley approaching it. Of course Royce has not

escaped a good deal of criticism on his view, but still it is a very remarkable investigation which he puts forward in the Supplementary Essay appended to the first volume of his Gifford Lectures, *The World and the Individual*. He insists that the mathematical inquiry of which I have spoken shows that there are series of such a kind that the whole series, though infinite, though endless in the sense that it can be extended without limit, can yet be viewed as given in its entirety in its definition, and consequently as implicit in each member of the series.

You will see what that means from the illustrations I have given you. Take the second one first, the mathematical series. In the relationship of each member of this series to the others you have got the law of the whole that enables you to sum it up, and to show that the number two is the limit to which it approximates. In the case of the sonata you have, in like manner, the musical whole manifesting itself in the relation of the parts, and in that way, Royce argues, you have got the series in a form in which it can be viewed as given in its entirety in its definition, and implicitly given in its entirety in every member of the series. Such a series he calls self-representative. Next he applies, just as Dedekind did before him, this conception to the self. He finds that the number series is a purely abstract image of the relational system that must characterise an ideally completed self; that is to say, a self that does not merely pass from ex-

pression to expression, but comprehends the relation to each other of these expressions. The system of thought, so far from consisting in the bare conjunctions which are characteristic of appearance, is self-representative in that it is present as a whole in every thought in the series.

Let us take an illustration. "To-day is Thursday." That is one of my thoughts. Yes, and this last reflection, the reflection that to-day is Thursday, is also one of my thoughts. So is this further reflection that I made the reflection that to-day is Thursday, and so on. The infinity of this system consists, not in the fact that you can go on indefinitely extending it, but in the characteristic that every one of its members implies a corresponding reflective thought which in its turn is to belong to the system. The true or positive infinity of the system lies in its capability of being adequately represented in the one to one correspondence with its constituent parts. Thus, Royce holds, in opposition to Bradley, that thought can comprehend the infinite, because thought is of the character of a self-representative series, capable of comprehending the totality of the series in each member. He says that thought is not merely relational, but that at each stage it comprehends the series as a whole, and that there you have got an illustration of the capacity of thought to comprehend the infinite. That is his point of departure from Bradley.

From this standpoint the series is for Royce

a *totum simul*. The entire determined series of thoughts, in the instance above given, would be a self, completely reflective regarding the fact that all of these thoughts were its thoughts, and containing their entire genetic principle. The reason of the fission, which is typical of the act of judgment, the establishing of a relation between the subject and the predicate, between the thought and the mind which is productive of the thought, is therefore not, as Mr Bradley thinks, due to the impotence of thought, but to the self-representative character of its relational system. The Absolute must be such a system, and yet it must have the form of a self fully present in each act of thought.

Now I cannot linger over the further development of this, but I should like to go on to its application. What is real, according to Royce, is individual, unique, singular, the resting-ground of satisfied meaning or intellectual purpose. Of course, he concludes from that that there can only be a single absolute reality. Finite forms, where they assume the forms of personalities or of objects, arise only by distinction within this unique entirety, distinctions which arise from the finite purposes which the absolute mind contains within its activity. He puts the matter in this form : Time is for him the form of the will. But, consistently with his view of the nature of intelligence as a self-representative system, time presents two aspects. We are aware that each element of the succession excludes the others from its own place in time.

We are also aware that the series of successive states of experience is presented as an entirety, as a whole. The other, the complement that the finite being seeks, is not merely something beyond the present, is not merely a future experience from which it is distinct. It is inclusive of the very process of the striving itself. For the goal of every finite life, he says, is simply the totality of which this life is a fragment. When I seek my own goal I am looking for the whole of myself. In so far as my aim is the absolute completion of my selfhood, my goal is identical with the whole life of God. In all our strivings the attainment of the goal means more than any future moment taken by itself could ever furnish. For the self in its entirety is the whole of a self-representative system, and not the mere last moment or stage, if such there could be, of the process. And this can only be so because in God we possess our individuality. It is as a meaning in the Absolute Mind that we have existence. Our very dependence is the condition of our freedom and of our unique significance. The lesson of philosophy is the unity of the finite and the infinite, of temporal dependence and of eternal significance, of the world and all its individuals, of the one and the many, of God and of man. Not in spite of our finite bondage, but because of what it means and implies, we are full of the presence and of the freedom of God. Personality, Royce goes on to declare, is an essentially ethical category. A person is a conscious being whose life, temporally

viewed, seeks its completion through deeds; while this same life, eternally viewed, consciously attains its perfection by means of the present knowledge of the whole of its temporal strivings.

You will observe that Royce's view of such a conception does not abolish time any more than the conception of the self abolishes the distinction between body and mere substance, or any more than in becoming you have the abolition of being and of not-being. These conceptions are taken up as moments, to use the technical term, into the larger whole, which in its comprehension of them and in its self-comprehension preserves them in itself, but preserves them as put past, as having another significance in which they are no longer the final form of reality but only a logical stage towards it. Therefore, with Royce, the conception of the will, striving in time and yet conscious of the entirety of the system in which it strives, is not a conception in which time is abolished, in which God is reduced to a mere "now," the vanishing point into which everything collapses, but time is preserved in it as the form in which the will in one aspect strives, while that aspect is seen not to be final, but when more fully comprehended to be but a moment put past in the larger view of the process. God's life is the infinite whole that includes the endless temporal process, and consciously surveys it as one life, God's own life. God is thus, for Royce, a person and self-conscious, because the self of which He is conscious is ■ self whose eternal perfection is

attained through the totality of these ethically significant temporal strivings, these processes of evolution, these linked activities of finite selves.

Now you will observe that the way in which Royce puts the matter is a way which is not remote, by any means, from the view of reality which I have been putting before you in the course of these lectures, and the reason is that Royce, and for that matter, Bradley, have the origin of their views in the doctrine which Aristotle long ago, and Hegel more recently, worked out of the true relation of the particular and the universal. One comes back to Hegel because, after all that has been said against the Hegelian doctrine, in his writings you have a systematic form and an unflinching thoroughness which are not to be found elsewhere. His system is presented with a fulness of detail and a largeness of scale which are unrivalled. There is a passage in Jowett's Introduction to Plato's Dialogue the *Sophist*, in which he gives an estimate of Hegel which, speaking for myself, I should unhesitatingly adopt. "Hegel," he says, "if not the greatest philosopher, is certainly the greatest critic of philosophy who ever lived. No one else has equally mastered the opinions of his predecessors, or traced the connection of them in the same manner. No one has equally raised the human mind above the moralities of the common logic, and the unmeaningness of mere abstractions, and above imaginary possibilities, which, as he truly says, have no place in philosophy. No one

has won so much for the kingdom of ideas. . . . He shows that only by the study of metaphysics can we get rid of metaphysics, and that those who are in theory most opposed to them are in fact most entirely and hopelessly enslaved by them."

Well, we must not in this world of ours stand still, if we would avoid degenerating into sterility, we must always be doing the work over again. As Goethe says in the second part of *Faust*:

"Nur der verdient sich Freiheit wie das Leben
Der täglich sie erobern muss."

"'Tis only when we daily strive to conquer them anew,
That we gain life and freedom for ourselves."

And so it is in the study of philosophy. You cannot stand still by the side of any one personality, however great. You must try, however humbly, however inadequately, to do the work over again for yourself, and thus, notwithstanding the debt which the world owes to Hegel, we have each of us in this generation to try, if we would comprehend the true meaning of his teaching, to think it all out for ourselves, in the light that he has given us, but still for ourselves. Otherwise we shall not really make any progress. The first series of these lectures has incurred a two-fold criticism. Some people said it was too Hegelian. Others, for whose opinion I have a great respect, said it was an altogether unorthodox interpretation of Hegel. Well, there is nearly as much strife and disputing about the interpretation of Hegel as there is about the interpretation of the

Scripture. Yet the fact of the strife over the interpretation of the Scripture does not make the Scripture any the less excellent, nor does the strife over the interpretation of Hegel make Hegel any the less a good teacher. Therefore I am content to say what he himself said to the orthodox of his time, "I am a Lutheran and wish to remain so." I am content to say that I am a Hegelian and wish to be called so. There are reservations implicit in both declarations.

Now I go back to my text. Like Bradley and Royce, I feel that it is impossible to be content with a definition of the Real in terms of the mere intelligible relations which, in reflection, are separated from feeling as being something different and apart from it. We start, I repeat, from within the concrete, living actuality of mind, outside of which we cannot get, even in thought, and of which the plane of the human intelligence is only, after all, an intermediate plane or stage. Human thought, dominated as it is, to an extent of which we are largely unconscious, by human ends and purposes, comprehends at a level which is not the fullest or the highest. Our minds are before consciousness in pictorial distinctions, in which we figure to ourselves these minds as belonging to bodies which go about separately in this world. That view is not the final view, but it is none the less a necessary view, and as such is true and representative of the degree of reality to which it belongs. The social purposes and ends which have to be fulfilled in the presenta-

tion of the world in the aspect of a society in which personality is related to personality—in which men and women are not isolated but are dependent on each other in the family and in the State—give rise to pictorial conceptions which do not come upon us by accident, but are the outcome of phases in the deeper self-comprehension of the Absolute Mind. How that comes about and its meaning I shall try to explain to you in later lectures. At present it is enough to say that its effect upon us is to dominate our thinking, to throw it into the distinctions which give rise to finiteness, and to make the self-comprehension of the human being pursuing his ordinary avocations only an imperfect stage in self-comprehension. Finiteness arises from the fashion in which we conceive the mind in ourselves; that is to say, the fashion in which the mind conceives itself in us.

Like Berkeley, we have to put a new question. We have to ask what is the meaning of Reality? And our answer must be that it means being contained in and comprehended by mind, and has, as an essential element in it, being *for* mind, or *before* mind. Antithesis and distinction, such as reflection is always giving rise to, are essential for clear knowledge. Hence it is that the understanding, the business of which is to produce clear and definite knowledge without reference to the question whether it embraces the whole of the aspects of Reality or not—hence it is, I say, that the understanding makes these distinctions in their sharp

forms by means of its abstractions. But, in truth, even the conceptions which the understanding makes use of are, as we shall see presently, in their nature dialectical; that is to say, their opposites are inherent in them. They refer beyond themselves; they refer to their opposites and to their union with these opposites.

Mind as the Ultimately Real, as what is truly actual, is, by reflection and by the abstraction which reflection brings in its train, separated into the aspect of mere thought, upon the one hand, and the boundless hard-and-fast contingency which baffles thought, upon the other. The distinction is a distinction which emerges within mind, and it gives rise in the study of mind to two aspects which have to be considered in their separateness, but which, having been considered in their separateness, have to be recognised as arising only by the distinction which reflection makes within mind, a distinction which, after all, is a vanishing one when more fully grasped. On its abstract side self-consciousness discloses itself as the movement of thought in forms, in conceptions, in what are called categories, which are related to one another dialectically; that is to say, each of which not only implies the next of them, but implies the whole series and finds its completion and truth only *in* the entire series. You get in that way what Hegel called "Logic," the metaphysical view of thought distinguished abstractly as pure thought, put in contrast to what is not so distinguished. Its

antithesis, that with which it is put in contrast, is a counter abstraction, Nature, which again is simply an aspect within the concrete totality of Mind. This is the truth of the two, and therefore their *prius*. And again I say to you, what I said yesterday, that to me there seems no more vain or foolish controversy than the controversy as to how Hegel made the transition from nature to mind. He was not talking of transitions in time, nor was he talking of making or constructing. He was simply displaying his system as a whole, and the only way to do that was to show how it is of the nature of thought to make abstractions, correct them by dwelling on their contraries, and comprehend the two sides as merely distinctions within the larger and final conception of mind or spirit which embraces both as moments within itself.

If one analyses one's own self-consciousness one finds that in the apprehension of the self, in the endeavour to fix it, one distinguishes it from a not-self which is other than the self. It is *my* not-self that is distinguished from my self. But in so concentrating on myself I have made it an object which ceases to present the aspect of the mind which apprehends. If I endeavour to fix thought again as something which I can isolate and consider in contrast to what is not thought, I have made it an object, as it were, external to my self, and so I get into the endlessness of Royce's series. But the true view is the recognition of the dialectic of thought as the inherent movement which is of

the very nature and essence of mind. And when you have studied that movement by simply observing it as it does its own work, you discover that you have the very characteristic of mind in the activity which in *apprehension* produces these distinctions, and simultaneously reconciles them by *comprehending* them as belonging to a higher unity. In that way the method and the subject-matter to which the method is applied fall together in a fashion that obtains in no other department of human knowledge, because in every other department of human knowledge the mind is in reflection distinct and regarded as essentially distinguished from the object which it is contemplating. And so when we get to the most thorough-going investigation of all, the metaphysical investigation of the nature of Ultimate Reality, a unity the highest of all emerges in our comprehension, and in that way we escape from what would otherwise be an infinite or unending progress. The true infinite is discovered just in the recognition of the nature of the movement. So soon as you have realised the nature of mind you find that you do not reach infinity by merely heaping item on item, but only by getting the law of the series which each member of the series must obey, and so disclosing the difference between the members and the series as a difference which has been called into being, but has none the less to be put past.

The reason why mind makes these distinctions is a reason which I shall deal with in a subsequent

lecture, and I shall show you that it is of the very essence of mind that it should do so. But I wish simply to point out here that this train of analysis leads us straight to what must be the conception of God in which it terminates, God as the finally self-comprehended Reality of Mind—the Last that is really First, Mind at its highest plane of self-comprehension. Our own human plane of reflection is the outcome of the reflection of the Absolute Mind in those finite forms which are the steps or stages or moments in its activity. The logical process can only be set forth in a system, and it would take me far beyond the limits of these lectures were I to try to give you an account of the attempt—whether it be more or not we need not discuss here—which Hegel has made to set out in systematic form the movement of mind in its self-comprehension.

I have pointed out to you that the endeavour to make these things appear as simply movements of abstract thought, to set out the movement of such thought in its abstract forms, however useful, however valuable—and it is both useful and valuable—is capable of throwing light on one side only of reality, and that when you come to the other side, the counter abstraction of nature, the other aspect of mind which is equally embraced in its fuller self-comprehension, you find a different aspect of the activity of thought. You find reflection there operating by making sharp distinctions. The unifying influence of thought is not looked

for there, because the purposes and the ends which the mind has before it in the contemplation of nature are purposes and ends which are foreign to that unification and do not require it. The purpose which we have before us when we are face to face with nature, I mean the habitual and thus unconscious purpose which dominates our way of conceiving it, is to contemplate it without reference to the subject. We abstract from the fact that nature is there only for the mind which perceives it, or as object for the subject. We shut out that aspect of the truth as completely as we can, and the result is that we get nature, characterised as it is by sharp and clear distinctions, in forms in which separation and isolation are the order of things. For instance, the apprehension of nature as in space is a mode which displays things as at the utmost possible stage of isolation from one another. In time, as I showed you before, you get a little nearer to establishing some sort of unity among them, because, while the present excludes both the past and the future, it yet has meaning only in relation to the past and the future. Therefore in time you have got nearer to the unity which comes only from comprehension as distinguished from mere apprehension, from reason as distinguished from mere understanding. A yet more developed application of reflection under the domination of the same kind of end gives you the aspect of nature as mechanism. The finiteness of such conceptions as the understanding here makes

use of is exhibited in the cause, which shows its inherent contradiction by passing over into the effect, and becoming indistinguishable from the effect when you think it out. In the law which the man of science finds when, putting aside the mere crude appearances of phenomena, he fixes upon what is essential, what underlies, is a principle in which he passes beyond mere particulars of sense, and abstracts in a manner which, though finite, brings him to conceptions in which the foreignness of things, the separation of things in space and time, is, in a large measure, overcome. In the higher aspects of nature this is strikingly so. For example, as I showed you earlier, you set before the mind in the perception of the living organism the conception of a whole which shows itself through the metabolism of the parts, and dominates the parts, more as soldiers in an army are dominated by their common purpose, than as marbles are held together in a heap.

It is only the understanding in its abstraction that shuts out the fuller comprehension which would come to us if we had before our minds that nature is there only for mind which perceives it. Of course, I do not mean that our minds make nature. We are in one aspect parts of nature. I explained that very fully in the last set of lectures, and how it came about that we arrived at our conception of our minds as particular things which contemplate nature as through windows. But the fact remains that nature is there only as the object of mind, and only *for* mind; and if you com-

prehend that relationship fully you will have got rid of the apparently absolute character of the hard-and-fast relations of nature and its boundless particularity. Even in nature as the man of science regards it you see the manifestation of dialectic. Take the quantities of the mathematician. Take quantity as you have it in the measurements of space and time. Take the old puzzle of Achilles and the tortoise. Just as quantity always has two sides, a discrete and a continuous, the discrete the side which is dealt with in arithmetic, and the continuous that other side which is the subject of the calculus; so in the puzzle of Achilles and the tortoise these two sides appear. You remember how Achilles sets out to overtake the tortoise, but the tortoise has gone a little way by the time Achilles gets up to the point from which it started. By the time Achilles arrives at the next point the tortoise has gone a little farther, and so on, and Achilles, in this view, never overtakes it. But just as we can sum up the series by showing the law of its growth, the relation of its parts, so we can show that there is an ascertainable point at which Achilles must overtake the tortoise. The fallacy is the passing from the view of space in which it is discrete to the view of space in which it is continuous without being aware of the transition, and the mixing up of two abstract aspects passing under the same name. But the fact that you have the discrete and the continuous side apparently co-existing, shows that the movement of thought

is inherent even in the particularity of nature, and that fully comprehended nature discloses the dialectic which is characteristic of every aspect of reality.

Thought never stands still, except in the abstractions of reflection, and it is characteristic of philosophy that it has been occupied greatly with pointing out the antinomies or contradictions which we find at every turn even in our most everyday view of things. Nature is never fully known until it is comprehended in its relation to self-consciousness. When it is so comprehended, and is grasped as arising by distinctions which fall within self-consciousness, its foreignness is overcome, put past. That is how we come back again, by whatever road we travel, to mind as the ultimate form of reality.

I have now got some way in my analysis, and I shall go on in a subsequent lecture to develop the meaning of the finite quality which characterises our human minds.

LECTURE IV

My task in the earlier series of these Gifford Lectures was to set out the proof of the thesis that the nature of ultimate reality is mind. In the first three lectures of the present series, and particularly in the second and third, I have endeavoured to put before you some account of the characteristics of mind and of its content. In this fourth lecture I have to endeavour to show you how mind comes to present itself as finite, and the consequences of this.

When Spinoza in the second part of his *Ethics* has completed his demonstration that the human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God, he pauses and says, rather pathetically, "At this point many of my hearers will, no doubt, stick fast and will think of many things which will cause delay, and therefore I beg of them to advance slowly, step by step, with me, and not to pronounce judgment until they shall have read everything which I have to say." Something of Spinoza's depression is upon me. If the pathway is difficult it is not, however, my fault any more than it is yours. It is the nature of the subject that makes it so. My

task is to set before you, as intelligibly as I can, a great conception, the work of a succession of great men, a conception which we have inherited from past ages, and which in their own fashion these great men have dealt with in its different aspects. But for those who would profit by the work that has been done by the intellectual giants who have attacked the problem of the nature of reality in the past, it is essential that they should have some clear realisation of the difficulties which were present to the minds of these men.

Above all things, a sense that there *is* a problem is necessary, and that sense is not one which is very easily awakened. I have pointed out to you that the great hindrance to the grasp of what one may call the conception of reality which has been the common conception of these great thinkers—because, as I think I have already shown you, it has varied more in language and in form than in substance in the hands of those who have fashioned it—is the irrelevant and unmeaning metaphors which we carry with us as a burden on our backs. This, I say, is the chief hindrance to getting hold of what the great thinkers have put before us. This was apparent, I think, yesterday, when we had to try to scale the precipitous cliffs which have to be surmounted if we are to attain to a view of the nature of mind. We felt then the extraordinary difficulty of shaking ourselves clear from similes and analogies, drawn from regions of inquiry which were wholly foreign to the regions in which we

were painfully toiling, and that burden it is which presses upon those who have to climb with difficulty from point to point of these almost inaccessible rocks, with the constant sense of being dragged back. Nevertheless our duty is to clear ourselves by careful criticism as far as we can from the effect of that burden. The footholds are there firm enough, if we would only look for them as they have been cut by the great thinkers of the past. After all, if people make it a reproach against philosophy that it is difficult, there is an answer. Philosophy is not necessary; it is not even a help to everyone. Only to those is it a necessity whose minds have been disturbed by thought. The gulf which thought makes thought alone can bridge over, and for those who have once become conscious of the problem and of the difficulty of its solution, there is no other way but the hard toil of the thinking consideration of things.

Well, to-day I shall have to deal with the problem of the forms of finitude in mind. Now the relation in which man stands to the mind within which his reality falls in ultimate analysis, must remain an inscrutable mystery if we cannot free ourselves from the domination of the category of substance, an unnecessary and unnatural category when we are investigating the nature of mind. Of course if we start from this, that what is must be a *thing*, a *thing* which, if we thought out our conclusions about it, could have no meaning except as existing in space and in time—if that be the ulti-

mate conception by which thought is hemmed in, then it is impossible to represent God in any other light than as a substance, or to find any intelligible relation between Him and the finite mind.

But God is a Spirit, and those who seek Him must seek Him in spirit and in truth. It is not the methods of mechanism, the methods which are applicable to the externalities of space and time, that can help here or that are in place. My self-consciousness is an ultimate fact, and yet in its finiteness, as characterised in the concept of my particularity, it appears as *my* self-consciousness. Now one pauses here to observe that at this point there is a problem to be solved. What we mean by the element of particularity, what we mean by self-consciousness as *my* self-consciousness, as distinguished from somebody else's self-consciousness, is a matter which is not thought out in the usages which guide us when we employ this conception in everyday life. A necessary conception it is, and one which represents the truth from our everyday practical standpoint. It is not only useful, but without it we could not get on, and, indeed, it is the consequence of our view and experience of the social whole of which we form a part. We stand in relation to other selves, and yet there is something to be thought out. Taken simply so, it is plain that self-consciousness has not fully comprehended its own character, and one has to see what is the nature of the distinction which it has made within itself, and which gives rise to its

finite quality or appearance. There can be no doubt of the conclusion to which the train of reasoning which we have been pursuing leads. There can be nothing outside self-consciousness. The universe, when we reflect on it and do not leave it in abstraction, is a universe that is there for us as object for a subject, and its meaning and development must be a meaning and development within the field of the object-world of consciousness.

As Hegel somewhere puts it: "The universe as it is *in and for itself*"—observe the phrase—"is the totality of existence; outside it there is nothing." That is to say, you cannot escape from the closed circle of the mind and its content. There is no meaning in even raising a question of anything outside. It is on the basis of the mind itself that any such question would be raised. Yet to take a short-cut and to assert that because I am self-conscious, and because all the distinctions which go to the making up of the universe fall within my self-consciousness, therefore, I am the absolute God—to assert this is not only startling, but one feels instinctively that it is an assertion which no one has a right to make. It is absurd to say such a thing of a mere particular man, a link in a chain with a beginning that stretches back endlessly into the past and will stretch forward endlessly into the future. Such an assertion seems to mean one of two things. Either the universe is a mere appearance, the projection of a mind which

is taken as being something here and now in space and time, and that possesses knowledge as a quality. In this case the universe can be nothing more than the projection of a mind that is a finite thing. In such a light the universe has no more reality than have the pictures which a magic-lantern throws upon a sheet. Such a conclusion, of course, is revolting to common sense, and must fail to bear scrutiny. Or, on the other hand, the assertion may be taken to mean that in truth the ultimate form of reality is a correlation of substances, and that the mind and its object and God Himself, so far as they are taken to be anything else, are mere appearances, mere misinterpretations of a reality which consists in the mechanical connection of substances. Such a conclusion is equally incapable of being stated self-consistently. Both of these views are, moreover, pronounced by the heart, whatever the intelligence may say, to be blasphemous; for they are the denial of the truth of that spiritual significance which throughout history has been the profoundest moving force in the souls of men. The conviction of this truth it is that has done more than anything else to arouse men to the effort to solve the problem which reason has raised, and that has awakened the human mind to the necessity for a careful criticism of its categories.

Well, one comes back to scan again, in the light of these difficulties, the final fact of one's own self-consciousness as manifestation within which both the universe without and the universe within

disclose themselves. What is the meaning of its finiteness? We have seen that such finiteness cannot consist in this, that the mind can really be a thing here in space and now in time. Let us see whether we can get on any better by trying to image it under another form; let us try to reflect upon it, to think about it as mind, as subject if you please, in that large and full significance of the word that it gets when we purify it as far as we can from similes drawn from the region of the external world. If you do your best in this direction, you will find that you are inevitably led back in your investigation to the self as the final and ultimate reality, but not possessing its final and ultimate form in the finite self, as it appears when, after the fashion of John Locke, we dive into our own bosoms. In that finite self you find at every turn the evidences of incompleteness of comprehension, and the suggestion that arises, as you pursue your path, is that if the phenomenon of the finite self were more completely thought out, the difficulties which you meet with would prove to be difficulties due mainly to the inadequacy of your own procedure.

"The truth," says Hegel in a daring sentence, "is that there is only one reason, one mind, and that the mind as finite has not a real existence." Of course, he does not mean to say that the universe collapses under reflection into a mere point, into an inert *simultaneum*, or to deny to it the movement that characterises mind as mind. What he means

is just what I have been putting before you, that the true view of mind is the view which goes beyond that limited aspect in which it appears as one among many, or even as my own particular mind. The relationship of being one among many, the relationship of being mine as distinguished from yours, belong to that aspect in which mind presents itself to itself as a phenomenon falling within its own object-world, as a phenomenon which arises because mind has made abstraction from the fact that it is itself setting up the very distinctions which it is contemplating.

Now in our daily practice we find some confirmation of the extent to which these difficulties vanish when we confront them from a higher standpoint. It is when we rise above the contemplation of minds as related to each other as *things*, that we get rid of the difficulty of explaining to ourselves why we prefer at our best the well-being of our neighbours to our own. But even in daily practice the same difficulty occurs. Man is often tempted to feel that though as a free personality he has the power of choosing the right, and is responsible if he does not choose it, yet that temptation is too much for him, and it is unnatural that his choice should be otherwise than the choice of what is lower. This is a frame of mind of which we have only too familiar experience. But, on the other hand, the saint, the man who lives at the highest level, finds, just because he lives at the highest level, and his conception is one which

raises him above the particularism of these temptations, that they are no serious temptations to him. The greatest saint may lapse; when he lapses it is not because he has ceased to be free, but because for the moment he has done what any human being may do, he has lowered his standpoint. At his highest standpoint the man who is really holy is free from temptation, because temptation presents no attraction to him, looking at it as he does.

Well, just in the same fashion if you have once actually got the speculative point of view, these difficulties which seem so great, because they afflict you as his temptations afflict the saint who cannot always live at the same high level, yet will come to seem less, because they are vanishing difficulties from the point of view at which you have learned that you can contemplate them. In practice as in theory there are stages or degrees in reality, and when we once have reached to a higher stage in our view of reality and are sticking to it, whether it be practical life or whether it be speculative contemplation that we are concerned with, troubles that we thought insuperable at a lower stage cease to be troubles at all, because they cease to exist. We see how they arose, we see how they presented themselves, but we also see how that presentation can be superseded in a larger view.

I have had to dig down to the foundations, in order to get at the nature of reality, through the covering soil to which the current abstractions and

metaphors and similes have imparted an adamant hardness. Other aids than philosophy may assist the faith that underneath there lies a foundation which can be reached. You can all be helped by Art and by Religion. Your Goethe, your Carlyle, your Wordsworth, your Browning, yes, and your New Testament, all these give the sense of the things that are unseen, a sense that may be strong enough to carry you over these difficulties. There you will find aids of another kind to faith, the faith of the doctrine that it is not in some remote other world that the truth is to be looked for, but just in this world, seen and comprehended at a higher level. And it is not even necessary to turn to the poets and to literature for this sort of aid. Some of the finest natures, perhaps the very finest natures, do not need that.

"If thou appear untouched by solemn thought,
Thy nature is not therefore less divine,"

writes Wordsworth, and so it has been at all times. And yet the vindication of the truth, if the truth must be vindicated, can only be given by Reason. Art and Religion can do much. They can bring before us vivid images, can lead us into moods which humanity with a thousand voices proclaims to represent the truth and the impress of reality. But it is only the iron logic of philosophy that can break through the hard incrustations beneath which lies buried the full truth, the completed scheme.

When completely thought out, reality dis-

closes its hidden nature, in the light we have now got, as self-conscious mind completely self-comprehensive, whose characteristic it is to be active, and being active, to be actual. I have now to show you that it is of the very quality of such mind to throw itself into finite forms, and so to make the distinctions and create the aspects which in everyday life are familiar to us, but the unstable and merely relative character of which appears when we take things from the standpoint of what has been called reason as distinguished from understanding. That mind is self-conscious as well as conscious is, when we think the matter out, a mere tautology. If you analyse the simplest form of consciousness, for instance the sense of feeling, there is implicit in it a reference to self, because it is "I" who feel. It is only by an abstraction, by the cutting-off of reflection, that you ignore the fact for the moment that it is "I" who feel. The full truth is that a feeling is always referable to a self. It is legitimate to speak in another sense only if we know what we are doing. For instance the psychologists tell us about the threshold of consciousness, and they point out, and point out with justice, about the aspect in which it discloses itself under their methods, that there is such a thing as a subconscious self, and that there are antecedents to sensation which do not cross the threshold of consciousness. That is quite true if you are looking at the soul from the standpoint of what I described to you, in the earlier lectures,

as presentationism, where the whole content of consciousness is set out as though it were a series of discrete events in time. But that standpoint, useful and legitimate as it is for its own purposes, and constantly as we employ it not merely in psychology but in daily life, is only a very limited one. In it abstraction is made, and is necessarily made, from the higher unity of the self, *for* which the history in time, which presentationism gives, exists.

To be conscious is to be conscious of *my* self as comprehending. There is no such *thing* conceivable as mere consciousness that is not also self-conscious when it is thought out. I call it "thing" because such a consciousness, if we could attach any meaning to it at all, would be a thing, would belong to the region of what was external, and not properly to the self as self. Even if we desire to be sceptical we can only raise our scepticism as the reflection of an "I" that comprehends.

Self-consciousness is the logical *prius* of every effort of thought and of every phase of feeling, even the lowest. The task of thought is to make explicit what is implicit, and it only fails to do so when it takes things in abstraction. Grasp them in the fulness of their comprehension, and you find that self-consciousness is the presupposition of every conceivable form of experience. Well, that carries with it an important consequence. If God be mind, if His nature is to be mind, He must be *in some sense* self-conscious. One has here to

guard oneself, because the idea of self-consciousness is infected by many metaphors drawn from the everyday world. What I mean is that the nature of mind is to be actual in its distinctions, and to comprehend these distinctions and itself as their source. This characteristic of consciousness is of the essence of mind, and therefore is of the essence of God. We come to that conclusion as soon as we find that the function of thought is to do something more than merely establish relations between things that are given to it. As soon as you become aware that there *can* be no distinction excepting upon the basis of thought, and that beyond thought there is nothing, because it is only on the basis of thought that we can even speak of anything beyond thought, you are forced to the further conclusion that mind must in every phase be self-conscious.

In self-consciousness we apprehend the self. It is of the essence of self-consciousness that it should distinguish the self from what it puts before it in distinction from the self. That is to say, at the ordinary level at which we men and women reflect, we think of the object-world from which the self is distinguished as one object and the self as another object. In other words, when we apprehend the self, when we present it to ourselves as distinguished from its object-world, we apprehend it as understanding does, in separation from something else which is correlative to it, and in this way we give it the character of finitude. That is how the finite arises. It is the work and the

apprehension of thought which takes even the self and fixes it, so to speak, in contradistinction from the self, abstracting from the unity of comprehension in which the two are held. Just as I apprehend my object-world as "there and then," so I apprehend myself as "here and now," the centre, as it were, of the universe.

Well, there again you have in still further development the notions of the finite. They spring up upon you the moment you begin to think at this plane, the plane at which you are encouraged to think by the social purposes which you have to fulfil as members of society. These are all modes of what we may call the relation of *otherness*, which is the quality of the finite. If I fix myself, for example, in reflection, as one among many, I get the notion of a plurality of selves isolated in time and for that matter in space, and so I am brought very far into the region of the finite. And the occasion of my making these distinctions is my purpose of leading a social life, of living among my fellow men and women, of profiting by my experience, by my memories, by my relationship to my family, by what I have done, by what I may be, by that chain of connections which binds me up in a whole with those about me. The purpose of realising myself in that world makes me insist on these distinctions, and as these distinctions are distinctions all of which belong to the region of the finite, the characteristic of finitude penetrates deeply into my notion of myself. Of course this kind of

apprehension, however necessary, is a narrow and limited one, because it ignores the larger view of mind as the subject within which all these distinctions take place.

Mind not only has for its task to make explicit what is implicit, but it must do so, because as I showed you before, the character of its activity, the activity which posits itself, so to speak, in conceptions, is dialectical. That is to say, each conception is posited in such a fashion that it is made at once to involve a correlative, a correlative linked to something beyond, and the whole is found to form a chain in which the imperfect is taken up by the movement of thought into what is more perfect and more complete. Thought is always active, and therefore it never can and never does rest content in any single finite aspect. The consequence is that the world in which we live, the world as it seems, has an infinity of aspects. It has the aspect of beauty and of morality, it has the aspect which is dealt with in mathematics, the aspect which is dealt with in political economy. All these aspects of the world as it seems are equally real, and what we have to do is to determine their relations to one another, and to be careful that we do not confuse the standpoints at which these different aspects arise, and misapply the conceptions which have led to their separation. They are the outcome of the finite purposes which guide our reflection on our own experiences, and they are the necessary outcome of these purposes.

Well, the nature of thought is not to rest satisfied with any one of these aspects or with any one of the conceptions under which they arise. From the very beginning the ultimate nature of thought, the ultimate goal which it has to realise, can be nothing short of its complete comprehension of itself, and the reason is of course that only in the fully comprehended system of the mind within which all these distinctions have been made, can their relation to one another, and to the end which they presuppose, be adequately shown. That is where, what I told you of in an earlier lecture, the new and deeper view of evolution comes in. It is not only in time that you have evolution; you have evolution in thought, in the stages of comprehension, and evolution in which what comes last in time is first in thought, because all the stages that precede it in time are really only fragments of it isolated by the abstractions of reflection. The completed totality is the truth of the whole movement of the process. But to say that is not to say that the nature of mind is to deny the reality of all those lower stages and to make them naught. The passing through these lower stages is part of the very activity of mind. Its essence is to *posit* itself, so to speak, in abstract distinction, and then, in its fuller comprehension, to overcome that distinction, to show it as one which has been made only by the abstraction of the understanding, an abstraction made for the purposes of self-realisation in the

form of clear and distinct knowledge. In geometry we deal with figures in which we have abstracted altogether from colour, from beauty, from weight, from everything else except consideration of the purest kind in space, and thereby we get clear and distinct knowledge, because the mind can concentrate in this kind of consideration. Such illustrations show that it is the work of the mind to make abstract distinctions in understanding in order to enrich knowledge, and afterwards to take up the distinctions so made in the larger unities which thought reaches as it comprehends still more fully.

Now I want in this connection to follow out the illustration which we have of this in the case of time. Time is a relationship or form which belongs to the object-world, the world in which we image either things as outside us, or the stream of our mental states as within us. Time, as Hegel says in the *Natur-Philosophie*, is the presentation of becoming, of what is there just inasmuch as it ceases to be there. Now see what is implied in that. The event which is in time is there just inasmuch as it ceases to be there. The reason is that the now is always ceasing to be the now. The now is nothing that you can lay hold of; before you can do so it has passed into the then, and the next instant becomes the instant which you characterise as the now. That instant is made what it is by its relation to a future which will be but is not yet. Therefore you have in time this

combination of being and not-being which gives to succession the character of the presentation, or rather the attempt at a presentation, of what becomes, of transition. You cannot have any fixed image of time. Time has always got this contradiction within itself, that it is in the *relations* of the elements in it, the past, present, and future, that time consists. It is in the deepest sense a relation of finitude.

Hegel points this out in a passage in which he says that it is not because things appear in time that they are finite; it is because they are finite that they appear in time.* In other words, time is just the abstract form of the characteristic which finite things have of being in a state of flux. As Heraclitus pointed out, all things are in a state of flux, and so it is with the finite world. There is no distinction which remains permanent. What appears is always altering, for the individuality of reality is always disclosing a new and fresh aspect. It is in comprehension by thought that you get the stability, the unity, the element that is permanent, because it is out of time in the sense that time is in reality for it.

Well, as inherent in its nature, time has got a curious contradiction within itself, a contradiction which exhibits itself in the fact that time has always two moments, the moment of the discrete and the moment of the continuous. You fix time, the moment, as now, but in so fixing it you find

* Hegel, *Natur-Philosophie*, p. 54.

that what you are really fixing on is something with a continuous flow which causes it to be gone as soon as you think you have grasped it, and so it is that in all investigations of time you have got these two sides confronting you. In arithmetic, which is founded in large measure upon time, you have an illustration of this. I discussed with you yesterday, the series, the self-representative series. Let it be the mathematical series which we took as an illustration, $1 + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4} + \frac{1}{8}$, and so on, extending without end, but yet having a limit in the number 2. In that series you have got this curious result, that the series is endless, that you can always go on adding to it a diminishing fraction, and yet, on the other hand, that it has got an end because even if you were to project it into infinity it never could exceed the limit of 2. Now there you have the characteristic which time discloses, that the moments in it are not really exclusive one of the other. When the series is self-representative, as such a series is, and as the series of my thoughts is, you have the characteristic of each member of the series in this that it represents the whole. In this characteristic lies the contradiction which is only explicable if you understand that the form of time is really a form in which the self comprehends itself, and grasps what it comprehends as the self for which time is, and which in that sense is out of time. The self belongs to eternity in the true sense of the word, but yet posits itself in distinctions which are superseded in its comprehension of them.

It is the nature of mind that it is free from the dilemmas that affect the object-world, and that it neither stands still nor is mere change. Its nature is to be permanence in change and change in permanence. The whole mind is present in every act of the mind, and every act of the mind implies the whole mind. It is not a process on which you can get any light from metaphors and similes drawn from the object-world, because it is what lies at the foundation of the object-world itself. You can, perhaps, get at it best if you keep in mind the contradictions which appear in even such familiar features of the object-world as the time sequence. But just because there is the phase of presentation on the part of the mind of itself to itself, the element of exclusion by which one phase is distinguished from another is a real phase. Yet it is not all. It is a phase whose nature is to be forthwith put past, and taken up into a higher comprehension.

Now, the effect of that is to give us some light upon what the nature of time must be when contemplated from the standpoint of Absolute Mind. It cannot as so contemplated be non-existent. Rather it must be there as taken up, preserved in a more complete comprehension. The endless aspect of the series is in contradiction with the fact of its limit, and therefore a higher standpoint, for the purposes of which the lower standpoint is inadequate, is necessary for the solution of the contradiction and the comprehension of the whole. And when you set to yourself the problem of how the

universe in time must seem to God, the answer is that as God is Mind and as it is of the nature of Mind to realise itself in these distinctions which go to make up among other things the time series, God must in His self-consciousness include these distinctions, and yet preserve them, not as a mere time series, but in a higher conception in which they are comprehended in the entirety in which the series is summed up, and summed up in a fashion of which even that expression gives no proper analogue. Now, this is a consideration which throws some light on the problem of immortality, a problem on which I shall have to touch in later lectures, because it shows that existence in time is not the whole of existence as fully comprehended. For the mind of God the world must appear as no mere *simultaneum*, no mere negation of change, but as the time series summed up and comprehended in the fullest grasp of thought. It is only from such standpoints as those of geometry and mechanism, in which we set the distinctions in their characteristic abstraction, that the spectres which trouble us appear as more than spectres.

These abstract conceptions have their place. The movement of thought which makes them renders possible the riches of the self-comprehension of mind. But it is mind that we are dealing with, and mind is not inert. It posits itself in difference and gathers itself up at a higher level than that from which it started. Its very nature is to be present to itself in finite forms. That it must

do in order to fulfil the nature of its being, to realise its own end. There you have the *why* of the process of finitude.

It is into the forms of finitude that the Absolute Mind goes forth in the process of its self-realisation. How plain it is that if we would contemplate the nature of God, we must, as in worship, contemplate in spirit and in truth.



St. Leprieux

Hegel.

LECTURE V

IN the last lecture I showed you how the forms of finitude originate in the mind. Their origin we found to be finite ends, and the result was an illustration of the truth that the attempt to comprehend the universe ought to be a search after ends and not after causes; a very important distinction.

We got some way towards a view of the Absolute Mind as not only self-conscious, but as requiring and so conserving the finite forms which it sets up and transcends in the act of setting up. Following this out, we begin in the present lecture to get something like an idea of what must be the relation of man to God. I may now attempt, on the basis of what I have already said, a definition of God which may serve us provisionally as a starting point for the rest of the lecture.

God means Absolute Mind conscious of itself as completely realising the highest ends. He is the completed consciousness which comprehends itself in its completeness as the *prius* and source of the whole of the movement that forms its content. Do not forget what I pointed out to you in examin-

ing the nature of the self-representative series in a former lecture. Both moments in the time series, the moment of exclusion, and the moment of the implicit presence of the whole in each member of the series, are if transmuted yet implicit in the character of Absolute Mind. That is to say, in endeavouring to contemplate the Mind of God it is plain that we are not to think of time as having ceased to have meaning, but are to look upon it and its two aspects as merely superseded in the higher standpoint from which He must contemplate Himself. No pictorial image of such a mind can be adequate, for all pictures are based on relationship in time and space, and they are never complete. They always suggest what lies beyond in time and space, and therefore it is not to pictorial representation that we can turn, unless we are prepared to bear in mind that the picture, however admirable, can only be a symbol of what is to be adequately expressed in nothing short of the highest categories of thought.

Now let us, furnished with this definition of God, turn to the nature of man. It is plain that man is finite mind and that as finite his mind is realising itself at a level of comprehension that is not the highest level. Man's ends are finite ends. Thus his categories, the conceptions which his ends call into use, are finite categories, and his world and himself also are presented as in separation from mind, as in *hetereity*, the form of what people have called "otherness." By reason of the

domination of these finite ends, and the consequently self-limited action of reflection in the form of understanding, the content, cut off in this way in abstraction, gets a semblance of permanence, of being fixed. We thus become apt to take truth to consist merely in that which we all think, instead of having a foundation to be sought in an answer to the deeper question, Why and How we all think it so.

Philosophy ought to be able to show the relationship to each other of the ends that are finite, how they arise, what is their order, what is their position in the scheme in which the activity of mind manifests itself. If this is shown in an abstract form we get what is called "Logic" in Hegelian terminology; that is to say, the abstract forms which belong to the content of the Idea, the subject-matter of the first part of the Hegelian Encyclopædia. This conception goes deeper down than would be possible in any picture of mere *creation*, because creation, after all, is a word which carries with it the association of an image in time, of something brought into being, it may be out of nothing, but at all events *ab extra*; whereas we are here dealing with activities of thought dominated by these ends which are and must be the *prius* of any such picture.

The Hegelian doctrine, no doubt, identifies human self-consciousness with the consciousness of God, but it does not conversely identify the consciousness of God with human self-consciousness.

The greater contains the less and is not contained in it here any more than elsewhere. Because it is *mind* that we are dealing with, no real difficulty arises, as we shall presently see, over such problems as that of evil. One of the great objections which has been urged against all systems of absolute idealism, all systems that would identify the mind of man with the mind of God, is this. It is said, if they be true you must attribute evil to God as something falling within His nature. Well, if we were dealing with what is to be conceived as a substance that would be so, but we are dealing with what is of the nature of mind, and I shall be able to show you presently that the difficulty is not a difficulty which arises, if we will only be in earnest with the notion that what we have got before us is not substance but subject.

Equally it is true that the forms of history belong to the finite. That is another reproach which has been urged against the standpoint of the German idealists, that they identify God with Spirit as it discloses itself in history. But the forms of history are finite, just as the forms of human mind are finite. It is even conceivable that there may be finite forms higher than any that disclose themselves in humanity or in history, and which, just because they are finite forms, must turn out to be inadequate to the conception of God. The lesson one learns, the deeper one digs down into this ground, is the complete relativity of human knowledge, in a more thorough-going sense of the expression than

that which has been current. The way of looking at things of our everyday standpoint leads us to anthropomorphism in a fashion which is still more menacing to the desire to reach the truth than is ordinarily conceived. We have to be in earnest with the view that God is mind, and nothing short of mind, if we are to make any progress.

Now, I shall digress for a few moments from this very abstract and difficult line of thought to some parallel teaching. It is always interesting if one finds that what one has been searching for and thinks one has arrived at has something corresponding to it in the conclusions that have been reached by other men at other times. First of all I will take you back over two thousand years, and I will tell you what Aristotle said, as the result of his consideration of this very problem. I am going to quote to you a passage from the XIIth Book of the *Metaphysics*, 7th chapter, and the rendering which I shall offer you is a rendering of a passage so obscure that I should have but little confidence in my translation, but for some extremely competent assistance which has been given to me. Not only have I had the advantage of comparing the versions given by Bonitz and by Schwegler, but Principal Donaldson and Professor Burnet have been so good as to make suggestions as to the rendering.

“The intelligence,” says Aristotle, “which is complete in its own nature is the intelligence

which has for its object that which is good in its own nature, and the absolute intelligence has for its object what is absolutely good. But the mind thinks itself when it comprehends what is intelligible; when it comprehends, and so, as it were, is in contact with what is intelligible, it becomes intelligible to itself. So that the mind and what is the mind's object are one and the same. For the capacity to grasp the intelligible that is the substance of reality is mind, and mind realises itself or becomes actual in doing so. For what of divine the mind seems to possess consists in its actuality as distinguished from its mere potentiality, and what is most agreeable and best is the realised act of contemplation. If what is divine is eternally as blessed as we at times are, this is worthy of admiration; if it is blessed in a higher degree, yet more worthy. That, however, is the real characteristic of the divine. It has life in it, for the activity of mind is life, and mind is activity. Pure and absolute activity is its most perfect and its eternal life. Thus it is that we come to say of God that He is an eternal and most perfect living being. Life is His, unbroken eternal existence, for that is of the essential nature of the divine." You will appreciate at once how closely that approaches to the Hegelian view which I have been putting before you in these lectures. It is remarkable, looking over the sea of time that separates us from Aristotle, how clear a vision we get of a great intellect

working out the very same problems that we have to-day, and working them out to similiar conclusions.

Now I pass from Aristotle to another great mind of a very different order. Perhaps the profoundest critic of life that ever existed was Goethe; certainly his was one of the most comprehensive intellects that the world has seen. Now Goethe was not nominally a metaphysician; indeed he might rather be said to have laughed at all philosophy. Many of you will recall the passage in *Faust* in which Mephistopheles interviews the student and says to him :

“Grau, theurer Freund, ist alle Theorie,
Und grün des Lebens goldner Baum.”

Well, but although Goethe was not a professed metaphysician, and may be said, indeed, to have professed *not* to be a metaphysician, he was far more of one than people generally think. That great mind missed nothing. It had the power of taking in the most different aspects of things, and setting them together in great conceptions. There is a metaphor which Mr Gladstone once used of a great Parliamentary orator of his younger days. He said of him that “his oratory took in as vapour what it gave back in torrent.” You may say of Goethe that he absorbed in their most abstract form the theories of science and philosophy and poured them back in the concrete riches of his poetry. For Goethe this question of the

nature of God was one which was profoundly interesting. If you wish to see how closely he had given his mind to it you have only to turn up the Correspondence, which is published in two volumes, between him and Schiller, and to read some of the letters in the beginning of the second volume. There is one in particular which was written from Weimar to Schiller, who was then at Jena, on the 6th of January 1798, from which it is plain that Goethe had been studying very closely the teaching of Schelling. It is also plain from the letters written about that period that Schiller had been urging on him the study of Kant, and that Goethe had applied himself to Kant and also to some of the writings of Fichte. Goethe also, as we know from the Eckermann Conversations, saw a great deal of Hegel. To what extent he was influenced by the younger men we are not told, but in his writings there are things which very plainly point to the influence on him of Spinoza and also of the great school of German idealists. There is one well-known poem of which I will give you a rendering which has been furnished to me, a poem which very strikingly illustrates the artist's grasp of the very conception which I have been pressing on you throughout these lectures, that God is to be sought not in some distant world, there and then, but here and now, in what is present to us, but comprehended in larger and fuller conceptions than any that ordinarily pass current.

I will quote first the English rendering, and then I will read the poem to you in the German.

“In His name who hath Himself created,
And through eternity createth still ;
In His name who summoned into being
Faith, Love, Strength, Activity, and Will ;
In name of Him whom each man calls upon,
But Whom in essence no man ever knows :

As far as ear, as far as eye can reach,
All that we know is in His image shown,
That image and that likeness which suffice
The spirit's highest inspiration.
It speeds thee on, impels thee forward still,
And where thou wanderest all is fair for thee,
No longer shalt thou mark or reckon time,
But measureless shall every footstep be.

What were a God who ruled as from without,
Who let the world about His finger spin ?
Should He not be in Nature self-revealed,
And move and guide us rather from within ?
That all things which in Him exist and live,
May fail in naught of what His power can give.

Also there is a Universe within,
And thence the goodly custom which arose,
That every man should hail as very God,
The highest and the holiest thing he knows,
Shall yield both Heaven and Earth unto His sway,
Should fear Him, yea, and love Him where he may.”

Some of you who know your Goethe will recognise at once the first poem in the collection which he published under the title of “*Gott und Welt.*” I will now give it in German, because

you have it there in a way which even the best English version cannot reproduce.

“Im Namen dessen, der Sich selbst erschuf
Vor Ewigkeit in schaffendem Beruf;
In seinem Namen, der den Glauben schafft,
Vertrauen, Liebe, Thätigkeit und Kraft;
In jenes Namen, der so oft genannt,
Dem Wesen nach blieb immer unbekannt:

So weit das Ohr, so weit das Auge reicht,
Du findest nur Bekanntes, das Ihm gleicht,
Und deines Geistes höchster Feuerflug,
Hat schon am Gleichniss, hat am Bild genug;
Es zieht dich an, es reizt dich heiter fort,
Und wo du wandelst, schmückt sich Weg und Ort;
Du zählst nicht mehr, berechnest keine Zeit,
Und jeder Schritt is Unermesslichkeit.

Was wär' ein Gott der nur von Aussen stiesse,
Im Kreis das All am Finger laufen liesse,
Ihm zients die Welt im Innern zu bewegen,
Natur in Sich, Sich in Natur zu hegen,
So dass, was in Ihm lebt und webt und ist,
Nie seine Kraft, nie Seinen Geist vermisst.

Im Innern ist ein Universum auch;
Daher der Völker löblicher Gebrauch,
Das Jeglicher das Beste, was er kennt,
Er Gott, ja seinen Gott benennt,
Ihm Himmel und Erden uebergiebt,
Ihn fürchtet, und wo möglich liebt.”

Well, I will quote to you finally yet another great man, and again of a very different type. Luther, in his *Commentary on the Book of Daniel*, has given us his definition of God, or perhaps it would be more accurate to say his test of what is a

real conception of God. "A God," he says, "is simply that whereon the human heart rests with trust, faith, hope, and love. If the resting is right, then the God is right; if the resting is wrong, then the God, too, is illusory." *

Now all these definitions by men of such different minds as Aristotle, Goethe, and Luther, are interesting in this, that they fix upon us the imperative necessity of beginning with the *here* and *now* if we would get to the nature of God. We must look within ourselves. We must take mind as it is and see what abstractions, what contractions, our plane of comprehension has brought about, and if we find that by criticism we can free ourselves from these abstractions, then the way lies open to getting a plainer conception of what it is that we are in search of. And so it comes about that not only the metaphysicians but the poets have been able to throw a light upon what, after all, is the most profoundly absorbing problem which can occupy humanity.

I now go back to the point at which I had arrived. I have shown you what is the relation of man to God, that it is the relation of mind comprehending itself at a lower level to mind comprehend-

* "Verum cum in Scriptura etiam idola aliquando Dii vocentur, cumque Deus nihil aliud sit quam id, cui cor humanum se credit, in quod spem omnem reponit, in quo fiduciam fixam habet, quod amat. Si fiducia pia ac bona est tum et Deus verus est. Si fiducia illa erronea ac falsa est, tum et Deus nihil est." —Luther, *Commentarius in Daniele Prophetam* (Frankfort 1556), p. 200 *recto*.

ing itself at the highest level. Now if that be true man must be at once in union with and in separation from God. If man's mind be just the infinite mind comprehended at a lower plane, then it is evident that you must have all the indications of unity in combination with difference. And this is because of the very character and nature of thought, as I have already set it out before you in the earlier lectures of this series. The nature of the mind is to be activity, and not only activity, but dialectical activity; that is to say, activity which is always seeking to realise itself in a higher truth, in which it takes up aspects which it had before fixed upon and set. One finds evidence of this in the recognition made in all ages of the necessarily progressive nature of the human mind. You see it, for example, in the doctrine of the Fall, and of the Atonement. In the pictorial representation which is given of man's early condition you have the state of childlike innocence, from which there was first a parting and then the return back to a state of childlike innocence, but not until after much that was disastrous had been passed through. But there is a difference between the state of mind of Adam before the Fall, and the state of mind to which man is represented as brought back in the scheme of salvation. In the mind of Adam you have childlike innocence, no doubt, but it is the innocence that comes of ignorance. In the course of man's redemption you have a mind brought back to God after having travelled along devious ways,

but ways which lead on to a higher level, until in the end the new dispensation is seen to be a higher dispensation than the old. And the reason of this is just that the mind of man has been in all ages recognised as having this double nature, the tendency to alienate itself from God, and the tendency, not less strongly marked, to bring itself back again.

Man is conscious of separation from God in that he is conscious of evil. But that is only one side of man's nature. He is finite spirit, and in his finiteness lies the possibility of the alienation. But he is free finite spirit, for freedom is of the very essence of spirit in whatever form you find it. Man can choose evil or he can choose the return to God. He is therefore responsible. He only does choose evil when he abstracts from his real relation to God, and so ignores and shuts out his higher nature.

Now much speculation has been concentrated in theological commentary upon the meaning of what is called the sin against the Holy Ghost. It is pretty plain that the idea underlying that sin is simply the idea of the man who shuts himself out from his higher nature, concentrates upon the moment of alienation and excludes the moment of return. It is a sin which is unforgivable in the sense that there can be no talk of forgiveness for the mind which does not seek forgiveness, which does not seek by surrender of its finite ends to free itself from the alienation. That has always seemed

to me to be the idea which underlay the thoughts of those who laid stress upon the peculiar and baffling nature of this sin.

But now look at the other side of the picture. Man is conscious of separation from God; that is to say, he is conscious of evil. But he is also in potential union with God. He is conscious of the capacity to lift himself towards God; that is to say, he has religion. When he renounces the will to live, his private will, the will which seeks his own finite ends, he has made the first step towards his reconciliation with God; that is to say, towards the transcending of the separation which has divided him from God, because, as we have seen, it is these very finite ends, which by hypothesis he is now renouncing, that have so coloured his view of things, so dominated his self-comprehension, as to throw his mind into the form of evil, of alienation. The consciousness of the possibility of identity with God is the consciousness of the higher side of his nature. Man dies to his private self in order to live, when he renounces his private will. His ends now become God's ends. Religion is an affair of the will, of a choice of ends, of an identification of the will with the divine will. It is therefore not theoretical but practical; it belongs to the sphere of the will.

The consciousness of this potential identity, of the significance of the renunciation which is necessary if we are to transcend the endless chase which is the characteristic of every process in

time, including the effort, however strenuous, at self-realisation in a social life in the world, is just religion. But, as in the case of the self-representative series which we discussed before, the life in this world, the life in *heterenity*, is an essential moment in the process without which the higher could not come to be. We have to die that we may live, and we equally have to live that we may die. The old dispensation is essential for the accomplishment of the new dispensation.

One understands better, in the light of these considerations, why it was that the chase of psychology after the self, which I traced out for you in the old course of lectures, proved so vain. The self of man in ultimate analysis discloses itself as free finite spirit. It cannot be got at as spirit, as subject, by the abstract and presentational method of psychology. This was found to consist in the fixing upon an aspect of the mind which was artificially set by itself and preserved in rigid self-identity. The method of presentationism, as explained and criticised by Professor Münsterberg in the book which I quoted to you so much in the last lectures, consists in the taking of the mind as though it were but an object, fixing it in thought as if it were but a series of feelings succeeding one another in time, and regarding the conception so obtained as an adequate conception of the mind. So it is for the purposes of psychology; you must treat it so if you are to get that possibility of measurement which

first becomes open to you by connecting the series so obtained with the physical events to which the modern physiological psychologist attaches so much importance. But that is not a final notion of the mind, and it is not a notion which can ever lead you to any adequate grasp of the self. The self we can get at, but only after we have found that the process of psychological analysis is of no use for our purpose. If you take the two moments in the presentation of the individual, body and soul, and seek for the conception in which alone they cease to be self-contradictory abstractions, you find it in the conception of the finite self as free finite spirit. Because the comprehension of the free spirit is here finite, its self-comprehension does not wholly overcome the externality in which it appears before itself, if I may use an expression that I have used before. Because his plane of comprehension is imperfect nature appears to man as a series of facts in mutual exclusion. It discloses a want of rationality and a certain contingency, inasmuch as he cannot bring these mutually exclusive events into any relationship which will rid them of the foreign aspect which they present to thought.

But it is only for finite mind, the mind which operates under finite categories and by understanding, as distinguished from the comprehension of reason, that nature appears thus hard-and-fast. Hegel points out in a passage in his *Philosophy of Religion* that "Nature enters into a relation with man only, and not on its own account into a relation

with God, for nature is not knowledge; God is Spirit, but nature knows nothing of Spirit.”*

Now, that is a very remarkable piece of criticism. What Hegel says is that, for the knowledge of God, nature does not appear as it does to us, and that it is real only at the plane of self-comprehension of the finite mind. In a higher kind of knowledge nature would not appear as it does to us, would not exist in the fixity and contingency which characterises it for our finite plane of reflection. The form, he says, in which you find nature arises only in and through the finite mind. It is only for the spirit that is limited by the categories of finiteness that the vision of nature as external, irrational, and irresolvable by intelligence, exists, just as in the same way it is only for the finite spirit that evil exists. The man who could always remain at a high plane would not be tempted. It is only when he lets himself down to the lower level that he is apt to make the choice of what is evil. And so it comes that it is only for finite spirit and because of the freedom of finite spirit that evil exists. Evil has no direct relation to God any more than nature has. Both appear only in the relations of finiteness and for the spirit that is finite.

There is another very important passage of Hegel which occurs just a few sentences above the one which I have quoted to you from the *Religions-*

* Hegel, *Philosophy of Religion*, English Translation, vol. iii. p. 42.

Philosophie, and I will read it, because it may now throw light for you on what we have been discussing :—

“Another question,” says Hegel, “or what is partly the same question with a broader meaning, is raised when it is said that the world or matter, inasmuch as it is regarded as having existed from all eternity, is uncreated and exists immediately for itself. The separation made by the understanding between form and matter lies at the basis of this statement ; while the real truth is that matter and the world, regarded according to their fundamental characteristics, are this Other, the negative which is itself simply a moment or element of posited being. This is the opposite of something independent, and the meaning of its existence is simply that it annuls itself, and is a moment in the process. The natural world is relative, it is appearance ; *i.e.*, it is this not only for us but implicitly, and it belongs to its quality or character to pass over and return into the ultimate Idea.

“ . . . The Idea is manifested, but its content is just the manifestation, and consists in its distinguishing itself as an Other, and then taking back this Other into itself, so that the expression taking back applies equally to what is done outside and inside. In nature these stages break up into a system of Kingdoms of Nature of which that of living things is the highest. Life, however, the highest form in which the Idea exhibits itself in nature, is simply something which sacrifices itself and whose essence

is to become Spirit, and this act of sacrifice is the negativity of the Idea as against its existence in this form. Spirit is just this act of advance into reality by means of nature; *i.e.*, Spirit finds its antithesis or opposite in Nature, and it is by the annulling of this opposition that it exists for itself and is Spirit. The finite world is the side of the difference which is put in contrast with the side which remains in its unity, and thus it breaks up into the natural world and the world of finite Spirit.”* There you have in Hegel’s own language the substance of what it has taken three lectures to set out before you.

Now I have discussed how it is that we come to appear to ourselves as though our mind had a local position in space and time and were a product of natural evolution, because that is the meaning of what we have been considering, the appearance of nature as something which limits the mind, as the *other*, to which the mind stands in relation. The understanding fixes exclusively upon the moment of antithesis in the logical process. It fixes upon the limitation of the mind which is characteristic of the finite standpoint, discovers the other of the mind in nature, and then proceeds to set in contrast to mind the nature which confronts it. One aspect becomes dependent upon the other and cannot be separated from it. The finite mind is conscious of itself as belonging

* Hegel, *Philosophy of Religion*, English Translation, vol. iii., p. 40.

to the object world, and so as related to nature, and not only to nature in the sense of mere externality in space and time, but to other finite minds which it conceives as having, not only a connection with nature, but a local position in it, as having position in space and as being, like itself, the product of evolution in time.

The finite mode of looking at things never completely transcends the appearance of externality that is characteristic of its finiteness; indeed, if it did, our knowledge would be not the knowledge of finite men but as God's knowledge. Yet its concepts, its concepts even of itself, are altering, developing concepts. In the finite mind you have as its characteristic the dialectical movement, the process of self-comprehension and, in that sense, of self-evolution, just as markedly as you have it in the absolute mind, but with the stages less perfectly separated out. If you take the finite mind as it manifests itself to itself in externality, the consciousness of a child, let us say, and trace it psychologically, you find that this is so. As I showed you in the first set of lectures, the true view of the way in which a child's mind grows is not to look on it as a process of piecing together ideas which exist in independent completeness and are as it were brought in and put together like a tessellated pavement in the child's mind. The true view is that there is a development from what is indefinite to what is definite, the differentiation of what begins as a psychological *continuum* into

more definite form. All this has been worked out by Professor Ward in his great article on "Psychology" in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*; and I do not go back to the matter because I discussed it pretty fully in last year's lectures. The point of it is that the child's mind differentiates itself through the course of its experience out of what is indefinite.

Now if that be true we have in it just the imperfect picture in time of what takes place in thought. In thought you have what comes first, implying, as what gives meaning to it and gives it reality, the larger conception which it may reach only at the end of a process in time, but which was implicit from the very beginning. In nature we see stages in the evolution of logical conception. We have such stages in number, the externality of which is transcended in the categories of mechanism, categories which import and imply something more than rigid externality. Yet these are themselves transcended in life, where you have got rid of the indifference to each other of the parts in mechanism, and have reached the whole which realises itself in and controls the parts and yet is nothing outside or distinct from them. In like manner you have the spectacle of what is a progressively fuller self-comprehension on the part even of the finite mind. We can see how that arises not only in our individual selves but in our social consciousness. Take my relation to other people in the world in which I live. My conscious-

ness of myself and the meaning which I attach to my own personality are a consciousness and a meaning which grow as grows the definiteness of my conception of the other persons. The one reacts upon the other. The comprehension of the identity of the self with that other who is recognised as equally a self, bound together with me in a common social whole, is one of the instruments by which I work out my own self-comprehension. The notion of such a whole is larger than the notion of the particular self from which I start, because it is freer from the exclusiveness of externality. If I think of myself merely as *M* or *N* confronted by a mechanical world, I think of two objects which I separate from each other as substances. When I think of *M* or *N* as in a social world with duties and obligations and common ties with other inhabitants of that world, then I have got to a larger and higher conception, and one at which I am above the externality of nature.

In his book on *Philosophical Theory of the State*, Professor Bosanquet has worked this out very fully. He shows how the reflection of the action of our own selves in the action of other men and women does much to stimulate and to develop our own consciousness of self. He draws the inference that every social group, the family, the city, the state, is the exhibition in space and time of the totality of the corresponding mental systems of individual minds. The social group or whole, he points out, must be a whole gathering

into itself psychical dispositions and activities, answering to one another in indeterminate ways. The social whole is therefore of the nature of a continuous or self-identical mind pervading a system of differences and realised in them. It differs from a machine, and even from a living organism, in that the whole is present in every part, not merely for the observer, but, through the nature of consciousness, in some degree, at least, for the part itself. It is not the less real because it is in a plurality of natural individuals that it is realised. And, like all the conceptions of reason, it contains the potentiality of its own supersession in a yet deeper and fuller conception. Purpose, the seeking to fulfil definite ends, has brought it about. Deeper purposes and larger ends point us to a continuation that goes beyond it.

Now that is the analysis of a philosopher. Let me contrast it with the same conclusion reached by one who was not a professed philosopher and whom I have quoted before, Carlyle. I shall just take a few sentences from *Sartor Resartus*, because they very strikingly illustrate the way in which Carlyle had come to much the same view of the nature of the relation of man to the social whole as has Professor Bosanquet, and as have those who have maintained the thesis which is the subject of these lectures.

“Of man’s Activity and Attainment,” says Carlyle in the 8th chapter of the Second Book of *Sartor Resartus*, “the chief results are aeriform,

mystic, and preserved in Tradition only : such are his Forms of Government, with the Authority they rest on ; his Customs, or Fashions both of Cloth-habits and of Soul-habits ; much more his collective stock of Handicrafts, the whole Faculty he has acquired of manipulating Nature : all these things, as indispensable and priceless as they are, cannot in any way be fixed under lock and key, but must flit, spirit-like, on impalpable vehicles, from Father to Son ; if you demand sight of them, they are nowhere to be met with. Visible Ploughmen and Hammermen there have been, even from Cain and Tubal-Cain downwards : but where does your accumulated Agricultural, Metallurgic, and other Manufacturing *Skill* lie warehoused. It transmits itself on the atmospheric air, on the Sun's rays (by Hearing and Vision) ; it is a thing aeriform, impalpable, of quite spiritual sort. In like manner ask me not, Where are the *Laws* ; where is the *Government* ? In vain wilt thou go to Schönbrunn, to Downing Street, to the Palais Bourbon : thou findest nothing there but brick or stone houses, and some bundles of papers, tied with tape. Where then is that same cunningly devised almighty *Government* of theirs to be laid hands on ? Everywhere yet nowhere : seen only in its works, this too is a thing aeriform, invisible ; or if you will, mystic and miraculous. So spiritual (*geistig*) is our whole daily Life : all that we do springs out of Mystery, Spirit, Invisible Force ; only like a little Cloud-image, or Armida's Palace, air-built, does

the Actual body itself forth from the great mystic Deep." *

Well, there you come very near to language which might be the language of any metaphysician, and yet it is the language of one who was observing in the concrete, and expressing merely the reflections which a historian, who was at the same time a poet, would make upon what passed before him.

I will conclude this lecture by quoting to you, in his own words, something else that Professor Bosanquet has said, because it is something that points us to what lies beyond even the ends and purposes which are embodied in the social whole.

"We have taken," he says, "Society and the State throughout to have their value in the human capacities which they are the means of realising, in which realisation their social aspect is an inevitable condition (for human nature is not complete in solitude), but is not, by itself, in its form of multitudes, the end. There is, therefore, no breach of continuity when the immediate participation of numbers, the direct moulding of life by the claims and relations of selves, falls away, and the human mind, consolidated and sustained by society, goes further on its path in removing contradictions and shaping its world and itself into unity. Art, philosophy, and religion, though in a sense the very life-blood of society, are not and could not be directly fashioned to meet the needs and uses of the multitude, and

* Carlyle, *Sartor Resartus*, Book II., Ch. 8.

their aim is not *in that sense* 'social.' They should rather be regarded as a continuation, within and founded on the Commonwealth, of the work which the Commonwealth begins in realising human nature; as fuller utterances of the same universal self which the 'general will' reveals in more precarious forms; and as in the same sense implicit in the consciousness of all, being an inheritance which is theirs so far as they can take possession of it." *

* Bosanquet, *Philosophical Theory of the State*, pp. 332, 333.

LECTURE VI

I WILL begin this lecture by answering a question which has been put to me by one of my audience. I am asked to explain how I understand self-consciousness to exist apart from actual physical brain-cells, changes within which are to be held responsible for all mind activity. Well, I dealt with that question at some length in the first six lectures of the last series, and the point of the answer which I then gave was this. All competent thinkers agree that you cannot stop with the mere picture of thought as a function of the brain. The brain and the whole of the external world as it appears in space and time are only there, in the deepest sense at all events, in the mind or *for* the mind that perceives them. That was what Berkeley and Mill taught, and what men like Mr Herbert Spencer teach, and the true controversy that arises is as to what brings about the appearance of objectivity or reality which this picture presents. I took Mill as my text in the lectures to which I allude, and I showed you how Mill brings you to the conclusion that it is in the fact that we *must* so think these things that we find what we mean by their reality.

I pointed out to you that this analysis was one which did not go deep enough, but that it at all events dispelled the notion that thought could be regarded merely as a function or product of the brain. It is quite true that in a certain way we do regard and must regard our minds as in time and as conditioned by a body which exists in space and time, but that view of the relationship belongs only to the picture which we have, as it were, painted for ourselves, and it is the hard-and-fastness of that picture which these lectures were directed to explain. I took an illustration, which perhaps is not a bad one upon this point, the illustration of the stereoscope. You look through the stereoscope at a flat piece of paper, and the lines which have been arranged on it stand out as if they were in three dimensions, instead of merely in two as we know they are. Now, everybody who looks through the stereoscope has the same conviction, that the lines are standing out in three dimensions. That is because everybody who looks through the stereoscope under the influence of suggestion thinks things in the same way, but abstracts from the circumstances in which his knowledge arises. He ignores the relation which would account for that abnormal presentation, and that is how he falls into the mistake of taking it to represent reality. In other words, he has not fully comprehended what is the object of his contemplation. Well, in the same way we form a picture of the mind as dependent on and contained by a body, a picture

the origin of which we do not fully comprehend. It is quite right that we should form such a picture ; it is the picture which we have to form in order to fulfil the purposes which are ours in our everyday intercourse with our fellow human beings. But the picture of the world that is ours and our fellow human beings' is a picture which has grown in its definiteness in a fashion akin to the picture which we get through the stereoscope. Therefore my answer to my questioner is that while this view is not only a legitimate one for everyday life, but the view which we adopt in psychological investigation, it is a view which is abstract, and that its abstractness arises from this, that the mind in making it has not fully comprehended its own operation. I should like to be able to follow out this topic, but were I to do so it would land me in anthropology and psychology, and it would take six lectures at least to trace out the whole of the reasons why the mind comes to present itself to itself in the form of something conditioned by a body. I have touched on it in some of the lectures in this series, but those of you who wish to follow the subject further, and who read German, cannot do better than turn to a book—a short book of about 130 pages—which was written by Erdmann on the subject, under the title *Leib und Seele*, and which has been re-edited by a Dutch professor, Professor Bolland. It is plain from Professor Bolland's Introduction to that book that whether Hegelianism is alive in Germany or not it is very much alive in Holland, and the book, to

which he has contributed some valuable notes, is the most modern exposition I know of the Hegelian position on this point.

Now I come back to my topic. In the last lecture which I delivered I pointed out to you that great thinkers of the most various types had been in accord with the conclusions to which I was leading you. I showed you that Aristotle and Goethe, approaching the subject in entirely different fashions, had arrived at what was in substance a common result. Now, to some of you it may seem depressing that after two thousand years of work we should be going back to Aristotle, and discovering that he had found out these things long ago. But there is another side to that reflection. It is comforting to think that the truth is nothing so buried away that the human intelligence has not been able to get at it. It is a satisfaction that the great thinkers, in their diverse investigations into the meaning of reality, have arrived at substantially the same result as to its ultimate nature. That gives you the sense that the ground is more solid than people sometimes make out. There is another consideration which must be borne in mind by those who think that there ought to be the same sort of progress in philosophy that there is in science. In science the results which are reached by one generation are often superseded by the further results obtained by a subsequent generation. Much of what even Newton taught us is no longer sufficient, for mathematics and physics have now got

further than Newton had got. But that arises from the character of what science has to deal with. Science investigates—I am taking science in its narrower sense—the relations of things in space and time, and because it is carrying out the investigation of relations in space and time it is dealing with a field in which an endless progress is inevitable. There is no limit to space, there is no limit to time, considered as stretched out before us, and therefore there is no end to the possibilities of an inquiry conducted progressively into the content of that world which is stretched out in space and in time. You are always adding to your knowledge, and your method cannot sum up the series.

But there is another department of the mind where what you meet with is quite different in character. In art you deal with the concrete immediacy that confronts you. You do not try to break things up into abstract relations; you try to grasp what is highest in the world as it seems, and to present it at the highest level that the human mind is capable of. That is done, not by analysis, but by the insight of genius, when you have art in its highest form, and the result is that it is done once for all. We do not expect that the progress of another two thousand years will enable the human intelligence to produce anything greater of its kind than a Dante, or a Shakespeare, or a Milton has given to us. They have shown us what the *aperçu* of the human mind at its highest can amount to. We do not ask that what they have done should

be superseded, because we see that it is individual and cannot recur.

Well, philosophy stands midway between science and art. It too, like art, is not concerned with the endless progress of space and time relations. But, unlike art, its business is to comprehend in the forms of abstract thought, and consequently it occupies an intermediate position, a position in which it has, as it were, to deal with a series, but to deal with it upon the side of its summing up. And in that way philosophy, while it discloses progress, can disclose it only in the form of an increasingly complete grasp of the conception of reality which its great founders have fashioned out.

The history of philosophy is indeed no vain succession of system succeeded by system and thrown aside as if it had not been. We witness in this history the progressive deepening of the grasp which the human mind has got upon the nature of reality; we see the evolution of a conception in which past systems are not left behind as they would be on a journey through the world, but in which what is true in these past systems is taken up and preserved in those that succeed them.

Well, that is a reflection which may give some comfort to those who despair of philosophy. Philosophy is really the study of the self-comprehension of the mind, and its subject is neither the endless progress which you have in science, nor the immediacy and individuality of the sense pictures with which art deals.

Now I want to sum up, because I think it may make a little more clear to you what I have been doing, the result of the standpoint which I have been seeking to suggest to you, in other words than my own, and I am going to take a passage—or rather two passages—from Hegel and to give you in his own words what his view of the work of philosophy is. “The world,” he says, “into whose depths *thought* penetrates is a supra-sensuous world, which is thus, to begin with, erected as a beyond over against immediate consciousness and present sensation; the power which thus rescues itself from the *here* that consists in the actuality and finiteness of sense, is the freedom of thought in knowledge. But the mind is able to heal this schism which its advance creates; it generates,” and here he is speaking of a particular phase of it, “out of itself the works of fine art as the first middle term of reconciliation between pure thought and what is external, sensuous, and transitory, between nature, with its finite actuality, and the infinite freedom of the reason that comprehends.”*

Then he goes on in a passage later in the same book to say this:—†

“The modern moralistic view starts from the fixed antithesis of the will in its spiritual universality to its sensuous natural particularity, and consists, not in the completed reconciliation of these contrasted sides, but in their conflict with one another,

* Hegel, *Introduction to Philosophy of Fine Art*, Bosanquet's Translation, p. 13.

† *Ibid.*, p. 101.

which involves the requirement that the impulses which conflict with duty ought to yield to it. This antithesis does not merely display itself for our consciousness in the limited region of moral action ; but also emerges as a fundamental distinction and antagonism between that which is essentially and in its own right, and that which is external reality and existence. Formulated in the abstract, it is the contrast of the universal and particular when the former is explicitly fixed over against the latter, just as the latter is over against the former ; more concretely, it appears in nature as the opposition of the abstract law against the abundance of individual phenomena, each having its own character ; in the mind as the sensuous and spiritual in man, as the battle of the spirit against the flesh, of duty for duty's sake, the cold command, with the individual interest, the sensuous inclinations and impulses, the individual disposition as such ; as the hard conflict of inward freedom and of natural conception—empty in itself—compared with full concrete vitality ; or of theory and subjective thought contrasted with objective existence and experience.

“These are antitheses which have not been invented either by the subtlety of reflection or by the pedantry of philosophy, but which have from all time and in manifold forms preoccupied and disquieted the human consciousness, although it was modern culture that elaborated them most distinctly, and forced them up to the point of most unbending contradiction. Intellectual culture and

the modern play of understanding create in man this contrast, which makes him an amphibious animal, inasmuch as it sets him to live in two contradictory worlds at once; so that even consciousness wanders back and forwards in this contradiction, and, shuttle-cocked from side to side, is unable to satisfy itself *as* itself on one side or the other. For, on the one side, we see man a prisoner in common reality and earthly temporality, oppressed by want and poverty, hard driven by nature, entangled in matter, in sensuous aims and their enjoyments; on the other side, he exalts himself to eternal ideas, to a realm of thought and freedom, imposes on himself as a *will* universal laws and attributions, strips his world of its living and flourishing reality, and dissolves it into abstractions, inasmuch as the mind is put upon vindicating its rights and its dignity simply by denying the rights of nature and maltreating it, thereby retaliating the oppression and violence which itself has experienced from nature. Such a discrepancy in life and consciousness involves for modern culture and its understanding the demand that the contradiction should be resolved. Yet the understanding cannot release itself from the fixity of these antitheses. The solution, therefore, remains for consciousness a mere ought, and the present and reality only stir themselves in the unrest of a perpetual to and fro, which seeks a reconciliation without finding it. Thus the question arises, whether such a many-sided and fundamental

opposition, which never gets beyond a mere ought and a postulated solution, can be the genuine and complete truth, and, in general, the supreme purpose. If the culture of the world has fallen into such a contradiction, it becomes the task of philosophy to undo or cancel it, *i.e.*, to show that neither the one alternative in its abstraction nor the other in similar one-sidedness possesses truth, but that they are essentially self-dissolving; that truth only lies in the conciliation and mediation of the two, and that this mediation is no mere postulate, but is in its nature and in reality accomplished, and always self-accomplishing. This intention agrees directly with the natural faith and will, which always has present to the mind's eye precisely this resolved antithesis, and in action makes it its purpose and achieves it. All that philosophy does is to furnish a reflective insight into the essence of the antithesis in so far as it shows that what constitutes truth is merely the resolution of the antithesis, and that not in the sense that the conflict and its aspects in any way *are not*, but in the sense that they *are*, *in reconciliation*."*

Well, there you have the substance and essence of what I have been saying put in another form. It is a summing up of the method which thought must resort to if it is to get rid of the gaps and the antithesis which itself has created. The nature of thought and reality cannot be got at psychologically

* Hegel, *Introduction to Philosophy of Fine Art*, Bosanquet's Translation, p. 101.

by the presentationism which isolates thought from feeling and gives it a relational and what is sometimes called a discursive appearance. Great difficulty has been caused in the understanding of idealism by the notion that things exist, on the one hand, out there in their hard-and-fastness independently of the mind for which they are what they are, and on the other hand, that thought is something that we can isolate and distinguish from the other faculties and contents of the mind as if it had a position by itself. In grammar we break up the language which embodies thought into different parts, the subject, the predicate, and the copula, as though the copula were something which had existence apart from the other two which it unites. It is grammar and the old division of logic, based upon a scheme which Aristotle who founded it probably used for a special purpose and not as a guide to what he was teaching his pupils of the nature of reality, that have led to much of the difficulty that we often experience to-day. Just as in psychology we fall into presentationism—to use Münsterberg's phrase which I have so often used before in these lectures—the setting of feeling as not, what it is in reality, a part of the continuous flow of the content of the mind, but as something which can be isolated and treated as though it had an independent existence apart from the other contents of the mind, so in ordinary logic and psychology we are very apt to do the same with thought. We do it for some purposes, and it is right that

we should do it for some purposes, just as in psychology it is necessary to resort to the method of presentationism, but when you come to talk of the nature of reality and when you are inquiring into the meaning of things by the methods which we are using here, the conception of thought in which it is presented as an element existing apart from feeling is not only a narrow one, but a false and extremely misleading one.

Of course, thoughts do not make things. It is ridiculous to suppose that thought, in that narrow sense, can give you the meaning and nature of reality as consisting in what is reducible to such thought. The ignoring of the fact that thought has a wider meaning in which it embraces the entire activity of the mind, has led to a vast amount of confusion and fallacious reasoning.

Yet it is by asking what to be means, and by purifying our notion of the work of the mind, which bodies itself forth in reality, from the abstract fashions of regarding it which are useful for everyday purposes, that we make progress. The plane of our degree of reality in the self-development of absolute self-comprehension is what we have to clear our minds about. Our self-comprehension, the self-comprehension of finite mind, is only partial, just because mind in that form has imposed on itself the categories of what is partial, the conceptions of finitude. But we cannot entertain the notion that such limitations are final in the mind that fully comprehends itself as that within which all reality falls.

For the absolute mind and in the absolute mind to think must be to create. It is obvious that in saying this I am taking the word "thought" in the wider sense. To think is to create; in other words, for this is the other side of that reflection, intelligence and will must fall together. If we were at the plane of absolute self-comprehension, relieved from those categories of finitude which are always imposing upon us the necessity of conceiving everything as having reference to another beyond it, something foreign to itself, we should comprehend the world as God comprehends it.

Now, this idea of complete self-comprehension is no new idea. You find it in the poets. I go for illustration to another poet, a speculative poet, yet one who was less speculative than Goethe. Most of you here know Tennyson's little poem, a very short one, on the flower in the crannied wall:

"Flower in the crannied wall,
I pluck you out of the crannies;
Hold you here, root and all, in my hand,
Little flower—but if I could understand
What you are, root and all, and all in all,
I should know what God and Man is."

Well, God as self-consciousness, the basis and presupposition of even our capacity to reflect about Him, must have an object from which He distinguishes Himself. I showed you in a previous lecture that even a sceptical question could only be raised upon the basis that it was an "I" that reflects, that to be self-conscious was the very characteristic

of mind, that the very nature of mind consisted in being self-conscious. But in self-consciousness we distinguish the self from something else. This is of the essence of the conception of self, and that characteristic must in some sort be the characteristic of Absolute Mind, as it is of mind at the plane of finite comprehension. If the Absolute Mind must have, as is implied in the fact of self-consciousness, an object, it is plain that that object can only be itself. For the Absolute Mind nothing can have any meaning, outside itself. Its object must fall within itself, can only be within itself. It must find the necessary distinction from itself in an Other that is just itself. The mind of God must have in its Other itself, and must recognise in that Other just Himself in the form of otherness.

Now that is not a modern conception. That is a conception which was embodied by Aristotle in his famous definition of God, the infinite intelligence, as the *νόησις νοήσεως*, "the knowledge of itself by knowledge." Absolute Mind can only think itself, and can only find the necessary distinction from itself in the Other which is just itself. That Other is *for* it, and the only finitude that comes in is not, and cannot be, finitude as belonging to the Absolute Mind as such, but to the Absolute Mind as Other to itself. It must recognise in its object itself, and itself as having assumed as object the form of finitude which for the Absolute Mind is thus an aspect in its own self-comprehension. Just because the other, the object of which the Absolute

Mind is conscious, is mind itself, the other must appear as a mind which knows, but knows having assumed the form of finitude. The Absolute Mind, of course, does not as such comprehend under the form of finitude, but its object, which is just itself as subject known as such in knowledge, appears as mind which has imposed upon itself the form of dependence on another to which it stands in contrast, and therefore knows under finite categories.

Now, if that is so the Absolute Mind has before it in the mind which is its object a mind for which nature and evil, which cannot be for it directly, can arise because of the nature of finitude, and these therefore touch the Absolute Mind only indirectly, in an aspect only of its self-comprehension. That is how the Absolute Mind realises itself in the process into which it is necessary that it should go in order to the enrichment of its self-consciousness. Without an object there could be no self-consciousness; without these distinctions there could be no content for the Absolute Mind; and yet in making these distinctions it must comprehend them as falling within itself, and as created by itself.

That is how God's nature is eternal activity, how He, so to speak, goes out into series and yet remains as the sum of the series—an eternal *now* which is not distinguished from but is the inclusion in itself, in a superseded and transmuted form, of the moments of past and future. In an ordinary time series we distinguish past, present, and future as three moments

which are related to one another, and are not wholly mutually exclusive like parts in space, yet we never transcend wholly the foreignness which time presents, the externality to each other of the members of its series for thought. But in such a series as I have been describing to you the whole of the series is summed up in an eternal *now* which does not make time unmeaning, but must transmute and supersede the notion of the past and the future as facts which limit or make finite the now, the eternal now of perfect comprehension.

Well, the purpose of the Absolute Mind, the end which it seeks to realise, must be self-comprehension in its utmost fulness. Self-consciousness must go into otherness in order to enrich itself, and it must return into itself, so to speak, in order to be the self-consciousness of the Absolute Mind. That is to say, just as we found that the nature of thought was a triple movement, that mind posited itself in difference and then comprehended its unity with that difference in that the difference turned out to fall within itself and to form one whole with itself, so we have the same movement of thought, the same dialectic of the notion, when we come to the characteristic of Absolute Mind. Just because we are dealing with mind of which the nature is to be activity and dialectical activity, you must have these three moments in the Absolute Mind: the first, the aspect from which you proceed, that of mind which we may speak of as mind in itself in so far as we abstract in reflection from the movement;

then the mind setting itself in antithesis to itself as the condition of self-consciousness; and then the self-consciousness, the complete self-comprehension, as the totality which embraces the two. And it is obvious that we are not here describing a process in time; we are describing a whole in which the first two appear only as aspects, and in which the richest conception is the conception of the totality of the other two moments.

You get in this way three phases: Absolute Mind in itself; Absolute Mind in its heterogeneity or otherness, under the distinction which it has set up of itself from itself; and Absolute Mind in synthesis, a synthesis which is the real *prius* of the other two. If this is the true nature of mind, its dialectical character must show itself not merely in the abstract language in which metaphysics describes it, the difficult language which I have been using, but also in much more concrete forms. You have it in art. You have it in such poems of Goethe and Wordsworth as I quoted to you, where you witness recognition of dialectic as the real characteristic of the world when that world is closely enough scrutinised. And you have it also in religion. Now, religion is the side of things in which the relation of man to God is realised, not in abstract terms, but in feeling and in acts of will. The nature of God, the nature of Absolute Mind, is to exhibit the triple movement of dialectic, and so the nature of God, as conceived and presented in religion, must be a triplicity, a Trinity. The doctrine of the

Trinity is by no means a specially Christian doctrine. You find it in other religions. You find it in Greek thought; you find the traces of its foundation in the *Dialogues* of Plato. It penetrated deeply into the way of looking at things of the Neoplatonic School of Alexandria, and through the Neoplatonists it came to influence the early theologians in a very marked fashion. It is not merely in philosophers like Philo and Plotinus that you find the beginnings of this doctrine. You find just as definitely the same sort of doctrine appearing in teachers like Justin Martyr and Athanasius, who were much under the influence of Plato and at the same time prominent Christians.

The creeds have always spoken in pictorial language. That is essential, because religion is something which deals not with abstractions, with what is mediated by thought, but with the immediate, with feeling, with direct consciousness. The creeds speak in pictorial language, and because truths which can be represented only in metaphysical language and abstractly are thus put into pictorial conceptions, there is constantly strife arising over the pictures which the mind frames of the ultimate aspects of reality. As it is stated in the creeds the doctrine of the Trinity is essentially a doctrine which can be adequately expressed only in metaphysical language. It belongs to reason as distinguished from understanding. I mean, of course, by reason the attitude of mind which comprehends, as distinguished

from the mental attitude which merely apprehends. And just because a doctrine which belongs to reason has been seized on by understanding, much strife and much obscurity has arisen.

Hegel makes the observation that "those who oppose the doctrine of the Trinity are men who are guided merely by their senses and understanding." But he goes on to point out that the advocates of the doctrine have used images and metaphors which are responsible for the confusion. The apparent incomprehensibility arises simply from this, that people will try to express in images which belong to the region of space and time what belongs to a higher level than that of mere space and time relations. There can be no incomprehensibility in the doctrine of the Trinity if our view of the nature of thought be true, the view, namely, that the difficulties with which thought has to cope are difficulties of its own creation, which it must therefore be adequate to deal with.

Well, let us see whether we can compare our metaphysical result, the result which we have reached in these lectures, as to the nature of mind, with the theological expression of the doctrine to which I have just made reference.

The Gospel of John begins with this sentence:—"In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God." Now, the Greek which is translated "word" is "Logos," and it is evident that the expression "word" is a very imperfect translation of what is conveyed by

“Logos.” Logos is an expression which you find early in Greek philosophy, and it was a familiar expression in the School of Alexandria. It may well be that this sentence is an interpretive sentence which was inserted into the Gospel of John by somebody of a more metaphysical mind than its original writer. One might possibly paraphrase the first verse of John’s Gospel, rendering it in metaphysical language, thus: “In the beginning was the concrete actuality of Spirit, and this concrete actuality of Spirit stood in relation to God, and one aspect of God was the Spirit which was so related.” That, of course, is a paraphrase, but it is a paraphrase which comes very near to what seems to be the metaphysical meaning.

You have in the New Testament the recognition of the three moments on which metaphysics lays such stress. You have, first of all, that which in philosophy would be the aspect which belongs to what Hegel calls “Logic”—I mean the aspect which represents Mind taken in itself and apart from its consciousness of itself in another. Mind in itself may be said to represent what in theological language is described as the Father. In the element of the Son you have mind gone into otherness, heterogeneity, finite mind, the nature of which is conditioned by the externality which, as we saw, is only for and through the finite mind—God, in other words, imposing on Himself the limits of man’s finitude, and so only, in this fashion alone, coming into direct relation with

nature, with evil, and with death. Then there is the third moment in the movement, the return of the Absolute Mind into itself in the fulness of its self-consciousness, the Holy Spirit, the aspect in the Trinity which is in reality the logical *prius* of the two other aspects, aspects which are separable only in abstraction.

Now, if you take into account that these three aspects of one reality, although they are three, are yet one, and, although they are one, are yet so in the unity of an Absolute Mind which distinguishes itself and expresses itself under these three aspects, the difficulty of the doctrine of the Trinity turns out, as Hegel has said, to be due to the tendency of man to look at things always in the light of his abstractions of the understanding, instead of from the standpoint of reason which comprehends and so transcends its own distinctions.

Turning back to John's Gospel I may observe in passing that the view of the nature of Ultimate Reality which I have been suggesting, throws light on a point on which there was a great controversy in the early Church. If it be the case that the true conception of the nature of absolute mind is that it implies the contemplation of itself as in otherness, as having taken upon itself the guise of finiteness, and as at the same time being reunited with itself in the completeness of self-conscious spirit,—then the third, the complete actuality in which the others are separable only by abstraction, is a third which implies the union of the other two.

The actuality of self-conscious mind has, as its moments, not merely the first aspect in the antithesis, absolute mind, taken by itself, nor the second taken by itself, but the two in combination. Now what was in the thoughts of the early theologians of the School of Alexandria is not easy to determine. But they had inherited the Platonic view of the dialectical nature of reason, and it is evident that they ascribe such a nature to God as they conceived Him. It seems, therefore, that those who succeeded them were right in invoking their authority in support of the doctrine that the Holy Spirit must be taken as proceeding from the Son as well as from the Father. If so, the weight of authority in a great controversy of the Christian Church is with those who argued in the sense in which the Western Church ultimately resolved it.

The Logos, as I have said, was a familiar word to students of Greek philosophy. The Platonic doctrine of the dialectical relation of the one and the many had profoundly influenced the School of Alexandria. Now, the translation of this first sentence in John's Gospel is very difficult. It is discussed in a very learned and scholarly work which I regret to think is out of print, but which I have had the advantage of consulting in the preparation of these lectures. I refer to Principal Donaldson's *Critical History of Christian Literature and Doctrine from the Death of the Apostles to the Nicene Council*. Principal Donaldson points out

that the words in the verse in John are not just what some of the interpreters have taken them to be. The words are in Greek, *καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος*, not *καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος*. To translate *θεὸς* as "God" seems therefore to go too far; to render it as "divine" seems too little. That is why I have suggested the true translation as being that the Logos was an aspect of the divine, a rendering which would accord with the current tradition of the Alexandrian School. It seems as though what was meant was to indicate, not numerical identity, but a different aspect of one reality. Especially suggestive, as showing the frame of mind from which that expression may have originated, is Principal Donaldson's account of the teaching of Justin Martyr, who lived in the second century. Justin Martyr was a close student of Plato. He explains that he wishes to call himself a Christian "not because the teachings of Plato are different from those of Christ, but because they are not in all points like." He believed that his teacher, Plato, had learned much from Moses, and that in Plato there were even anticipations of the doctrine of the Cross. Now, the influence of the Platonic doctrine of the one and the many, which was very prominent in men like Justin Martyr, certainly did not diminish as the Church grew. Athanasius was Bishop of Alexandria, and his name is associated with a great creed. Two things are certain, the one that Athanasius had been brought largely in contact with Neoplatonism; the other, that Athan-

asius had nothing whatever to do with the Athanasian Creed. That document was composed very much later. It probably did not emerge in its completeness until the seventh century, and Athanasius, who lived in the fourth century, obviously could have had no direct connection with it. But the name of Athanasius was a name of great renown, and it may well be that those who constructed the Athanasian Creed thought that his was a suitable name, having regard to the nature of his teaching, to give authority to a doctrine which seemed to accord with what tradition associated with him.

On the question of the nature of the Athanasian Creed and its position in Church history, I do not, of course, feel competent to speak, but Harnack, whose *History of Dogma* is the source of most of such information as I have upon the subject, in the fourth volume of the English translation discusses the origin of this Creed, and defines it as "the transformation of the doctrine of the Trinity as an article of Faith to be inwardly appropriated, into an ecclesiastical legal statute on the observance of which salvation depends." He states that the Athanasian Creed was apparently a Gallican Rule of Faith explanatory of the Creed of Nicæa, and that, probably as early as the fifth century, it began with the famous phrase "Quicumque vult salvus esse." By degrees it grew into its position as a Confession in the eighth or ninth century. Now the Athanasian Creed is the Creed which settled once and for all

the controversy over the "filioque" clause. Those of you who have read Church history know that the "filioque" clause was the clause which affirmed that the Procession of the Holy Ghost was from the Son as well as from the Father, and that over this question the Western Church and the Eastern Church were divided. The Athanasian Creed, which declares that "The Holy Ghost is of the Father and of the Son; neither made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding," pronounced for the Western view, and of course became the Creed of the Western Church. It asserts that "Unity in Trinity and Trinity in Unity" is what is to be worshipped, and it thus lays down a doctrine, obviously of Platonic origin so far as its language goes, which accords with the metaphysical view which I have been setting before you. The Athanasian Creed has been much abused, but at least it has the merit of showing a speculative insight much more profound than that of the other creeds. The history of the "filioque" clause controversy illustrates how much more of resemblance than of difference we find between old thoughts and new, when we take the trouble to try to understand the context and the circumstances in which the old thoughts were expressed. As Hegel, in his *Proofs of the Existence of God*, says: "The consideration" (of the relation of the mind of man to Absolute Mind), "is a matter at once of the deepest and most elevated kind, and just because of this it is the most difficult of tasks. You cannot carry it on

by means of finite categories ; that is, the modes of thought which we employ in ordinary life and in dealing with contingent things, as well as those we are accustomed to in the sciences, don't suffice for it. The latter have their foundation, their logic, in connections which belong to what is finite ; such as cause and effect ; their laws, their descriptive terms, their modes of arguing, are purely relations belonging to what is conditioned, and which lose their significance at the heights where the Infinite is. They must indeed be employed, but at the same time they have always to be referred back to their proper sphere and have their meaning rectified."*

"The fact," he goes on, "of the fellowship of God and Man with each other involves a fellowship of Spirit with Spirit. It involves the most important questions. It is a fellowship, and this very circumstance involves the difficulty of at once maintaining the fact of difference, and of defining it in such a way as to preserve the fact of fellowship. That Man knows God implies, in accordance with the essential idea of communion or fellowship, that there is a community of knowledge ; that is to say, Man knows God only in so far as God Himself knows Himself in Man. This knowledge is God's self-consciousness, but it is at the same time a knowledge of God on the part of Man, and the knowledge of God by Man is a knowledge of Man

* Hegel, *Proofs of the Existence of God*, English Translation, p. 303.

by God. The Spirit of Man, whereby he knows God, is simply the Spirit of God Himself." *

Hegel's *Philosophy of Religion*, from the last part of which I have quoted these words—for the *Proofs of the Existence of God* are an Appendix to his *Philosophy of Religion*—is one of the most important parts of his system. It fills up several gaps in his teaching. And in the *Philosophy of Religion* you have, in addition, the exhibition of a rich and reverent mind letting itself go freely into the task of trying to bring order and clearness into the comprehension of the most difficult of all problems.

Well, religion is related to philosophy, to abstract knowledge, in a way which marks it out as, on the one hand, necessitating that abstract knowledge for orderliness in its own doctrines, and, upon the other hand, as containing in itself something which no abstract doctrine can supply. The forms of religion vary. Their expressions of the truth differ in different ages and with different minds. But in the highest forms of religion there is a common content or substance. Faith always means the sense that the true reality of the world lies in the unseen; not in that which is merely hidden from sight, in the ordinary sense, but in aspects which require the use of higher categories than those of everyday social life for their grasp.

The central doctrine of the Atonement illustrates this, for it implies the potential identity of man and God in *a single subject of knowledge*.

* Hegel, *Ibid*.

Excepting on this footing, it is hardly intelligible. What it signifies is the return into identity from difference, the conception which, throughout the history of thought, has underlain the profoundest forms of speculation. In the religious consciousness this return appears as an exercise of the will—as a dying to live and that others may live. Thus the deliverances of the religious consciousness, in its broad interpretation, converge, as do those of the æsthetic consciousness, towards the same result as the teaching of philosophy gives.

I have completed with that observation the first six lectures of this course. What I have done in them is to try to build up an affirmative conception of what philosophy means by the expression “God.” The result of my attempt has been to define God as mind that comprehends itself completely. Within such mind all reality—of whatever character or degree—must fall. It is a deduction from the definition that mind as it is in Man is this same self-comprehension, but at a plane or stage which is imperfect. I have shown you, further, that it is the nature and level of the purpose to be realised that determines the nature and level of the comprehension, and that thus it is in ends and not in causes that the explanation of the Universe is to be sought.

In this set of six lectures I have thus endeavoured to deal with the nature of what is Divine. My remaining four lectures will be directed to the nature of what is Human.

BOOK IV

FINITE MIND

LECTURE I

THE discussion of the nature of mind which occupied the last six lectures brought us to the conclusion that complete self-comprehension is the characteristic of mind, in the sense in which it is the equivalent of final and ultimate Reality. Such complete self-comprehension is, as I showed you, only possible in a consciousness where the categories, which are the forms of what, for want of a better expression, I will call its life and movement, are present in the entirety of their system and full relationship to each other. If mind concentrates under certain of these categories to the exclusion of others, and of their real relationship to these others and to the whole, imperfect self-comprehension is the characteristic of consciousness. Yet the very nature of reflection is to concentrate, in this partial and abstract fashion, as the logical preliminary to more complete self-realisation. Thus the finite is a necessary moment in the true infinite, but a moment only. So it is that mind as it is in man is mind that knows itself as known, and as known yet knows, a form into which Absolute Mind throws itself, in the attainment of the full

fruition of the riches of its self-comprehension. Such is the necessary outcome of the dialectical nature of thought. Like the men of science, whose procedure we discussed in Book II. of the first series of these lectures, we men and women have to limit ourselves that we may fulfil the ends for which we exist, and these ends themselves exist because they form part of the scheme of the Divine Mind.

Thus the self-comprehension of the human mind has the defect of its quality. Only in so far as its quality is what it is can that mind be human. In so far as it is human it is defective, and must remain so, in self-comprehension. That self-comprehension has to take place under time distinctions, in a process which is unending, because its essence is to recognise what is as qualified by what is not, inasmuch as, being not yet presented, the latter lies beyond. There is for us nowhere an aspect of reality which is not in contrast with another aspect, actual or possible. Did we not conceive our lives under such distinctions we should be untrue to the very basis of our existence, such as it is.

Even thought, which we are always seeking to abstract and present as other than its object, and to contrast with feeling, is thus characterised for us by finitude. It is natural that we should apply to it a method of investigation which gives us, indeed, clear knowledge of a kind, but clear knowledge purchased at the cost of our being obliged to treat thought abstractly, as if relational

and discursive. But the relational and discursive aspect turns out quickly to be but an aspect in which thought can present itself to itself. The fashion of such presentation implies a violent abstraction. That thought can itself correct this abstraction is apparent from the very fact that it is aware of the shortcoming and does correct it. The more closely self-consciousness is investigated, the more apparent it is that the distinction between subject and object is made by and falls within it.

Now you and I may expect, as we proceed to look in the next four lectures into the nature of finite mind, that we shall find this tendency to self-correction on the part of reflection everywhere apparent. Complete comprehension of self in its object there can never be, for the reason that I have so much dwelt on. But there can hardly be a limit assigned to the progress towards it. We shall expect, if we scan closely enough, to see in an ordinary view of the world about us lower aspects being displaced by higher ones, in a process that is unending in the sense that no limit can be assigned to it. *We* may not be able to sum up the series, but our study of the nature of consciousness may assure us that it can be, and is, summed up for a mind that is at a higher plane than ours. Just as the aspect of life was found by us to be freer from the abstractions of finitude than that of mechanism, just as consciousness in like manner proved to be, even for presentationism, an aspect of reality fuller and truer than that of life, so we

should expect to find aspects of the world as it seems in which that world expresses a nature that is greater than the nature of finite self-hood, with the distinctness in which it crystallises what appears in it. Now such aspects we seem to discover lying ready to hand in what is characterised by beauty, and indeed in the entire world as it is for the artist, and especially in the forms in which he recreates it. Let us try to find out what these aspects mean for him.

The most obvious characteristic of external nature is the mutual exclusiveness of its appearances, and the stubbornness with which they resist the attempt of reflection to attribute to them a pervading rational significance. But in the recognition of beauty in nature we have before us a relationship which transcends this hard-and-fastness of externality, and which is there, not for the pig or the sheep, but only for the being that reflects. Yet as reflection does not make things, and as, on the other hand, things have no meaning or existence except in reflection, beauty must belong to those forms of reality which fall within the individuality which the universal and particular combine to form. It must be an aspect within the individual as object, as real as any other aspect of the world as it seems. If so, its character must be that of the individual—in other words, neither that of a universal of reflection, nor that of a mere fleeting particular of feeling. It must be complete in itself, and an end in itself.

Let us try to find out what are the character-

istics of the beautiful. In the first place, the senses through which we perceive beauty are the senses which are in the highest degree the handmaids of intelligence. We do not get any definite idea of beauty through the senses of taste or smell or touch taken by themselves. It is through sight and hearing that we perceive beautiful objects, and through these senses almost exclusively. This fact seems to indicate that it is only for a reflecting mind that what is beautiful exists. For a dog or a horse it is there, at the most, only in a very slight degree. On the other hand, it is clear that beauty is no abstraction, and cannot be resolved into concepts, however much its perception may vary with the capacity to form concepts. An object that is beautiful, whether for sight or for sound, is beautiful in so far as it is *expressive*. It must embody much more than a mere mechanical relationship, however perfect, much more than mere attainment even of a purpose. What then is it that such an object must express? If we go beyond the mere beauty of Nature, and turn to Art, we seem to get the answer to this question. The mind of the artist has the characteristic quality of mind : it is essentially *free*. It can mould and sever or combine its materials as it pleases. It can, therefore, in its various forms of activity, construct sensuous images which are in the highest degree expressive, expressive of the highest meaning which the mind is capable of grasping.

“The beauty of Art is the beauty that is born—born again, that is—of the mind, and by as much

as the mind and its products are higher than Nature and its appearances, by so much the beauty of Art is higher than the beauty of Nature." *

A sunset in Nature is infinitely richer in material and in brilliancy than a sunset painted by Turner. But the reason why a picture by Turner is in an extraordinary degree valuable is twofold. In the first place, in the picture we see nature as Turner saw it—in other words, we get an expression and a quality of expression which we cannot get otherwise. In the second place, although the expression is embodied in only a few poor patches of paint on a canvas, it is embodied in permanence, and not in the fleeting fashion in which nature generally embodies an expression. The true artist is therefore no copyist. His material, that which his technical skill enables him to mould, is, nothing abstract, but the individual in sensuous form. Yet in the sensuous material which he so moulds, mind is apparent. He is "nearer to mind and its thinking activity than is mere external unintelligent nature; in works of art mind has to do but with its own." † The immediacy of nature is in its character boundlessly contingent and transitory, and the tendency of reflection is to erect over against it an abstract realm of universals which, rational and permanent as is their nature, are yet inadequate to the concrete riches of this chaotic

* Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of Fine Art*, Bosanquet's Translation, p. 3.

† Hegel, *Ibid.*, p. 22.

and fleeting spectacle. "But the mind is able to heal this schism which its advance creates, it generates out of itself the works of fine art as the first middle term of reconciliation between pure thought and what is external, sensuous, and transitory; between nature with its finite actuality, and the infinite freedom of the reason that comprehends."* . . . "Art liberates the real import of appearances from the semblance and deception of this bad and fleeting world, and imparts to phenomenal semblances a higher reality born of mind."† The work of art is what it is for sensuous apprehension. But it is no mere sensuous object. It addresses itself to the mind which is meant to be affected by it, and to find satisfaction in it. It is not for its *use* but for its *truth* that we turn to an object of art. But the truth to which we turn is not truth in a scientific or abstract form, but the truth which consists in the recognition of expression in an individual and sensuous form.

Many passages might be quoted from great art critics which bring out the point that I have been so constantly trying to insist on, the point that the individual is no mere symbol of abstract knowledge, no mere means to an end, but an end in itself, a true individual in which the mind rests satisfied as with something complete, self-sustaining and unique, something which leaves no sense of purpose unsatis-

* Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of Fine Art*, Bosanquet's Translation, p. 13.

† *Ibid.*, p. 15.

fied. In our appreciation of his work the artist raises us to his own plane of comprehension. This is most plainly so in music, and the reason is easy to find. In music we are in feeling lifted away from the hard externality of nature which confronts us in even the most perfect definition of external form which painting or sculpture can give us. The centre of reality is no longer the not-self with which the self is confronted as with something foreign in which it has to seek a meaning, but feeling which belongs essentially to the region of the self. The externality of time and space is, as it were, abolished while we listen and realise ourselves anew in the sound that has transformed our world. Schopenhauer states this in another way when he points out that in music, as in all art, we are carried away from the desire to assert our individuality in the world of time and space, away from the plane at which we *will*, and at which we suffer pain because we suffer hindrance from the *Other* which confronts us. He speaks of the sense of unutterable depth in music "by virtue of which it floats through our consciousness as the vision of a paradise firmly believed in, yet ever distant from us, and by which it is so fully understood and yet so inexplicable." "This," he says, "rests on the fact that it restores to us all the emotions of our inmost nature, but entirely without reality, and removed from their pain."*

In music we may say that we

* *World as Will and Idea*; English Translation, vol. I., p. 341.

are lifted to a plane which is above that of everyday life, in so far as the hard-and-fastness of our everyday standpoint melts away. A new standpoint emerges in which feeling predominates, which is characterised by very little abstract conception, but in which we none the less recognise that mind has lifted itself above the plane of the differences which really fall within it and are not final. The incrustations and inhibitions which hold down the "subliminal self" are in part, at least, removed, and there arises a new order of certainty. But just as I showed you in the earlier lectures that the revelations of the subliminal self were no safe guide by themselves, and must be made the servants of reason and not its masters, so the emotions which music awakens do not all stand on the same footing. Between the strains of a valse and a sonata of Beethoven there is a great difference, which cannot be referred to any difference in strength of feeling. It can only depend on the extent to which mind is bodied forth in the latter as distinguished from the former. We may derive satisfaction from the sonata even though badly executed. But perfection in execution cannot make the valse appeal to us in the same way. Technique is of high value and importance. Without it the greatest artist could not express his mind. But it is rather a means to an end than an end in itself. It is only mind that can satisfy mind, whether in music, or painting, or sculpture, or poetry. Mind seeks to find itself here, just as it does in other aspects of the world

as it seems. This is why the "own composition" at a concert is often so wearying to those who do not belong to the class of listeners who go there in search of technique only.

What I have been trying to set before you is still more apparent in poetry. The greatest quality of poetry is, as has often been said, that of "size." In other words, a really great poem must express a really great mind. In poetry, as in music, it is not an abstract conception that we look for. It is an individual reality complete in itself and depending on no meaning outside itself. The universal and particular moments in this individuality are not broken up by reflection, as is the case in science or even in everyday experience. Reflection is, of course, operative; otherwise in poetry we should be without permanence of expression, the contrast to the fleeting particulars that the actual perception of nature rescues only for the instant. But the permanent moment in poetry does not take the form of an abstraction, existing out of time and space. It may be a sensuous image, provided that what gives its characteristic and significance to the image is its embodiment of mind, its presentation of what is only for mind, and is therefore mind itself presented in this form. This is why art is the form of the individual which gives us the middle term between nature as essentially external, and thought as essentially above time and space. We cannot reduce beauty to principles of thought, or to relations of space and time. Beauty and the

object world of art constitute a realm by themselves, a realm complete in itself, an aspect of the world as it seems which is real, as every other aspect is real, because it is an aspect in which mind presents itself to itself, is for itself, a phase which cannot be explained away or melted down, because it is one among the ultimate forms of reality.

That poetry exists only in the reflective consciousness is clear when we consider what a poem is. On paper it is but a series of marks made with printer's ink, and it has no other significance either to the dog that chews the paper, or to the foreigner who knows not the language. To a person devoid of sense of poetic form it is but a series of somewhat obscure and ill-framed sentences. But to him who finds in it poetry it is very different. For such an one the poem is an individual fact of experience, but differs from other individual facts of experience in, among other qualities, its permanence. However often the book is shut, when it is opened the same thing is perceived. The ink may have faded, the paper may be torn, but the expression never changes. This is even more apparent in the case of music. The sounds in each performance are different, and, as unique individuals of experience, are there for the first time. The execution may vary greatly. But the impression made is the same, because what is expressed is not of the transient character of events of space and time, but belongs to a higher plane of mind, yet a

plane which has no existence except as embodied in the sensuous form which the art of the musician has created. All forms of art have this characteristic as their essence—that the moment of universality in them lifts their creations above the transitory and fleeting nature of the instant in which they are apprehended, and detaches them from the relationship of place in the Universe. The object whose nature is so transformed may be a very simple one. A Dutch landscape painter has placed before us, say, a peasant's cottage and some animals. Any one who cares is attracted and moved by the picture. Why? However minute and careful the work, it is but patches of paint on a canvas, and the material is far inferior to that of the original, nature. Yet it moves us as nature cannot. The reason is that the artist has detached and fashioned the scene in such a way as to lift us above the merely sensuous. A sense of aloofness from the contingency of our surroundings comes to us, and of aloofness from the particularism of ourselves. The moment ceases to interest us, to be important. The peasants, the cottage, the cattle, have long since passed away, nay, they never were! But they express and engross us in that stillness and peace of nature which they do not symbolise as a word symbolises a concept, but embody as a universal in individual form. They lift us towards a view of the world from the platform of those who are spectators of all time and all existence. In this fashion, Art mediates

between thought and sense, and so fulfils a special function which can be fulfilled by no other form of spiritual activity.

What has been said may serve to cast some light on the famous saying, "Art for Art's sake." For it follows, in the first place, that in the concrete fact of Art we can never separate form from matter. We can never value a poem merely for its cadence, or only for its meaning. It is an end in itself, and is to be valued for its own sake and not for that of some end or standard beyond. In the second place, Art can never be explained in terms of anything else, for that would mean that as a form of reality it was derivative only, and not self-subsisting. We may, indeed, show its place among the planes or stages from which Mind comprehends what is in ultimate analysis Mind. But, just because it is equally real with every other plane or stage, every attempt at a definition of it is tautologous. To define a poem as "the succession of experiences—sounds, images, thoughts, emotions—through which I pass when I am reading as poetically as I can"—is, not to define, but to point to a "this" beyond which I cannot get. The poem, like the picture and the sonata, is no copy of nature; its appeal is to the imagination which is contemplative, and not to that which is merely reproductive. In the whole which the poet creates neither form nor matter can be abstracted or altered. The parody, which can make the hero of the poem into a ridiculous figure, depends on this fact. Where form is less obviously

essential than it is in verse, as, for instance, in the novel, parody becomes easy, as in Thackeray's parodies of Scott and other novelists of the romantic school. There, by an alteration of form, the significance of the whole is transformed from what is serious into what is ludicrous. This is more difficult with verse, where form predominates, but it has often been done. On the other hand, the form may be reproduced apart from the matter in the parody, and then the result is uninteresting for want of content, and is merely a *tour de force*.

It can hardly be too much insisted on that, in the work of art, form and content are really inseparable. What would *Hamlet* or *Paradise Lost* be without the presence of both? The combination is what gives these poems their "size." And this combination is no addition of elements that are independent of one another. The gift of the artist is not to be a thinker, or to set before his mind an abstract conception, and then to see how he can embody it by virtue of his technical skill. His gift is rather that of creative imagination, in the formations of which his qualities are indissolubly fused, just as the qualities of form and content are indissolubly fused in his work. It is so that we get in the creation of the artist something that appeals to us far more vividly than the reasoning of the philosopher. I remember reading in the newspapers that someone had written to Cardinal Newman to ask him to state precisely what he had in his mind when he wrote "Lead, Kindly Light!"

The Cardinal was said to have replied that he did not know. Of course, he did not know! The verses were the work of an artist, not of a theologian, and that is what was not realised by an excellent clergyman who tried, without consulting their author, to improve them by adding a verse setting forth their theological significance.

The present Professor of Poetry in Oxford University has put this so admirably, in the course of an inaugural address which he delivered not long ago, that I will quote his words: "Pure poetry is not the decoration of a preconceived and clearly defined matter; it springs from the creative impulse of a vague imaginative mass pressing for development and definition. If the poet always knew exactly what he meant to say, why should he write the poem? The poem would, in fact, already be written. For only its completion can reveal, even to him, exactly what he wanted. When he began, and while he was at work, he did not possess its meaning; it possessed him. It was not a fully formed soul asking for a body: it was an inchoate soul in the inchoate body of perhaps two or three vague ideas and a few scattered phrases. The growing of this body, its full stature and perfect shape, was the same thing as the gradual self-definition of the meaning. And this is the reason why such poems strike us as creations, not manufactures, and have the magical effect which mere decoration cannot produce. This is also the reason why, if we insist on asking for the meaning of such

a poem, we can only be answered, 'It means itself.' ” *

In his *Conversations with Goethe*, Eckermann describes how Goethe instructed him in what to look for in the works of art that were shown to him: "We then opened the portfolios, and proceeded to the examination of the drawings and engravings. . . . Goethe in such matters takes great pains on my account, and I see that it is his intention to give me a higher degree of penetration in the observation of works of art. He shows me only what is perfect in its kind, and endeavours to make me apprehend the intention and merit of the artist, that I may learn to pursue the thought of the best and feel like the best. 'This,' said he, 'is the way to cultivate what we call taste. Taste is only to be educated by contemplation, not of the tolerably good, but of the truly excellent. I therefore show you only the best works, and when you are grounded in these you will have a standard for the rest which you will know how to value without overrating them. And I will show you the best in each class, that you may perceive that no class is to be despised, but that each gives delight when a man of genius attains his highest point. For instance, this piece by a French artist is *galant* to a degree which you see nowhere else, and is therefore a model in its way.'

"Goethe handed me the engraving, and I looked

* *Poetry for Poetry's Sake*—An Inaugural Address delivered on 5th June 1901—p. 28. By Professor A. C. Bradley.

at it with delight. There was a beautiful room in a summer residence, with windows looking into a garden, where one might see the most graceful figures. A handsome lady, aged about thirty, was sitting with a music book from which she seemed to have just sung. Sitting by her, a little further back, was a young girl of about fifteen. At the open window behind stood another young lady holding a lute, upon which she seemed still to be sounding. At this moment a young gentleman was entering, to whom the eyes of the ladies were directed. He seemed to have interrupted the music, and his slight bow gave the notion that he was making an apology which the ladies were gratified to hear. 'That, I think,' said Goethe, '*à la galant* as any piece of Calderon's, and you have now seen the very best thing of the kind. But what say you to this?' With these words he handed me some etchings by Roos, the famous painter of animals; they were all of sheep, in every posture and situation. The simplicity of their countenances, the ugliness and shabbiness of the fleece, all was represented with the utmost fidelity, as if it were nature itself. 'I always feel uneasy,' said Goethe, 'when I look at these beasts. Their state, so limited, dull, gaping, and dreaming, excites in me such sympathy that I fear I shall become a sheep, and almost think the artist must have been one. At all events it is wonderful how Roos has been able to think and feel himself into the very soul of these creatures, so as to make the internal character

peer with such force through the outward covering. Here you see what a great talent can do when it keeps steady to subjects which are congenial with its nature.' 'Has not then,' said I, 'this artist painted also dogs, cats, and beasts of prey with similar truth; nay, with this great gift of assuming a mental state foreign to himself, has he not been able to delineate human character with equal fidelity?' 'No,' said Goethe, 'all that lay out of his sphere; but the gentle grass-eating animals, sheep, goats, cows, and the like, he was never weary of repeating; this was the peculiar province of his talent which he did not quit during the whole course of his life. And in this he did well. A sympathy with these animals was born with him, a knowledge of their psychological condition was given to him, and thus he had so fine an eye for their bodily structure. Other creatures were, perhaps, not so transparent to him, and therefore he felt neither calling nor impulse to paint them.'"

In a passage a little further on Goethe points out the difference between science and art. In science the treatment is nothing and the discovery everything. In art the idea is common property. It is the power of embodying it in a concrete work that makes the artist, it is this power for which we look in him. In his *Laocoon* Lessing expresses the same thought: "The aim of science is truth; the aim of the arts, on the contrary, is to give artistic pleasure. The artist need not copy or even be true to nature. He may achieve his aim in repre-

sending the commonest objects." For that aim is not mere nature any more than mere thought. It is rather, to use a phrase of Schopenhauer's, the Idea, and therefore the Ideal, with which he concerns himself, and to which he moulds matter and form alike.

The work of art is not to instruct, not to expound abstract conceptions. It has always to bring its content before the mind's eye, not in its generality as such, but with this generality made individual and sensuously particularised. When Byron says :—

" I live not in myself, but I become
Portion of that around me, and to me
High mountains are a feeling,"

he is expressing the standpoint of poetical emotion from which idealism is embodied in feeling about nature. The conception which qualifies such feeling could never be expressed abstractly with the same vividness, perhaps it could never be *expressed* at all so to seem real. But the poet makes us *feel* its truth. It is the function of genius to lift us, in the medium of what is particular and immediate, to a higher plane, and so to set the world in a new light. The spectator is, as it were, lifted up, so that he feels himself above and beyond the hard-and-fast distinctions which are, at a lower plane, assumed as reality. But the ideal with which he is brought face to face is not in contrast with a reality that is hard-and-fast. It is just that reality raised to a higher plane. The world as it is for art is what it

is in virtue of thought, which, as it were, shines through a sensuous garment. But the garment that shines is just as much a part of the world of reality as was the garment before it shone. In the world of art we are still in the real world, in the same way as the man of science who has passed from the phenomenon to its law is still in the real world. He looks at the water before him. He thinks of the law of its chemical constitution out of oxygen and hydrogen atoms; yet it is still water for him, though its meaning and the nature of its reality have become enlarged for him. The particular concerns him less, the universal more. So with the artist: he sets reality in a new light for us, a light which removes us farther from particularism:—

“ Art may tell a truth
Obliquely, do the thing shall breed the thought,
Nor wrong the thought, missing the mediate words.
So you may paint your picture, twice show truth,
Beyond mere imagery on the wall,—
So, note for note, bring music from your mind,
Deeper than ever the andante dived,—
So write a book shall mean, beyond the facts,
Suffice the eye and save the soul beside.” *

It is time to turn again to the significance of Art from the speculative side. We have approached sufficiently near to the nature of the beautiful to get some inkling of this significance. The topic of the meaning of Art and the divisions into which *Æsthetics* fall is one so vast, and so surrounded with materials which generation after generation

* Browning, at the end of the *Ring and the Book*.

has piled up, that nothing short of a treatise is sufficient to contain an account of it. Those of you who wish to pursue this topic further must turn to such books in this department as those of Hegel and Bosanquet. But with even the glimpse we have got of the nature of the beautiful it is possible to get some understanding of the place of Art as a stage towards reality.

Let us imagine that we can present to ourselves a view of the world as exhibiting no relations which go beyond those of externality to each other of events in time and space. Let us suppose, if we can, that the mind passively receives a series of impressions which assume in consciousness the form of a stream of isolated feelings. Let us try to imagine, further, that the mind which is passively conscious of these feelings reasons about them in a fashion which neither imparts to them nor takes from them any portion of the system in which they are real. The conceptions which the mind forms, and its purposes in forming these conceptions, will be abstract and separate from the concrete feelings about which the reasoning takes place. Now in the real universe we find no analogue of such a process. We saw that the mind and its object cannot be separated. We found that even in our everyday experience that experience was continuously moulded through the ends and purposes which determined the percipient in organising knowledge. But I told you in the end of the third lecture I delivered here last year,

how Kant, in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, had failed to realise this, and how he had tried to treat experience as something that could be peeled into layers like an onion, as something that consisted of elements, contributed by sense and understanding respectively, which were in some fashion self-subsisting and independent of each other, and which could therefore be considered as separable in fact. The result was that for Kant the real world was limited by what could be expressed through the conceptions of substance, cause, and reciprocity. On the other side of the gulf which reason had discovered lay a partly subjective world in which the Ideas of our practical reason, of the moral world, lay. To this unreal world must for him be relegated such ideals as those of God, Freedom, and Immortality, abstract conceptions which the constitution of reason compelled us to believe to be realisable somehow, but never here or now. It became obvious to Kant that this huge gap between the faculties of the mind as well as between their objects must in some sort be shown as bridged over, if we were to be capable at all of understanding how it was the world seemed, as it did seem to us, to present all these aspects, and not only the first kind. He had divided the mind into three faculties, that of Conception, that of Judgment, and that of Reason. The first gave us reality, but reality as but mechanical. The last gave us the ideal, but the ideal as separated from the real world by a gulf. If, then, the apparent

continuity of our actual attitude towards life was to be accounted for, there must be a faculty which produced the semblance of ideality in the region of direct perception, and the semblance of direct perception in the region of the ideal. This faculty was that of judgment, and its work was examined and its limits defined by Kant in his *Critique of Judgment*.

It is a tradition in the philosophical world that the Critique of Pure Reason influenced the development of speculative thought less than did the Critique of Judgment. The truth which underlies the tradition is that in the latter book Kant came very near the position which was common to Aristotle and the German thinkers of the early part of the nineteenth century. Here he set out a view of the individual in which the universal of reason and the particular of sensation were no longer divorced, as was, at least to a considerable extent, the case in the other parts of his system. It is true that the union is allowed to possess reality only of a subjective kind, as a regulative principle in judgment about experience, which experience thus comes to *seem* as though it contained individuals of beauty and organisation in which the ideal cannot be regarded as abstract merely, or otherwise than in indissoluble combination with sense. Still, so far as he allowed to such individuals any reality at all, they formed a true feature of the world as comprehended by us, a world from which we could not get away. For him the beautiful was a fact,

and it was quite different from the merely pleasant, which was what it was because it satisfied a purpose of a particular mind, and was therefore merely subjective. It was also different from the good, because this was what it was in virtue of being means to an end. For Kant beauty and life were the points at which two regions met, where reason was represented in the world of sense, and sense was represented in the world of reason. Only in abstraction could the beautiful and the living be broken up into their moments. For in them there was no division between means and end.

But Kant, as I have told you, while he declared that this was so, stopped short at admitting that it was so otherwise than *sub modo*, for a particular faculty only. He never got away from the artificial antithesis, which pervades his system, of subjective thought and objective things, of abstract universality and sensuous particularity. Of the Critique of Judgment, Hegel says: "This criticism forms the starting-point for the true conception of artistic beauty. Yet this conception had to overcome the Kantian defects before it could assert itself as the higher grasp of the true unity of necessity and freedom, of the particular and the universal, of the sensuous and the rational. And so it must be admitted that the artistic sense of a profound and, at the same time, philosophic mind, was beforehand with philosophy as such in demanding and commanding the principle of totality and

reconciliation, as against that abstract endlessness of reflective thought, that duty for duty's sake, that intelligence devoid of plastic shape, which apprehend nature and reality, sensation and feeling, as a mere *limit*, and as an absolutely hostile element. For Schiller must be credited with the great merit of having broken through the Kantian subjectivity, and having dared the attempt to transcend these limits by intellectually grasping the principles of unity and reconciliation as the truth, and realising them in art. Schiller, in his æsthetic discussions, did not simply adhere to art and its interest without concerning himself about its relation to philosophy proper, but compared his interest in artistic beauty with the principles of philosophy; and it was only by starting from the latter, and by their help, that he penetrated the profounder nature of the beautiful. Thus we feel it to be a feature in one period of his works that he has busied himself with thought—more, perhaps, than was conducive to their unsophisticated beauty as works of art. The intentional character of abstract reflection and even the interest of the philosophical ideas are noticeable in many of his poems. This has been made a ground of censure against him, especially by way of blaming and depreciating him in comparison with Goethe's straightforwardness and objectivity. But in this respect Schiller, as poet, did but pay the debt of his time; and the reason lay in a perplexity which turned out only to the honour of that sublime soul and pro-

found character and to the profit of science and cognition." *

Schiller, though penetrated by the theoretical teaching of the Critique of Judgment, was not dominated by it, and he was able, as Hegel points out, to carry matters a stage further on. Jena, in the early years of that century, was a fruitful place. There Schiller and Goethe not only met each other but met Schelling and Hegel. The skeleton of the theory of art became clothed with living flesh and blood. Hegel himself there learned the lesson which taught him to seek to gather together in his hand the strands of which he had such ample opportunity to lay hold. For him the region of the beautiful, the region too of the other forms that belong to art, was the region in which Mind, the Idea, exists, not as philosophy conceives and sets it forth in abstract terms, but "as developed into concrete form fit for reality, and as having entered into unity with this reality. For the idea as such, although it is the essentially and actually true, is yet the truth in its generality which has not yet taken objective shape; but the Idea as the beautiful in art is at once the Idea when specially determined as in its essence individual reality, and also an individual shape of reality essentially destined to embody and reveal the Idea. This amounts to enunciating the requirement that the Idea, and its plastic mould as concrete reality, are to be made completely adequate to one another. When reduced

* *Philosophy of Fine Art*, Bosanquet's Translation, p. 116.

to such a form the Idea, as a reality moulded in conformity with the conception of the Idea, is the Ideal." *

Carlyle in his own way puts it in words which I may quote to you :—

“Another matter it is, however, when your Symbol has intrinsic meaning, and is of itself *fit* that men should unite round it. Let but the Godlike manifest itself to Sense ; let but Eternity look, more or less visibly, through the Time-Figure (*Zeit-bild*) ! Then is it fit that men unite there ; and worship together before such Symbol ; and so from day to day, and from age to age, superadd to it a new divineness.

“Of this latter sort are all true Works of Art ; in them (if thou dost know a Work of Art from a Daub of Artifice) wilt thou discern Eternity looking through Time ; the Godlike rendered visible. . . .

“ . . . Highest of all Symbols are those wherein the Artist or Poet has risen into Prophet, and all men can recognise a present God, and worship the same ; I mean religious Symbols. Various enough have been such religious Symbols, what we call *Religious* ; as men stood in this stage of Culture or the other, and could worse or better body forth the Godlike : some Symbols with a transient intrinsic worth ; many with only an extrinsic. If thou ask to what height man has carried it in this manner, look on our divinest Symbol ; on Jesus of Nazareth, and His Life, and

* *Ibid.*, p. 141.

His Biography, and what followed therefrom. Higher has the human thought not yet reached : this is Christianity and Christendom ; a Symbol of quite perennial, infinite character ; whose significance will ever demand to be anew inquired into, and anew made manifest.” *

Thus in the picture gallery of Art we have Reason which is intuitive, the complete fusion of the universal and the particular, the individual in a form in which thought and feeling have in this, as elsewhere, fallen together, the true relation between Logic and Nature. The here and the now are transcended. The fleeting impression is rescued from the flux of time and the relativity of place. It receives immortality from the spirit which it embodies, a spirit which, in its turn, only in this embodiment gains its unique and incomparable character as concrete fact. The words of an Aristotle or of a Newton may cease to be for us lasting and final words. The words of a Homer or a Shakespeare are imperishable. For as men and women we cannot transcend the plane at which they represent the most that is possible in immediate presentation.

* Carlyle, *Sartor Resartus*, Chapter on Symbols.

LECTURE II

I SPENT my time yesterday in examining the human mind in phases in which it touches the infinite. In the earlier lectures of this second course, I began by approaching mind from the side on which it presents an aspect that is absolute. In this latter part of the course, I am starting from the aspect in which mind is finite, and working up to the level at which it attains to the infinite. Yesterday I took that phase of the human mind in which its perception is immediate, and in which what it perceives yet represents knowledge that is absolute. I took the immediate as it appears in Art, and I showed you that in Art the mind transcends its own finite forms. In Art it is quite true that that with which we are in contact is in its nature something that has a locality in space and a position in time. It may be but the vanishing patches of paint upon a canvas. But what the mind really has before it in Art is, not the patches of paint upon the canvas, but itself, directly revealed in the highest form. Art is no matter of inference; Art is not something to which we come mediately. It is that which is directly presented,

but presented, as it were, in a sensuous form through which it shines. Absolute mind as disclosed in Art is not something which is *behind* the sensuous form, but is *in* the sensuous form, and gives its meaning and character to that form. Therefore, although the patches of paint are but patches of paint, and although the canvas is but canvas, what is represented by the hand of genius is something, as I showed you, which is above time and space in the sense that time and space are indifferent to it. The meaning for us of what is in the landscape of the Dutch painter remains, although the figures have no reality, and although the scene belongs to a period of time which is past, or even never was. The significance is one which transcends the particularism of the observer and the observed, and in it you have the directly revealed manifestation of that side of mind in which it is no longer finite but has transcended the limits of its own finitude. In other words, you have, in what is represented in the picture, mind comprehending itself in its fulness.

Now that is one phase of mind in which it discloses itself in immediacy, and there is another phase of mind in which, even for us men and women, the higher aspect is disclosed in a different form of immediacy. Religion is something just as real as is Art. In Religion you have an aspect of the human mind in which it is in contrast with the human mind as you have it in ethical relations. In Ethics you are always confronted with this, that

beyond the deed that is done lies another deed which has yet to be accomplished. In the duty which you have to another person to treat him as a person, as you yourself would be treated, you are still in the relationship of the one and the many. That other person is, like yourself in that relation, finite, and beyond him and you, beyond even the society of which you both form members, there are levels which you have not reached, and which, if you did reach them, would still leave you confronted with something beyond, separating you from infinitude. In Ethics, in other words, you are capable only of endless progress, in which the self never reaches its own goal or its own self-comprehension. But in Religion, the essence of which is the surrender by the self of its finite ends and the acceptance of the ends of God in place of these finite ends, you have the transcendence of that relation of finitude in which the self is always confronted with another beyond. In Religion the self finds its true life in the life of God, and in that way the contradiction which manifests itself at every turn of its finite action is overcome.

In Religion you have got reality, but reality manifested, like reality in Art, only in immediacy. You have it in the sense of the surrender by the will of its finite purposes. In Religion, as in Art, you are dealing with what is immediate. It is in feeling, not in abstract conception, that Religion dwells, and it is in that act of will which assumes the form of the surrender of the

purposes that are not final that the essence of Religion consists. Therefore in Religion, as in Art, what you are dealing with is not abstract conception. I do not wish you to understand me as conveying to you that one ought to, or indeed that one can, separate Art and Religion and Thought from one another as though they were the manifestations of three different faculties of the mind. On the contrary, what I have been insisting on throughout the whole of these lectures is that we must start from the mind itself as final reality, and that Art in the form of feeling, and Religion in the form of the consciousness of an act of will completed, and Thought as the other form in which the activity of the mind manifests itself, are three forms, but three forms which are only separated and isolated from one another by the act of the very self-consciousness to which they belong, and within which they are merely phases of one activity. Nevertheless, when we are dealing with that aspect with which Religion is concerned, we are dwelling upon that which concerns the will, as distinguished from that which belongs to the sphere of the beautiful or to the sphere of contemplation.

When we take a man of devout character who is also a thinker, when we take, for example, the personality of such a man as Spinoza, "the God intoxicated," we recognise in him a holy man, not on account of his thought, but on account of his attitude of will, the attitude of will which manifested

itself throughout his work, the resignation of the will to live, and the acceptance of absolute purpose. Nevertheless we are always aware that in the contemplation of such a character we cannot separate off the will from the intellect, but that the one profoundly influences the other. The purpose of the religious man is to die to self, as it has been said, in order to live in God; that is to say, in the exercise of the freedom that belongs to him even as finite spirit, to cease to will finite ends and purposes. The medium in which his religious consciousness embodies itself is thus acts of will and phases of feeling. Scientific knowledge belongs to another sphere, and the ends which scientific knowledge seeks to realise are apart from the ends which are sought after in Religion. Between Science and Religion, so understood, there is no conflict, simply because the two do not aim at the same thing, and accordingly we must bear in mind that the deliverances of the religious consciousness, in so far as they travel outside their sphere of immediacy, must always be symbolical, and can never in themselves and of themselves be guides to scientific conceptions.

By the reflective phase of that initial activity of mind, which only in abstraction is separated into the different forms which I have mentioned, I mean the power which the human mind has to become in contemplation conscious of its own limits, and in this consciousness to transcend them. Now that consciousness is not immediate, as is

the case with Art and with Religion. It is only in reflection that the human mind can transcend the limits of its finitude, and that reflection takes place in the form of inference. Not only does it take place in the form of inference, but the inference is the inference of finite mind conscious of itself as finite. Nevertheless reflection does often assist the finite individual to bear with and even rise above the limitations of his finitude. I have never wholly agreed with Shakespeare that a philosopher could be no better than anybody else at bearing toothache—

“There was never yet philosopher
That could endure the toothache patiently,
However they have writ the style of gods,
And made a push at chance and sufferance.”

He ought to be better able to bear it, if he is not. But the philosopher, even in his philosophising, certainly does reflect on the footing of being a finite person, and his medium never can be more in itself than the universals of reflection which reflection detaches from their setting in reality, in just the same fashion as does reflection in geometry detach the universal from what is in its nature individual. The method of philosophy is therefore abstract, and although thought, which is the instrument of philosophy, can lift the human mind to the contemplation of itself as more than finite, it does not give that direct, rich, concrete sense of immediate contact which you have in the case of Art and in the case of

Religion. Thus it comes about that while Philosophy can aid Art and Religion, and is, as I have said before, the only proper guardian of the truth in these matters, it cannot, like these, give immediate presentation. What it does, is to show us that in all of what is said to be immediately present to the mind there is implicit, as the very condition of its possibility, knowledge of a higher kind, which in ultimate analysis becomes disclosed as creative knowledge in absolute mind. As I have already shown to you, it is the finiteness of our human ends which makes us abstract from the presence of this deepest aspect of reality. We do not get rid of our finite ends in our philosophising, but Art and Religion show us, even in our human lives, those deeper aspects of reality, which are in their nature ultimate, as forming the very basis of our finite existence, and they show us that directly. It is only in the distinctions made by finite spirit, in its freedom to follow the limited purposes which are of its essence as human, that the object world of finite mind becomes immediate, and its really mediate and derivative character is left out of sight simply because it is veiled by the abstractions of understanding. In other words, in so far as we are finite, and are therefore dominated by ends and purposes which are not the ends and purposes of absolute mind, we drop out of sight what it is that has made the world as it seems to us wear the aspect which it does. It is thus that there is hidden from us the reality which is disclosed in the highest forms of Art and of

Religion, and which is disclosed in the abstract reasoning of Philosophy. And this reality we are apt, when we give ourselves up to the domination of the purposes which make us human beings, to leave out of account and at times almost passionately to protest against as unreal.

There are striking illustrations of this in literature, of the most varied kinds. One there is, remarkable in its combination of simplicity with subtlety, in a well-known poem, Fitzgerald's "Omar Khayyàm." Omar Khayyàm, the Persian poet, is not, like the men of a still more remote Eastern land, overwhelmed by the consciousness of the infinite. He is aware that there is an ideal to pursue, but, strong in the sense of the direct presence of finite purpose, he holds it futile to make the effort to pursue an ideal—

"For 'Is' and 'Is-not' though *with* Rule and Line
And *Up-and-down* without I could define,
I yet in all I only cared to know,
Was never deep in anything but—wine."*

He speaks, however, as no common cynic in that somewhat sceptical utterance. He is dissatisfied with the endless progress of the world of finite ends, with the Beyond reached only to disclose yet another Beyond. But he will lay hold of what seems to be here and now, and try to put from him the consciousness of its unreality, regardless of whether or not he is consistent with himself in the effort

* Fitzgerald's "Omar Khayyàm" (1st ed.).

he is making. In a verse just before, he has exclaimed :

“ How long, how long, in infinite Pursuit
Of This and That endeavour and dispute ?
Better be merry with the fruitful grape
Than sadden after none, or bitter, Fruit.” *

The same thought is expressed by Browning, in language less cynical, but putting the same point :

“ Better ends may be in prospect,
Deeper blisses (if you choose it),
But this life’s end and this love-bliss
Have been lost here.”

None the less the history of humanity, and above all, the history of what has been recognised by humanity as highest and most real, proves beyond question that in a different attitude multitudes in all ages have found the apparent dilemma to be no dilemma. It is the business of philosophy to tell us how and why this has been so.

The problem which confronts philosophy is why even the best in the world of the finite should be transitory, should have an end as it has had a beginning, and the topic on which this most directly arises is the topic of death. I have already in part considered the nature of death in the earlier lectures. I pointed out to you that the finite and particular self is what it is to itself by contrast with nature. It recognises itself as confronted by nature, as limited by nature, and therein lies its finiteness. I examined the question of why that was so, and

* *Ibid.*

how it comes that self-consciousness can look upon itself as arising in time out of the world by which it finds itself confronted, and I also pointed out to you that in the knowledge which embraces that world in experience we have different stages or degrees of reality in that experience. We start, for example, with what is most alien and impenetrable to mind, the relation of things as external to one another in space, and again with what is nearly, though not quite, as alien and impenetrable, the relation of things as succeeding one another in time. In that succession you have an endlessness which is mindless and wearisome. But you get to other conceptions in nature which transcend what can be expressed in terms of space and time relations, and there you find you have risen above mere endless succession as well as above mere externality of parts in space. In life, in the organism, you are conscious of the presence of the whole as controlling the parts, and yet as having in space and time no existence separate from the parts. The whole is here in the parts, and the parts are what they are only in so far as they belong to the whole. In other words, the externality of space and time is in large measure, though not altogether, transcended, and you have passed in some degree from the endless exclusiveness of things as outside each other in these two relations.

But there is a further stage at which the mind arrives, and that is where it takes in that the object world is what it is only *for* the mind which per-

ceives it. In other words, you there see that the very externalities of space and time, the relationships of being outside each other and of being successive to each other, are relations which fall within the mind itself, and are what they are only for mind that perceives. These distinctions turn out to fall within self-consciousness, and so you find yourself getting a step further towards recognising mind as what is ultimately real through the various stages which become manifest in nature. Above and beyond the notion of life in the physical organism there confronts you the fact of the organism as sentient, as even intelligent, as displaying those characteristics which can only be displayed by a body which gets its significance from a soul, and displays its higher aspects in the form of a soul. And so it comes that in the human being, the being that presents the aspect of soul as well as that of body, you have got away from mere endless succession in time; you have got above even the notion of the whole which is in the parts and controls them, notwithstanding that the organism in one aspect belongs to externality, and you have got nearer to the notion of mind as that which embraces reality within itself. But just as you have got away from mere succession and endlessness, just as that aspect is seen to be not the only aspect but one which dominates only in knowledge of a limited kind, so you get to a further but still imperfect presentation of the self; this you have in the picture which you frame to yourself of the

individual which has soul and body. Here you are still conscious of defects in your presentation. In body and soul you have the manifestation of mind, but it is mind still thought of as *for* the self which perceives, and as under the domination of relations of space and time which have only been partially transcended. Taken in their abstract presentation, soul and body are in time, and as in time, although they have transcended the mere endlessness of succession, they transcend it only in so far as they have a limit or an end. I pointed out to you how in the mathematical series the notion of the limit, that is of a notional end to the apparently endless succession, was really the key to the conception of a whole which gives the series its truth and its existence. Well, so it is in the nature of the organism. There is here something that corresponds to the limit, which raises the process above mere unending succession, and that is the course of development of the organism in which it attains the fulness of its reality. In so far as that follows a course of growth and then decay, in so far as there is a development to be accomplished which is the key to the very meaning of the organism, there is implied a beginning and there is equally implied an end. Life is impossible except on the basis of development, and development must be of what is born, comes into existence, grows, and finally declines to a natural end; because the complete conception of life is only attained when we recognise that the individual is a member

of the species, and that it is the law and life of the species which give law and life to the individual. The species cannot continue, cannot maintain its vitality, unless the individuals which have become old and useless to it pass away, and consequently you see how in nature the individual being passes away for the benefit of the species. That is part of the great conception of evolution, and that is how the life of the world, taken as a whole, goes on. Thus it is that the notion of death is not merely implied in the meaning of the life of the individual, but is a notion which is so completely correlative to those of birth and of life that without it these two would not be intelligible.

Now let us, in the light of this truth that death is an event which is required for the completion of the life of the individual taken as a mere living organism, and is necessary for the life of the species, let us, I say, in the light of this reflection, examine the contrast between life and death. Death is a natural event, and in it you have, in point of fact, the reconciliation of the conflict of interest between the particular organism and the species. If the particular organism were as enduring as the type the type would suffer, and it is for the benefit of the species that the particular organism, having done its work, should die and pass away. When you turn from the mere biological point of view at which that is true to the point of view of psychology, where you have the soul as individual, as sentient, as reflective, as capable of

volition, you have other phenomena not altogether dissimilar from those upon which I have been touching. In the soul you have in childhood, as I pointed out once before, the characteristic of great detachment on the part of the mind. Its bodily surroundings, the world that confronts it, are something strange and foreign which it has to dominate and mould to its purposes, and in childhood you have the greatest sense of the freedom of soul life. Habits have not yet been formed. As you go on in life, and more and more make your body the servant of your will, and more completely dominate your surroundings, the real power of the soul increases, and by degrees, as old age approaches, the soul succeeds in so moulding its surroundings and its body to itself that it establishes courses of conduct and habits which lead to still greater facility in the realisation of its own activity. But that activity is gradually deadening into habit, and the deadening into habit which is characteristic of old age points to an end to that kind of external life of the soul, just as essentially involved in the completion of the existence of the soul as death is in that of the physical organism.

Well, whether we take it from the point of view of animal life or of physical life, the death of the particular living creature appears as natural and necessary, and is the more seen to be so the larger and more complete the outlook and comprehension of the process which takes place. It is only when we fall into the abstractions of the understanding,

which take what is presented in their own distinctions as final, and as representing complete truth and complete reality, that we rebel against this view. If we are dealing simply with the side of things in which they belong to nature, we do not rebel against the notion of death or take it as unnatural. I shall show you presently that the rebellion arises out of this, that people unconsciously assume that the higher aspects of the life of the spirit must be taken as subordinated to the law of the physical. But in the meantime I am dealing only with what I may call the physical side of the soul itself, the side which belongs to nature; and the point is that, if you keep to simple animal life, you do not find any contradiction in the notion of death, or the rebellion against it which you find at a higher stage, where you are really contemplating something higher than animal life.

Dealing first with mere animal life, I am going to quote to you the description, given by an American writer who is a keen observer of animal life, of the death of animals. This is what he says, after a great deal of study of the facts:—*

“How do the animals die!—quietly, peacefully, nine-tenths of them. . . . The vast majority steal away into the solitudes they love, and lay them down unseen where the leaves shall presently cover them from the sight of friends and enemies alike.

We rarely discover them at such times, for the

* *The School of the Woods*, William J. Long. Chapter on “How the Animals die!” p. 352.

instinct of the animal is to go away as far as possible into the deepest coverts. We see only the exceptional cases, the quail in the hawk's grip, the squirrel limp and quiet under the paw of the cat or weasel ; but the unnumbered multitudes that choose their own place and close their eyes for the last time, as peacefully as ever they lay down to sleep, are hidden from our sight.

"There is a curious animal trait which may account for this, and also explain why we have such curious, foolish, conceptions of animal death as a tragic and violent thing. All animals and birds have a strong distrust and antipathy for any queerness or irregularity among their own kind. Except in rare cases, no animals or birds will tolerate any cripple or deformed or sickly member among them. They set upon him fiercely, and drive him away. So when an animal, grown old and feeble, feels the queerness of some new thing stealing upon him, he slips away, in obedience to a law of protection that he has noted all his life, and, knowing no such thing as death, thinks he is but escaping discomfort when he lies down in hiding for the last time." . . . "In short,* unless the animals are to live always, and become a nuisance or a danger by their increase, Nature is kind, even in her sterner moods, in taking care that death comes to all her creatures without pain or terror. And what is true of the animals was true of man,

* *The School of the Woods*, William J. Long. Chapter on "How the Animals die!" p. 360.

till he sought out many inventions to make sickness intolerable and death an enemy. . . . The vast majority of animals go away quietly when their time comes; and their death is not recorded, because man has eyes only for exceptions. He denies a miracle, but overlooks the sunsets. Something calls the creature away from his daily round; age or natural disease touches him gently in a way he has not felt before. He steals away, obeying the old warning instinct of his kind, and picks out a spot where they shall not find him till he is well again. The brook sings on its way to the sea; the waters lap and tinkle on the pebbles as the breeze rocks them; the wind is crooning in the pines—the old sweet lullaby that he heard when his ears first opened to the harmony of the world. The shadows lengthen; the twilight deepens; his eyes grow drowsy; he falls asleep. And his last conscious thought, since he knows no death, is that he will waken in the morning when the light calls him.”

Goethe died with the words “More light” upon his lips, expressive, apparently, of just such consciousness of a simple natural life and of something that was coming simply and naturally.

Well, I have described how death appears natural when taken from the point of view of mere life, as distinguished from that of self-consciousness, and I will now take, as an illustration of a yet higher attitude in which death is contemplated as natural, the diary of a man of science who passed

from the world only some three years ago, Professor Pettenkofer of Munich. He was one of the greatest living authorities of the time on Public Health, and, among other things, it had always been in his mind that the question of how the infection of cholera was conveyed was one which could be answered only by experiment, experiment which might prove fatal, but which must be performed before the truth could be known. His view was that the mere presence of the cholera germ in drinking-water was not sufficient to account for infection, unless there were other conditions also present. Accordingly, finding himself in infirm health, he made up his mind to test his theory by experimenting upon himself. He had resolved that he would swallow a cultivation of the cholera bacillus in water, and this is the description, afterwards found in his diary, of what happened:—

“On the 7th of October 1892, in the presence of witnesses, I took the cholera drink, which tasted like the purest water. Some of my friends were concerned for me, and asked that if I were now determined that the experiment should be made, they might be allowed to sacrifice themselves in place of their old teacher; but I wished to act in accordance with the old maxim, *Fiat experimentum in corpore vili!* I have the right to consider myself a *corpus vile*. I am seventy-four years old, I have suffered for years from glycosuria, have not a single tooth left, do not even use my artificial teeth in

eating, but only when I have to speak long and clearly; and I feel also other burdens of old age. Even if I were mistaken, and the experiment endangered my life, I should look death calmly in the face, for it would be no thoughtless and cowardly suicide. I should die in the service of science, as a soldier on the field of battle. Health and life, as I have often said, are very high earthly gifts, but not the highest for man. The man who wills to stand higher than an animal must be ready to sacrifice even life and health for a higher ideal good."

Well, he made the experiment successfully, and, by surviving it without serious damage, proved that so far he was right. The story remains simply illustrative of this, that, with a sufficiently firm conception that death is a perfectly natural occurrence when a certain condition of the organism has been reached in natural course, a man of strong mind can subordinate the conception of death so completely as to have no fear of it of any sort or kind. This is possible in so far as we look at it as an event in nature, as the example of Professor Pettenkofer shows. But we do not take nature to be the ultimate form of reality, or merely *submit* ourselves to death as a final end to be attained.

Bacon says of death, that

"Revenge triumphs over it; Love slights it;
Honour aspireth to it; Grief flieth to it;"

and we have the same feeling expressed in other

and better known words: "Oh death, where is thy sting? Oh grave, where is thy victory?"

The acceptance of death seems to be there regarded as a step towards the attainment of something higher, not represented as something to come later in time, but as that which is in itself higher, and in comparison with which the reality of death disappears. This acceptance of death seems now to mean an attitude in which death itself becomes unimportant and unreal. Observe the contrast. Mere endless succession of time, with its blankness, is at the one extreme; at the other extreme is the life which is, in the only true sense, called eternal as being above time, the life which, when reached, is the highest form of reality. Between these there is a gap which has to be bridged over, a gap bridged over only in the expression of itself by mind, an expression which may assume the form of acceptance of physical change, or of the fulfilment of physical law, even if it assumes the form of the death of the organism. And yet this is only tolerable upon the footing that death itself and the intermediate stages to which it belongs are themselves unreal, compared with this highest form of reality.

Now let us pause and inquire a little what we mean by this. We do not mean merely to prefer to life as it is now a life which is subsequent in time. The notion of mere endless succession in time is a notion which altogether belongs to the finite. What is in the mind is rather the refusal

to regard the present life in time as more than relatively real. The mind looks for the truth about those things as to be got, not so much by setting up something beyond, as by breaking down the reality of what is here and now, so as to transform what is appearance here and now into the presentation of another and a higher aspect. Taken abstractly, we put life and death in sharp antithesis; but, as I have shown you, if we examine the matter from the point of view of the mere natural life of the organism, the antithesis seems not to be real, any more than in other cases where one has traced the origin of an antinomy to the action of the understanding in putting things in sharp abstraction. The formula of the understanding is that something is either this or something else, and yet we are constantly finding in reflection that the "either, or" and the dilemma based on it, are not exhaustive, and that there is a higher conception through which the sharp antithesis disappears.

The contrast, after all, between life and death is a contrast which is made within self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is not itself an event in time. It is that within which the world of events in time falls. This does not mean that the contrast between life and death does not exist. It does exist, but it presents its appearance of finality only for a comprehension which is not complete, and which therefore corresponds only to a degree in reality.

Now that is no point of view which is peculiar

to philosophy. With the instinct of a man of genius, Goethe rejected the old Roman maxim, *Memento mori*, "Remember that thou art dying," for the larger maxim, *Memento vivere*, "Remember that thou art living." The meaning of Goethe's *Gedenke zu Leben*, I take to be this:—"Think of life as something more than a mere present with a past behind it and a future in front of it. Think of thy present as a present which, fully understood, taken at its highest significance, pertains to the eternal, to the infinite self that makes within itself the distinctions out of which has arisen the contrast between past and present and future. Think of the instant, think of the moment in which thou livest, think of the deed which thou doest, think of the merest daily act, all as having eternal and infinite significance. Think of spirit as that which gives reality to what is, was, and shall be, as that within which what is, was, and shall be, falls." In other words, in his "instant made eternity," Goethe lays down the great truth, that, if you would find the highest aspects of reality you must seek them, not in some world beyond, but in the world as it is here and now, only fully comprehended and taken in its complete relation to mind. This does not mean that death has no place, still less that eternal life signifies endless duration and continuance *in infinitum* of the present life of the physical organism. Such a view would be repugnant, not only to the conception which Goethe puts before us, but to the best thought of the ages.

Jesus, when rebuking the Sadducees, tells them, as is recorded in the 22nd chapter of Matthew's Gospel, that they err, not knowing the power of God—for in the true resurrection they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God in heaven. God, he says, is not the God of the dead, but of the living. Again, in John 17th, he defines eternal life: "This is life eternal, that they might know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent."

The religious man, as Professor Edward Caird has pointed out in his Gifford Lectures,* believes in a future life for himself and mankind, because he believes in God, and does not believe in God because he believes in a future life or another world. In a remarkable passage † in his Lectures he goes on to say:—

"The belief in immortality may easily become an unhealthy occupation with a future salvation, which prevents us from seeking for salvation for mankind here, unless it be that natural spring of confidence in its own supreme reality, that unbelief in death, which seems to be the necessary characteristic or concomitant of true spiritual life. If it be a consequence of the intellectual conditions under which we live in the present day, that the empirical evidences of a future life that seemed most sure and certain to our fathers have for some of us lost

* Prof. Edward Caird, *The Evolution of Religion*, vol. ii, p. 242 (3rd ed.).

† *Ibid.*, p. 243.

their controlling power, this, in a religious point of view, may not be altogether a loss. It is possible even that the spiritual may gain all that the supernatural has lost"; an observation which, I think, is as remarkable as it is true.

How certain it is, that the repugnance which is awakened in our minds by such books as *Letters from Heaven* and *The Gates Ajar* is due to this cause—the feeling that the picture of a continuance in time of a life in all material respects resembling our own, and only quantitatively different from it, affords us no satisfaction. Those of you who recall Swift's biting description of the "Struldbrugs," of the people whose lives continue without cessation, and the consequent misery which he depicts in *Gulliver's Travels*, will remember what depths of unhappiness the contemplation of such a state of things can disclose. The picture of a physical life which does not obey the ordinary course of nature, the law which bids life to have a beginning, and bids it equally naturally to have an end, that is not any key to what we desire when we pray for eternal life. Eternal life gains nothing, but loses much, when it is represented as the persistence of a physical organism. It is only the abstract character of understanding which has led people so to symbolise it.

Well, in this lecture I have endeavoured to prepare the way for the more complete consideration to-morrow of what I think we are now in a position to enter upon—the true signification of

eternal life and the meaning of its reality. I shall endeavour in what follows to investigate the real nature of that life and its lesson. I am aware that the problem is one which man never will leave where it lies. The longing for "the touch of a vanished hand, and the sound of a voice that is still," will always forbid us to be satisfied with any doctrine that cannot redeem itself from the reproach of bidding us be content with an abstraction. We cannot accept stones in place of bread. We have therefore to see whether a conception of eternal life be possible which will free it from the reproach of offering stones in place of bread.

LECTURE III

I DEVOTED my time yesterday to the consideration of death looked at as an event in time, and I endeavoured to show you that the conception of an organism, preserving its life and pursuing its course of development from birth to death through the metabolism of its material, was less abstract and therefore higher than the conception of a mere endless succession in time. The presentation of such an organism, implying as it does transcendence of complete mutual exclusion of parts, belongs to a higher stage in nature, and the knowledge of it would seem to be a further step towards the self-comprehension of mind as what alone proves in ultimate analysis to be the real. In fact the pathway to reality would seem to be a pathway through stages of knowledge, each one higher than that which preceded it, to that complete self-comprehension by mind of itself which exhibits mind as containing all reality within itself. One of these stages of knowledge is the recognition of life as an intermediate stage in the comprehension of itself by mind. Yet in life we are still in the sphere of nature. And a life that did not in death

naturally fulfil its purpose as an individual member of the species, but on the contrary continued endlessly, would be unnatural and miserable; as, indeed, Swift showed in the illustration I quoted to you yesterday of the "Struldbriigs," and as we all instinctively feel when we read pictorial accounts of another world.

Eternal life must then mean something quite different from this, and to-day I propose to take up the problem of that meaning. My purpose is to begin by considering the question with which I closed the last lecture—the question why we are dissatisfied with the mere assurance that the forms of time have no application to self-consciousness, as a substitute for what people call the living personal sense of continuance beyond the grave. Now I want, in considering this, to see first what light metaphysics can cast upon the problem. There are two extremes, two forms in which we can think reality, each of which is abstract, and each of which is divided from the other by a considerable gulf. To begin with, the notion of mere endless succession is a barren notion, and one which is incomplete. If I take a particular, say unity, and count it again and again and again, I feel, not only that my task is in point of fact without an end, but that there is no reason in the nature of what I am doing why it should come to an end. The future is uninteresting and indifferent to me because it does not lift me in any sense beyond the present. That is one extreme.

The other extreme is such a logical conception as the abstract one of mind, as that within which all space and time and all distinctions within them fall. If that is set up merely in the form in which abstract thinking gives it to us, we feel that it also is shadowy and that it is not adequate to reality.

Well, these are two extreme views; they are in their different fashions abstract, and in order to see what they mean one has got to consider whether they do not represent mere planes of knowledge, bearing in mind that, as we saw before, knowledge, even absolute knowledge, only attains reality by collecting itself, as it were, out of the differences in which it has expressed itself. You have got, on the one side, abstract succession; you have got, upon the other side, the fixed notion of a self which is timeless because time falls within it. But the concrete riches of human life are between these two. They are like the individual in which just such abstractions attain reality for our finite knowledge. No life is sufficiently pictured under the conception of one antithesis or under that of the other. Real life contains within itself the elements of the two, and one comes to see that the difficulty and the antithesis have been caused by taking extreme views in a highly abstract form as representative and sufficiently descriptive of the facts with which we have to deal. Life has the side of succession in time in it; life also has its meaning as falling within self-consciousness, and getting its significance only through self-consciousness.

Between these two different kinds of knowledge there are, intermediate, other forms of knowledge; for example, our experience of the organism in which life determines parts that are always changing, and yet is not anything separate from these parts. The conception of the whole, which you have there, carries you beyond the mere externality to each other of the units which you find in a mere endless succession in time. Again, the course of life from birth to death, the development which that life pursues, the purpose which it realises, not only on its own account but for the sake of the species, and which ends with its death just as naturally as it commenced with its birth—these disclose that you are dealing with life and with knowledge at a higher plane, and therefore with reality in a higher degree, than what you find when you are dealing with the mere succession of events in time.

Now, bearing that in mind, let us see what light we get on the problem which confronts us when we cannot reconcile our individuality as part of nature with the sense which we have that in one aspect our lives rise above mere succession in time. Life, on one side of it, *is* succession in time. Life, on another side of it, finds its reality in the self-consciousness *for* which succession in time is. Therefore if we take the life of the individual and deal with it abstractly as a mere event in time, deal with it by the method which the geometer adopts when he abstracts from everything except

space relations in order to get clear knowledge, we reach a conception which is not adequate to what we are trying to express by it. If life is necessarily something more than the mere indifferent succession of unit to unit, it cannot be expressed merely as an event. Life, with its reference, its intrinsic reference, to self-consciousness as its highest meaning, imports more than any mere fact in that object world which is *for* self-consciousness, and, consequently, when we endeavour to get the clear knowledge which is essential for the purposes of our everyday social intercourse by speaking of a person as if that person could be labelled as a mere fact determined by space and time relations, we get a contradiction which presses itself upon us. We quite see how we come to regard the person in that light, but we also feel that that light is quite inadequate, and therefore unconsciously we proceed to determine the life, which we have thus abstractly conceived, as finding its completion, the higher truth which we have the sense, and rightly, that it must have, in something that lies beyond. Now that something our imagination, which presents pictures that succeed each other in time, causes us to present to ourselves as another period into which life enters in time after its termination as an event here. But, when we come to look at that pictorial future, it turns out to be just as inadequate as was the first pictorial presentation of the present from which it started.

What we mean is simply this, that in conceiving

life simply in the light of an event in time, we have conceived it too abstractly, and therefore inadequately. Our picture has not been a true picture. Our knowledge has been imperfect, and we have endeavoured to correct that imperfection by setting up a Beyond which is again imperfect and inadequate for just the same reason ; and therefore, while we are forced to conceive of a future life, that conception of a future life as a mere succession in time to the present is itself imperfect, for just the very same reason that the first was imperfect. In that way an antinomy arises.

Now what an antinomy is most of you know. Take a famous one. The world has either got a first cause or it has not got a first cause. It must have a first cause, because as you go back and back you must come to something which is the cause of all that is. On the other hand, it cannot have a first cause, because as you go back you find that each cause in its turn appears to be just an effect, and there is no end to the series of causes presenting themselves as in their turn merely effects. Well that is an antinomy which arises because we have made use of categories which are not adequate to their subject matter—the universe conceived as a totality ; and so the difficulty about the future life, the dilemma that the individual must either perish with the events of time, in which case his nature is not accounted for, or that he must have a future life, in which case that future life is impossible to reconcile with what we know about this one, is a

dilemma which arises out of a similar inadequacy of the conceptions applied. The more you look at it and the more you examine it, the more you see that the pictorial conception of immortality is one which is forced on us because we are bound to determine the life of the self as meaning more than a *mere* external event, and it is equally clear that the more you try to picture to yourself that future life, the more you get into hopeless contradictions. That point is, I think, one which is just as capable of being worked out in philosophy as are the antinomies about which there has been so much discussion—antinomies of which this difficulty is no more than a specimen.

What I have suggested to you has not been very much touched on in philosophy, but it has been put by Hegel in a passage in which he discusses a kindred topic, in the latter part of his *Philosophy of Religion*.* He points out that the subject is certain of its own infinite, non-sensuous substantiality; that the form of its self-consciousness consists in an endless yielding up of its particularity, and finds its infinite value only in what he calls the Love which consists in infinite sorrow and arises out of it. "This," he says, "is a quality and a life which is beyond time and what is transitory, and since it is also in antithesis to its finite and conditioned mode of existence in the present, its necessity of eternal self-realisation determines itself as future. The

* Hegel, *Werke*, xii. p. 313.

infinite demand to see God, that is, for the mind to become conscious of His truth in this temporal present, is not yet satisfied for percipient consciousness."

Well, that is putting the very point in another form. It is because life is more than a mere fact of externality, that we are forced by the action of reflection to determine it as having a future beyond the grave; and yet that determination, because it takes what is really an abstract view, is inadequate, and lands us in contradictions and difficulties. We have got to work ourselves out of that antinomy, and we can only do this by finding a higher conception which gives us what we want without the contradiction arising. So long as people think of life at its highest as a spectacle in time and, as in this aspect, a final fact of reality, so long will they be driven to long for its continuance beyond the grave in just that form, and to think that they are shut up to the alternatives of its either ending here or continuing beyond the grave. They take, do these people, two mutually exclusive views, and alternate necessarily from one to the other. And yet, so often as they try to picture this continuance, just so often will they be driven to fall into self-contradiction and inexplicable difficulties. The antinomy is a real one, and it must be solved by a deeper and more thinking consideration.

We have already in the course of these lectures had to discuss several antinomies. A remarkable

one was that which we had to deal with in the case of life and mechanism. It is obvious that you cannot give an adequate account of life in terms of mechanical conceptions. I will not labour that again, because I have dealt fully with it before; but out of the tendency to express everything in mechanical terms, there arose a theory which was called Vitalism. Vitalism of the old order declared that the only way to account for the fact of organic life was to suppose that there was some kind of vital force, different from ordinary physical forces, which conserved the organism and gave it its life. Well, that of course was just introducing a new mechanical conception to redress the difficulties of the old physical conception, and Vitalism—the old Vitalism—fell, because of its mechanical view, into just as great contradictions as did the theory which it was meant to improve.

Now the ordinary notion of a continuance of this life after death is subject to just as great difficulties as was the old Vitalism, but that does not drive us into saying that the soul and the self are to be conceived as something which comes to an end with the grave, any more than it would be right to infer from the failure of the old Vitalism that the mechanical interpretation of life was the true one. The truth in this case is that the difficulty which you have to face arises from the basis upon which you have started, and it was because it was an altogether inadequate conception of the soul to take it as a mere thing in time,

that you were driven to set up a correction of that conception by supposing a continuance in time beyond the grave as the only way of getting out of the dilemma in which you found yourselves.

In other branches of knowledge, interpreted in the large sense in which I have used the word in these lectures, the problem solves itself without difficulty. In Art, for example in the pictures which Art gives us of the lives of great men, we are not troubled with the notion of their deaths. Not only do we see in them minds that have risen above the fear of death, but we see that in their deaths the completion of life often lies. In, for example, the death of Cæsar, or of Nelson, Art can draw for us pictures which symbolise what we feel to be the highest modes of completion that we could have desired for these lives as it interprets them for us. We would not have them end otherwise—nay, it could not have been otherwise without destruction to the greatness of the story. "*Selig der den Er im Sieges Glanze findet*," is an expression which you find occurring over and over again in different forms in the history of literature. So it is in yet a deeper sense with the life of Jesus. It was not the continuance of that which was, indefinitely, it was its culmination in a scene in which past and present and future were gathered into one that was the truth of that life. Not in the mere temporal succession of the events of these great lives, but in action in which duration in time became of merely secondary importance, existed for

them and for us the culminating instant which became eternity.

Well, in the lives of such men we find the expressions of their personalities, of their self-consciousness, in forms that are for sense. Art has the power of presenting in sensuous form what is more than sensuous. In it mind finds itself again. The world that appeared for them, as it appears in identical forms for us who contemplate their careers, was a world which included, in what was necessary to its history, their own deaths. But, together with all its events, its beginning and its end, for them as for us that world arose and ended within self-consciousness and was in that self-consciousness transcended.

Art expresses these things for us symbolically, and when it tells us the story of the lives of great men it leaves us with no sense of difficulty in grasping the story. For Religion, which embodies analogous truths in its consciousness of free-will acts of self-surrender, these are *felt* to be the truths that are absolute. Faith, the sense of the reality of what is above and beyond that which is seen, makes them its substance. In Religion we are conscious of difficulties smoothed away for us, not by scientifically constructed pictures, but by the sense we have of truth attained in self-surrender, in the adoption of purposes which are greater than our own finite purposes ; and in the consciousness of that we get what is called faith, the sense of the things that are more than seen. Problems and

difficulties disappear, and men and women are sustained by a sense which lifts them up. That sense accompanies acts of will and arises out of acts of will. But Religion,—Religion as it takes form in the Church, as it takes form in the intercourse of the human beings whom it binds together,—Religion is assisted by the pictorial forms into which in the human mind it naturally passes. These pictorial forms do not give scientific truth, but they are, as it were, the symbols in which religious feeling expresses itself. We have the sense of Absolute Existence, of God, as of Someone from whom we are separated and whom we can therefore worship as lower beings worship the highest; but we also know and have the sense of our union with that highest form of mind in a single subject of knowledge, the knowledge in which the universe is sustained, and it is that relationship which enables us at once, in the exercise of our freedom as free though finite spirit, to be apart from God and to assume to Him the attitude of those who may pictorially regard themselves as separated from, and at the same time as returning to Him. Of these things, Religion, as I have said, can give no scientific pictures, but it can give us an assurance arising out of that sense of certainty which accompanies the act of the surrender of its particular existence by the will.

Metaphysics has for its business to put those things into scientific form, and it does so in its teaching about degrees of reality, and the eternity of self-consciousness as essentially above

time. It is when we lapse from the metaphysical standpoint, and try to express what is as though we could completely describe its nature in space and time relations, that we get into difficulties. Space and time relations are necessary; they represent reality when we regard things under certain conceptions adopted for limited purposes; but if we wish to get at the truth about such a matter as eternal life, we have to resort to conceptions of a higher kind, and only when we resort to conceptions of a higher kind are we delivered from the dilemma that this life either ends with the grave or continues beyond the grave. The grave and this temporal present, taken as events, turn out, from a higher standpoint, to be appearance merely, and not to be representative of reality. The antinomy has arisen in a form that seems at first sight insoluble simply because of the limited basis we have adopted, and what we have to do is by analysis to break down what appears as hard-and-fast, and not to set up and insist upon a counter abstraction.

Let us try to follow this out in a concrete illustration. A child dies. Its parents are overwhelmed with grief. As time goes on, their grief remains. The touch of a vanished hand is missed, and the tender grace of a day that is gone never returns to them. Now, try to follow what it is that is in their minds. They do not really desire a reunion on the footing that they,—changed it may be, by the lapse of twenty years' time, changed in

circumstances, in character, in age,—should meet again the child stereotyped, as it were, at the moment of death; nor do they desire that they should meet again a being developed in another world in surroundings far away from all the associations of this one, a being whom they would encounter as almost a stranger. What binds them to the child is something deeper. It is a relation, not of external event to external event, but *of spirit to spirit*. The physical organism of the child was but the symbol which expressed the higher meaning of its personality to them, just as in the patches of paint upon a canvas, which at one standpoint are mere patches of paint, we are able at another standpoint to discern as symbolised the higher meaning, the higher expression. The love of the parents for the child is not a relation of physical organism to physical organism. It is, as I have said, a relation of spirit to spirit, and it is only spiritually that it can be interpreted. The parents do not desire to have restored in another life, unaltered and without development, the being that was taken from them. Apart from growth, apart therefore from change, without a course of life which must have its termination just as it had its beginning, temporal existence in this or any other world which resembled it would be intolerable. It is only in a deeper and more adequate conception that we can find that relation of spirit to spirit which is really desired in our aspirations to immortality.

Now, that view of the nature of the individual is not a view which has been confined to philosophy. There are two little companion poems of Goethe, one called "Eins und Alles" and the other "Vermächtniss," in which this thought was expressed by him in words which are worth while quoting here :

"Im Grenzenlosen sich zu finden,
Wird gern der einzelne verschwinden,
Da löst sich aller Ueberdruss ;
Statt heissem wünschen, wildem wollen,
Statt läst 'gem Fordern, strengem Sollen,
Sich aufzugeben ist Genuss."

"In what is infinite to find himself again
Will who is finite gladly pass away ;
There to be free from what oppresses,
There free from burning wishes, wild desire,
There free from grinding pressure, keen ambition,
In self-surrender blessedness to find."

And then, again, in the other poem we have the companion verse :

"Kein Wesen kann zu nichts zerfallen,
Das Ew'ge regt sich fort in allen,
Am Sein erhalte dich beglückt !
Das Sein ist ewig ; denn Gesetze
Bewahren die lebend 'gen Schätze,
Aus welchen sich das All geschmückt."

"No being can to nothing pass away,
In everything 'tis clear the eternal moves.
In Being steady, then, thyself in joy,
Being eternal is, for laws conserve
The living Treasure
From out of which stands clothed in life the Whole."

There you have a poetical presentation of the

spiritual aspect of the individual, an aspect which rises beyond the mere organism and the mere notion of life as giving its significance to individuality.

Now in human affection it is clear that what is loved is no abstraction fixed by the understanding in universals that are unchanging. It is the concrete embodiment of the spirit which though finite is free, and which is but symbolised in the bodily forms in which it expresses itself, and in the changes in which the working out of its own destiny is imaged. The love of the parent, of the husband, is just like that of the patriot, of the artist, of the saint, is like that of God Himself. It is a relation, not of what is external to what is external, but of spirit to spirit. "When," writes Hegel,* "we say God is love, we are expressing a very great and true thought; but it would be unreasonable merely to take this in such a simple way as a simple characterisation of God, without analysing the meaning of love. For love implies a distinguishing between two; and yet these two are, as a matter of fact, not distinguished from one another. Love, this sense of being outside of myself, is the feeling and consciousness of this identity. My self-consciousness is not in myself but in Another; but this Other in whom alone I find satisfaction and am at peace with myself, and I exist only in so far as I am at peace with myself, for if I had not this inner peace I would be the contradiction which

* Hegel, *Philosophy of Religion*, Eng. Tr., vol. iii. p. 10.

breaks itself up into parts—this Other, just because it is outside of me, has its consciousness only in me. Thus the two are represented simply by this consciousness of their being outside themselves and of their identity, and this perception, this feeling, this knowledge of the unity, is love.”

Love, in other words, is the bond, the highest bond, which you find between mind and mind. In whatever form it takes, whether it originates in some natural relation, whether it originates in sense, whether it originates in the relation of citizen to his country, whether it originates in the relation of man to God, the highest of all these forms, it gets its meaning from a higher and deeper conception than anything that can be expressed in mere external relations. Love is the highest relation of spirit to spirit. With that conception you are still in the sphere of the one and the many, but you have got to the highest point, the point at which in the relation of one to another there is the consciousness of identity in the deepest sense.

Now if that be so, the real foundation of the love of the parents for the child that is gone, being a relationship of spirit to spirit, must be assigned to an aspect of existence in which the present is something more than a mere relationship to a past and to a future, each of them as transitory and unsatisfactory as itself, and in which the real nature of spirit may be sought in a region where the mutual exclusion that characterises events in time does not obtain. It is clear that at one

extreme we can describe to ourselves in abstract language, in abstract conceptions, a self within which time and space fall, because it is the subject for which all knowledge is. And if reality have degrees, and if therefore the knowledge in which reality consists have degrees, then it becomes apparent that a deeper and fuller view of things than the view which fixes life as an event midway between a past and a future is the view which would interpret life as in truth transcending the succession of these three different moments in the time relation. And so it comes that it is not on our own account, nor for their qualities, but because in their personalities our own lives really centre, that we love those around us. It is in form the consciousness of identity in difference, a relation which transcends that of mere externality, and belongs to a higher degree of reality and to a different standpoint. And if this be so, we seem to be near to the key to our problem. It is no longer of any use to put the dilemma that we must either again see or not again see those from whom death separates us. The antinomy of the abstract understanding raises the dilemma, but it is not an exhaustive dilemma. It is not, even at this present moment of life together, a question of *mere seeing*. If death is transcended, if it ceases to be more than appearance when you get to the completed comprehension of the conscious self, it is transcended and is unreal in the love which is the manifestation of the inmost nature of the conscious self, that inmost nature

which the physical organism, in its nature transitory, only symbolises. Neither the self nor that in which it recognises identity with itself fall within the sphere of transitory and self-abolishing appearance. If one goes, the other goes. If one is not so affected, the other is not so affected. Could we think out life, or even a particular event in it, completely, there were no room for the abstract antithesis of death. We are more than mere facts in time, and time cannot bar us off from one another if we are all of us more than mere facts in time. It is not by setting up a beyond, but by breaking down the false and hard-and-fast semblance of reality in the present, that we solve the problem that confronts us. Just as we found God, not in some remote region, but in the world as it is here and now, so in the here and now, in this present more completely comprehended, and more completely brought into that relation to mind which is the key to all reality, do we find the true immortality, the immortality of the soul, not regarded as a substance, but looked at as subject related, in the consciousness of identity called love, to subject and not to substance.

Doubtless there are many aspects in which death, to use the language of the East, is the Separator of persons and the Terminator of delights. These aspects are aspects which confront us very closely at our everyday social level. When we read an account in the newspaper of a railway accident, these are the aspects which are engaging

our minds. For the executor and the undertaker, there are no others that occupy their attention. But these are not really the aspects which occupy us when we find ourselves longing for the touch of a vanished hand and the sound of a voice that is still. It is the relation of spirit to spirit which then engages us. If we will but look at it from the point of view of spirit, if we will but remember where the pathway towards reality leads us to, we shall find that the dilemma that confronts us in our everyday conceptions is a dilemma which no longer presents itself as exhaustive.

In life, as I have pointed out often, there are in each moment implicit diverse standpoints at which reality is possessed of diverse meanings and degrees. There is no experience but implies more standpoints than one; perhaps every experience contains an infinity of standpoints and conceptions. And it is with the higher standpoints that the questions of immortality and of love and grief are truly concerned, and not with the abstractions which are the outcome of the lower standpoints. It is the Veil of Maya which the understanding is ever weaving for us that conceals the truth. For us, whose picture world arises under the finite forms of our finite knowledge, a direct presentation of the unreality of death can never be accomplished. Yet as symbols of more than they can express for abstract knowledge such pictures are of use to us. The dying man may have before his mind the pictorial spectacle of himself as passing away in a

world which he and others image as continuing after him. It does not disturb him, for in some form or another he has a deeper sense. He may be filled with a simple faith that assures him that his Redeemer liveth—or a faith may be his that in yet a different form tells him that it is within his own self that the world and himself as in it are passing, and that in his grasp of the fact he is above it, and is at one with the eternal. What is the insight that sustains him in these deep waters? Wherein does he comprehend and see what those do not who look at him and mourn? In this, perhaps. For him as for them the world is there, with its present, its past, and its future. The present is determined only through the future and the past, but equally the past and the future exist only as distinctions made within the present. For this present has a supreme reality that enables it to be grasped, by the mind that has sufficient insight, as that which possesses, beyond the appearance with which it is invested by the finite forms of reflection necessitated by the ends of workaday life, a higher degree of reality that belongs to the Eternal. At this level his present embraces within itself no less than the entire universe, and the separations that other purposes have hypostatized into what seems final and unyielding sink into mere appearance. The present contains within itself, for him who by faith or by knowledge is lifted above and away from purposes which pertain but to the passing moment, the entirety of what was, is, and will

be. His insight, the outcome it may be of the faith that in religion comes with the voluntary surrender of the self to God, or the outcome of a knowledge that may be rarer, but not the less brings peace, has disclosed to him supreme reality. Dimly, perhaps, yet certainly, he knows that he himself, those about him, the world which one and all have been used to take as foreign to themselves, as the Other that confronts them, are included and exist only in a self-consciousness that now emerges into the light as containing within itself every event that exists for it, even the spectacle of the passing of a life that, not the less because it is his own, in one aspect belongs to Nature. He sees all things in God, and this is not the less his faith because he may not know what it signifies in abstract knowledge, nor be able to express it. Not the less on this account does the true reality of his universe sum itself up in a Now that comprehends all change within itself, and is so beyond the reach of the all-severing wave of time. For those who stand by his bedside, if they have not the insight which he has, and their very health and strength immerse them in interests which make this hard of attainment, he is but part of that Nature the destiny of whose creatures it is to come to maturity and to pass away. Not for the mere Understanding that fixes in difference, in obedience to finite necessities, but only for the Reason that completely comprehends, can the full meaning of the scene be made manifest, and

appearance give place to reality. By Reason the limits of the finite may be transcended in knowledge, as for the dying saint they are in practice, and men may be certain that, could they comprehend as God comprehends, they should see the Eternal made manifest through the fleeting shadows of time. For there is but one Single Subject within which all knowledge and all reality fall. With and in that Single Subject philosophy and faith alike assure us that we are one. And so when his simple creed, pictorial it may be, but symbolical of the deeper meaning of reality, bids the humblest soul in his greatest and last extremity be assured that his Redeemer liveth, it may be that there has come to him an insight in form only different from that of the profoundest thinker.

Such a conclusion is not the mere outcome of mysticism. It is the outcome of the reasoned system which Aristotle founded and Hegel developed, and the method of which it has been my endeavour to set before you in these lectures as the only one that can cast the light of knowledge on the nature of ultimate reality.

The question therefore is a practical one, whether after all we must not frankly recognise that these aspirations, the "intimations of immortality," as Wordsworth has called them, from which we cannot escape, are in truth representative of degrees of knowledge in which the mind, though still at the standpoint of the finite, is raised above the ordinary dilemmas of everyday

knowledge. It may well be that between the extremes of mere duration on the one hand and being above time on the other, we can analytically construct the conception of a life which understanding cannot present as existence in mere temporal sequence, but which, while it preserves in love the differentia of otherness and individuality, is yet not necessitated to present itself to itself, even in immediacy, as a passing phenomenon. It may be right to recognise that such phases of consciousness belong just as much to what is reality as do phases in other kinds of knowledge. In such phases I can conceive that consciousness may be still finite, and yet as much above and beyond my consciousness as mine is beyond that of my dog, for whom the appearance of this world, as I pointed out to you in the lectures of last year, must be very different from what it is for me. Just as there are degrees in reality, so there seem to be degrees in the ends and standpoints of knowledge—degrees above those of our ordinary knowledge and yet short of the knowledge that is absolute. At such standpoints the categories of the one and the many may still apply, and separation in time and space yet appear unreal. In other words, it seems as though it were conceivable that mind should have, even in finite contemplation, a direct experience, more perfect than any that is ours, of a relation of itself to the world in which the passing of that world would not seem to imply the passing of the mind which in one aspect appears in it. In

even our human experience it is plain that the mind can triumph over death; and that should not surprise us, who realise that in social relations which are characterised by finitude, by a sense of something always beyond, even when the moral law is being obeyed, we are ever conscious that we are more than physical organisms, more than finite, that we are what we are only upon a basis that is absolute.

I will sum up what I have been trying to express of the teaching of philosophy about the future life. That life is represented as future only on the footing of taking the present as having no meaning save in reference to what is beyond in time—a limit, as it were, not more on the side of the future than on that of the past. But the present, so taken, is no adequate picture of reality. Along with the past and the future to which it refers us beyond itself, it belongs to the world of appearance only, seems as it does only in virtue of abstraction by the understanding. At a plane of fuller comprehension that present turns out to fall within a consciousness of self which is eternal, because only within it can time and the other distinctions which mind constructs arise. So comprehended the now is an eternal now, within which past and future arise as constructions of the mind. It is only on the basis of eternity and within it, that change has any meaning. Goethe's maxim, *Gedenke zu leben*, bids us think of life as greater than anything in it. Here we have the same truth, but in

a different form. Life now stands for us as intelligible only when contemplated from the standpoint of the eternal. Here and now is God, here and now is freedom, here and now is immortality. It is the old difference between appearance and reality, between the world as it seems at different planes of knowledge. The teaching of philosophy may to our minds, which even in the best thinking are dominated by the finite ends that make our thinking abstract, and ever leave us conscious of contrast with Another beyond, appear attenuated and shadowy. Yet none the less has appearance been penetrated and overcome by the wonderful might of thought which can rest satisfied only in the ultimately real. Thus it is that we turn quite naturally to Art and to Religion for the *direct* sense of the presence of what is truly closer to us than breathing and nearer than hands and feet. In Art, in its widest and highest significance, and most of all in Religion, with its deliverance from the sense of unending progress that characterises even the noblest of moral lives, does the spirit find freedom. The theoretical basis of this freedom I have tried to set before you in this lecture, and I should like to quote to you before I sit down, the analysis given by Hegel (who as usual deals with these things more powerfully than other men), of the peace which such a standpoint as that of religion can give—a peace based not on the mere negation of the will to live, as Schopenhauer conceived it, but on the reality which is attained in

the acceptance of ends which are God's ends, in the place of ends which are finite.

"All the various peoples," says Hegel,* "feel that it is in the religious consciousness they possess truth, and they have always regarded religion as constituting their true dignity and the Sabbath of their life. Whatever awakens in us doubt and fear, all sorrow, all care, all the limited interests of finite life, we leave behind us on the shores of time; and, as, from the highest peak of a mountain, far away from all definite view of what is earthly, we look down calmly upon all the limitations of the landscape and of the world, so, with the spiritual eyes, man, lifted out of the hard realities of this actual world, contemplates it as something having only the semblance of existence, which, seen from this pure region bathed in the beams of the spiritual sun, merely reflects back its shades of colour, its varied tints and lights, softened away into eternal rest. In this region of spirit flow the streams of forgetfulness from which Psyche drinks, and in which she drowns all sorrow, while the dark things of this life are softened away into a dream-like vision, and become transfigured until they are a mere framework for the brightness of the Eternal. This image of the Absolute may have a more or less present vitality and certainty for the religious and devout mind, and be a present source of pleasure; or it may be represented as something longed and hoped for, far off, and in the future. Still it always

* Hegel, *Philosophy of Religion*, Eng. Tr., vol. i. p. 3.

remains a certainty, and its rays stream as something divine into this present temporal life, giving the consciousness of the active presence of truth, even amidst the anxieties which torment the soul here in the region of time. Faith recognises it as the truth, as the substance of actual existing things; and what thus forms the essence of religious contemplation is the vital force in the present world, makes itself actively felt in the life of the individual, and governs his entire conduct. Such is the general perception, sensation, consciousness, or, however we may designate it, of religion."

I have now shown you that it is only for mind as finite that the hard-and-fastness of nature and its forms arise. For mind at a higher level it is put past. As mind we exist, in the deeper meaning of our reality, at that higher level. For the plain man the deliverance from the fear of death, which he finds directly given to him in the emotions which Art and Religion awaken, is a true deliverance. It is the task of philosophy to demonstrate by reasoning the foundation of this deliverance in the nature of mind. Herein lie the reconciliation and the identity of knowledge and faith, and the substance of things unseen.

LECTURE IV

THIS morning I approach the conclusion of these lectures. You will have observed that in the twenty discourses, of which this is the last, I have sought to draw near together Philosophy and Art and Religion. The reason is that in actual life, life as it is for us whose forms of knowledge are characterised by finitude, Art and Religion are the highest forms in the object world which, from our finite standpoint, we presuppose as confronting us within and without. That world we conceive, in our daily ways of looking at things, to be finally and immediately presented, and not to owe its construction to reflective mind. This conception I have shown you to require careful consideration. It has within it no permanence; it is, like all that depends on individual presentation, a vanishing one. It is in the conceptions of thought, notwithstanding that for us they will always be abstract, that permanence is after all to be sought. For the intellect of God the conceptions of philosophy can be no abstractions; for us, they always will be such.

The work of philosophy must therefore embrace

the critical examination of the symbols of Art and of Religion, the highest forms of what for finite intelligence is concrete and directly given, with a view to determining what in them is representative of ultimate reality. This is the task which I set myself in these Gifford Lectures. You will observe that I have guarded myself. I have been careful to point out that the images of the artist and of the saint are not to be looked upon as expressions of scientific truth. Nevertheless they are not on that account contradictory of scientific truth. The field of scientific truth has turned out to be a limited one. Dilemmas only arise when Art and Religion assert that their language is expressive of truth and reality as they appear at a standpoint which is not the standpoint of Art and of Religion. Of the standpoint of even what is called Naturalism I am the last to wish to question the value and importance. It is as a man of the world that I have come here to speak to you, to speak with a full sense of the value of concrete things. But because, when we stand still, we wish to feel solid ground under our feet, it does not follow that we should despise wings. Art and Religion fall into trouble when they speak the language of Understanding, but what they teach can be expressed in that of Reason. Into such language I have tried in these lectures to translate their teaching. We have found, as the result of our journey of discovery, that the pathway to reality leads us to look at the nature of what is ultimate

as mind completely comprehending itself, and that finite mind is this same mind in imperfect forms of self-comprehension, self-determinations on the part of the Absolute Mind that are but phases of the activity in which it creates and gathers up the full riches of its concrete self-comprehension. It is only relatively to an insight which is not fully attained in finite self-consciousness, but which is yet presupposed as its foundation, that space and time are abstract and insufficient forms. They have their meaning as distinctions made in the course of its self-realisation by the consciousness within which all reality falls, and whose vocation it is at once to distinguish in comprehension and to comprehend in distinction. It is to the doctrine of degrees in reality and in the knowledge in which the nature of reality lies, that we have to look for the key to the way out of the perplexity.

Yet how little trouble do people take to find this key. There is a passage in Hegel, the last of the many which I shall have quoted to you in the course of these lectures, to which I should like to call your attention at this point :—

“If we recollect,” he says in his *Philosophy of Mind*,* “how intricate is the knowledge of the divine mind for those who are not content with the homely pictures of faith but proceed to thought—at first only rationalising reflection, but afterwards, as in duty bound, to speculative comprehension, it may almost create surprise that so many, and

* Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, Eng. Tr., p. 176.

especially theologians whose vocation it is to deal with these ideas, have tried to get off their task by gladly accepting anything offered them for this behoof. And nothing serves better to shirk it than to adopt the conclusion that man knows nothing of God. To know God as spirit—to apprehend this accurately and distinctly in thoughts—requires careful and thorough speculation. It includes, in its forefront, the propositions that God is God only in so far as He knows Himself; His self-knowledge is, further, His self-consciousness in man, and man's knowledge *of* God, which proceeds to man's self-knowledge *in* God. . . . When the immediacy and sensuousness of shape and knowledge is superseded, God is, in point of content, the essential and actual spirit of nature and spirit, while in point of form He is, first of all, presented to consciousness as a mental representation. This quasi-pictorial representation gives to the elements of His content, on the one hand, a separate being, making them pre-suppositions towards each other, and phenomena which succeed each other; their relationship it makes a series of events according to finite reflective categories. But, on the other hand, such a form of finite representationalism is also overcome and superseded in the faith which realises one spirit, and in the devotion of worship."

With this extract I pass from the topic of the speculative conception of God. Before I sit down, I wish to say a few words about a subject to which I have made but little allusion in the course of

these lectures—I mean that of which we hear so much to-day under various appellations, one of which is Spiritualism. It would be the sheerest bigotry to pass by or ignore the work of the distinguished men of science who are engaged in investigating its phenomena. Names like those of Lodge, Crookes, Sidgwick, Gurney, Myers, are names that must appeal to us all by the weight of their authority. And yet it does not follow, because we listen with respect to what these men have to tell us, and because we recognise the remarkable work they have done in investigating and sifting certain phenomena, that we must accept their interpretation of their facts. For that interpretation appears to go far beyond what is strictly science. If these lectures have truth in them, mind is not a *substance*. The great difference is not between the *things* that we know, but between the *modes* in which we know them. By many adherents of spiritualism, on the contrary, it appears to be assumed that our experience may be interpreted as though the pathway to reality could lead to a region where minds will be discovered to be substances upon which other substances make impressions. Now this may for some purposes be a useful way of looking at our experience, but, as I showed you long ago in another connection, it is a way of looking at things which can at best be but provisional. Such a mode of inquiry as the Society for Psychical Research pursues may indeed enlarge the narrow

limits of a too narrow view of matter and of energy. It may also—and here I think it may be that there is very great value in the investigations of those who are looking into the phenomena of spiritualism—give us a fuller and more complete conception of the physical organism. Such work as has been done by the men whom I have alluded to, such work, too, as that which was done in their book, *The Unseen Universe*, by Professor Tait and Professor Balfour Stewart—is work which is full of interest, in so far as it tends to warn us that we are apt to come to the investigations of physics and physiology with presuppositions which are too narrow a mode of approach to what has to be looked at. It may be that the teaching of spiritualism will decisively show that we have hitherto excluded from our comprehension a large field of phenomena of nature which require close attention. But no such investigation can be any guide to the character of the ultimately real, as metaphysics defines it, and as I have sought to show you that it *must be* defined, in these lectures. Spiritualism and all cognate methods seem to tumble into the category of substance in just the same fashion as did the old pre-Kantian philosophy. Their standpoint seems to be dogmatic in the very sense in which Kant used the expression.

Now in order that I may not misrepresent a way of looking at things which I feel I may have failed fully to grasp, I wish to give it to you in the words of one who is recognised as having been

among its most distinguished exponents. There is no more complete or thorough work in this field than that recorded in the book by the late Mr Myers which bears the title, *Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death*; and I will quote to you from the First Volume his summing up of the standpoint which he has reached as the result of his inquiry:—

“To me at least,” he says,* “it seems that no real explanation of hypnotic vitalisation can, in fact, be given except upon the general theory supported in this work—the theory that a world of spiritual life exists, an environment profounder than those environments of matter and ether which in a sense we know. Let us look at this hypothesis a little more closely. When we say that an organism exists in a certain environment, we mean that its energy, as one part thereof, forms an element in a certain system of cosmic forces, which represents some special modification of the ultimate energy. The life of the organism consists in its power of interchanging energy with its environment,—of appropriating by its own action some fragment of that pre-existent and limitless Power. We human beings exist in the first place in a world of matter, whence we draw the obvious sustenance of our bodily functions.

“We exist also in a world of ether;—that is to say, we are constructed to respond to a system of

* F. W. H. Myers' *Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death* (1903), vol. i., p. 215.

laws,—ultimately continuous, no doubt, with the laws of matter, but affording a new, a generalised, a profounder conception of the Cosmos. So widely different, indeed, is this new aspect of things from the old, that it is common to speak of the ether as a newly known environment. On this environment our organic existence depends as absolutely as on the material environment, although less obviously. In ways which we cannot fathom, the ether is at the foundation of our physical being. Perceiving heat, light, electricity, we do but recognise in certain conspicuous ways—as in perceiving the ‘X rays’ we recognise in a way less conspicuous—the pervading influence of ethereal vibrations which in range and variety far transcend our capacity of response.

“Within, beyond, the world of ether,—as a still profounder, still more generalised aspect of the Cosmos,—must lie, as I believe, the world of spiritual life. That the world of spiritual life does not depend on the existence of the material world, I hold as now proved by actual evidence. That it is in some way continuous with the world of ether, I can well suppose. But for our minds there must needs be ‘a critical point’ in any such imagined continuity; so that the world where life and thought are carried on apart from matter, must certainly rank again as a new, a *metethereal* environment. In giving it this name I expressly imply only that from our human point of view it lies after or beyond the ether, as metaphysic lies after or beyond physics.

I only say that what does not originate in matter or in ether originates there ; but I well believe that beyond the ether there must be not one stage only, but countless stages in the infinity of things.

“ . . . In my view, then, each man is essentially a spirit, controlling an organism which is itself a complex of lower and smaller lives. The spirit's control is not uniform throughout the organism, nor in all phases of organic life. In waking life it controls mainly the centres of supraliminal thought and feeling, exercising little control over deeper centres, which have been educated into a routine sufficient for common needs. But in subliminal states—trance and the like—the supraliminal processes are inhibited, and the lower organic centres are retained more directly under the spirit's control. As you get into the profounder part of man's being, you get nearer to the source of his human vitality. You get thus into a region of essentially greater *responsiveness* to spiritual appeal than is offered by the superficial stratum which has been shaped and hardened by external needs into a definite adaptation to the earthly environment. Even thus the caterpillar's outside integument is fashioned stiffly to suit larval requirement, while deeper in the animal, unseen processes of rapid change are going on, in obedience to an impulse not derived from larval life.”

For Mr Myers, then, the soul, and for that matter the self, would appear to be a physical and external fact, something extended in space and de-

veloping in time. The categories of mechanism are the categories which he uses as adequately descriptive of its existence. After all, this leads us to something very like a higher form of materialism, because, take it as you will and twist it as you please, whenever you attempt to describe mental life in terms of the categories of cause and of effect and of substance, to materialism, in some shape or form, you come back. Such a standpoint gives the go-by to the criticism of modern philosophy. I do not presume to examine the scientific methods of this new school, or to ask whether their standards of testimony are wholly complete or sufficient. Certainly the material which they have got together is, much of it, very striking; while again, there is more of it which, according to the criteria of the physicist, or, for that matter, according to the standards which are applied in courts of justice, would require a great deal of consideration before we could accept it. Nevertheless their field of investigation is a novel one and their task a very difficult one, and far be it from any of us to be otherwise than grateful for investigations to which the splendid public spirit has been devoted which is shown in the work of Mr Myers and some of those who have collaborated with him. Still, I could wish that the adherents of this school had shown more consciousness that many of the conceptions which they use freely had been subjected to scrutiny by modern philosophy, and shown to be very full of what is misleading. Even to go

no further than the philosophy of Kant, no one ought to undertake an investigation into the field covered by Mr Myers' book without first making himself cognisant of the criticism to which Kant subjected the dogmatic use of the categories which Mr Myers so freely employs. In the difficult regions where such inquiry moves, a careful criticism of categories is absolutely essential.

But one does not need to go to metaphysics to find this out. The acute mind of the Professor of Psychology in this University of St Andrews, Professor Stout, has been directed recently to an examination of a phrase which Mr Myers and his colleagues have employed, the "subliminal self." Had they confined themselves to using that term as simply a convenient one for embracing certain classes of mental phenomena, Professor Stout would have offered no objection; but what they have done is to go further, and to give to the subliminal self an existence co-ordinate with that of the ordinary self of consciousness, and upon this point Professor Stout parts company with them. He subjects their conception to a close scrutiny, and comes to the conclusion that ordinary psychological method has at all events the capacity of accounting for all the phenomena with which they deal, without bringing in such notions as that of a subliminal self in the sense in which the phrase is used by the adherents of the school of spiritualism.

Now, Professor Stout examines the whole

matter in a critical but kindly spirit. A more hostile attack is made by Mr F. H. Bradley, in his book, *Appearance and Reality*, and while, as I have already told you, I am unable to go the whole length of Mr Bradley's scepticism in various matters with which I have had to deal in the course of these lectures, Mr Bradley's scepticism is so thoroughly reasoned, and consequently so valuable, that no one can deal with these matters who has not considered its foundation. And in no region is this more apparent than in his investigation of the phenomena of psychology. Mr Bradley is not only a great metaphysician, but also a great psychologist, and among other things he subjects the conception of the self, which Mr Myers deals with so freely, to a scrutiny which no one ought to ignore who is considering these matters. In his book, *Appearance and Reality*, he deals with the conception of the self, especially in the two chapters on the "Meanings of Self," and the "Reality of the Self." His general conclusion is the necessary outcome of his view of the merely relational character of thought, its necessary infection with the abstractions and isolations of the understanding. For reasons already given I cannot wholly accept his view, but his criticisms are none the less valid against all psychological attempts, based on presentational methods, to detect the self as anything approaching to a physical fact or substance. For him the self, as ordinarily spoken of, turns out to be appearance merely, no doubt the highest

form of experience we have, but for all that not a true form. It certainly cannot be described as a merely discrete or discontinuous succession of isolated experiences. For even introspection carries us further than this, and shows that as long as there remains in the self, sought to be distinguished from the rest of the universe, a certain basis of content ideally the same, so long may the self recall anything once associated with that basis. And this identity of content, working on the principle of redintegration, and so bringing up the past as the history of one self, is what the facts give us. It shows, says Mr Bradley, that self-sameness exists as an apparent fact, and that hence *somehow* an identical self exists; but *how*, according to him, we cannot tell. We cannot, he thinks, define what we mean by personal identity. Psychology shows us the importance of memory in the practical view of everyday life; but it shows us this besides, that a self is not thought to be the same, merely because of apparent continuity of memory, but only so when that memory is regarded as not being deceptive. Memory, he points out, depends upon reproduction from a basis that is present, a basis that may be said to consist in self-feeling. Hence, so far as this basis remains the same through life, we may recall anything once associated with it. As this basis changes, so does its connection with past events appear different. The basis may even be so altered that the very condition required for reproduction of our past life is gone, and if the

basis alters back and forwards, our past life may appear to us so differently that we seem to be different selves alternately, selves which have never really existed in the past, such as the selves conceived under the influence of hypnotic suggestion.

Observe how this psychologist shows that it is not only altogether unnecessary, but that it is a misconception, to resort to the notion of an outside self, a different thing, taking possession, so to speak, of the physical organism of the hypnotised subject and directing it. What he points out is that the identity on which we rest our view of our continuity rests upon the basis of memory, and if this basis be shifted—whether by suggestion, or by illness, or by whatever other means—the result is that we may enter upon a totally different view of our past and therefore of our present, and that we may appear to ourselves to be even different personalities. Thus, he concludes, mere memory is not the basis of a true personal identity. Some sort of continuity of existence is required, but what sort we cannot say. And in a remarkable illustration he observes: “He who is risen from the dead may really be the same, though we can say nothing intelligible of his ambiguous eclipse or his phase of half existence. But a man wholly like the first, but created fresh after the same lapse of time, we might feel was too much to be one, if not quite enough to make two.”*

* F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, 2nd ed., p. 85.

That is a kind of criticism which you really cannot ignore in the investigation of these phenomena; and until modern spiritualists equip themselves better with a knowledge of what has been done in the sphere of psychology, they cannot expect their investigations to receive the attention and the consideration which they would otherwise receive.

I agree with the attitude of Professor Stout in his recent article on Mr Myers' book in the *Hibbert Journal*,* in which he says that we have to listen attentively and gratefully to what is told us by the distinguished men who are inquiring into the phenomena of telepathy and hypnotism and the so-called subliminal self. They may be able to establish facts which will require the closest investigation, and their investigation may lead to an enlargement of the field of observation greater even than that which the progress of modern chemistry is rapidly effecting. But on the problem of the nature of ultimate reality, or on the problems of free-will and immortality, and of the relation of the divine mind to the human, it does not appear to me that their methods are capable of throwing light. If they succeed in showing, as it is at least possible that they may do, that our conception of the physical organism has been too narrow, this may have important consequences for physics and biology, and even for anthropology. But its interests can hardly extend beyond the region of these

* Professor Stout, *Hibbert Journal* for October 1903.

sciences into these other regions where the categories of externality are not applicable.

I pass therefore by the gate where they stand and beckon us to follow them down a different path from that which we have been treading in the course of these lectures. Their road leads to no region in which we could have found light on the deeper problem with which we are concerned. Accordingly I now bring you to what, so far as these lectures are concerned, is the close of our journey. From the place where we have come to stand we see lying beyond us new regions, the gate to which is now open to us. We have learned that not then and there in some other and different world, but here and now in just this one truly interpreted, is to be sought Reality. Such knowledge is but abstract. Not to philosophy alone can we look for deliverance. Philosophy, more than any other kind of science, more than even the science of the mathematician, enables us to survey the world from above the level of our finiteness. But it is not the abstractions of the scientist, nor even the system of universals in which philosophy herself moves, that can *set* for us the concrete riches that we find without as within ourselves. The poets and the artists, the men of goodliness and the men of godliness, they, too, have learned to see existence *sub specie æternitatis*, and they, too, must be our teachers if the spirit is fully to comprehend itself. The metaphors which they use may be inadequate, but their speech is to the heart,

and from the heart the head can never wholly be separated. They touch our emotions, and make, as no mere reasoning can,

“Our noisy years seem moments in the being
Of the eternal silence; truths that wake
To perish never.”

But still in the end it is to the history of philosophy that we must turn, if we would gain an abiding insight into the nature of Reality. To Reason the problem is due, and Reason alone, as I told you at the very beginning of these Gifford Lectures, can heal the wounds which Reason has made. Mind there may be, at a higher level than ours, and yet finite, that can find itself in the world as it seems, with less labour and more immediate certainty than can mind as it is in us men and women. Only by difficult analysis can the spirit penetrate beneath the hard crust of appearance and there discover itself as the reality that is final. Yet, in the struggle to raise ourselves to the level of speculative thinking, we have this comfort, nothing once gained can ever be wholly lost. Insight into its own nature by the mind that is conscious of its own potential greatness, brings with it deliverance, and freedom of the spirit. Man learns the lesson that the true home of his soul is eternity. “In the notion once is always.”

“All that is, at all,
Lasts ever, past recall;
Earth changes, but thy soul and God stand sure,
What entered unto thee,
That was, is, and shall be;
Time’s wheel runs back or stops; Potter and Clay endure.”

I have now completed my task, how imperfectly I well know. Under the sun there is nothing new. The real searcher after truth seeks not to unearth some isolated particle, nor is he eager for the joy of labelling it, when found, with the name of his own small personality. He seeks rather to make his own what the great minds have brought to light of the true nature of Reality in Art, in Religion, in Philosophy. For to comprehend is to pass beyond. He tries to add to the common stock what he has got, even if it seems to him but a fragment broken from the infinity of God's Truth. At least, he can fulfil that most sacred of all duties, to strive to be helpful.

Yet in the end each must do the work for himself and in his own fashion. Only in solitude can the hardest part of the pathway to reality be trodden :—

“Space is but narrow—east and west—
There is not room for two abreast.”

No one of us is like any other, either in his needs or in the mode in which these needs must be satisfied. Every man bears the impress of his finitude, with its infinite variety of form. Hardly less is that impress borne by even the greatest and highest expression in which the truth is told to us. Yet if that truth be hard to reach—nay, even if the most genuinely strenuous effort to reach it must ever remain incomplete, and the work have to be done over again by each one for himself, we have on justification for despair, or for sitting in idleness

with folded hands. For in the search for truth, as in all the other phases of our activity, we only gain and keep our life and freedom by daily conquering them anew.

There is a passage in Spinoza, with which I will conclude these lectures. He ends the final Book of his Ethics with these words:—

“I have finished everything I wished to explain concerning the power of the mind over the affects, and concerning its liberty. From what has been said, we see what is the strength of the wise man, and how much he surpasses the ignorant who is driven forward by lust alone. For the ignorant man is not only agitated by external causes in many ways, and never enjoys true peace of soul, but lives, also ignorant as it were, both of God and of things, and as soon as he ceases to suffer ceases also to be. On the other hand, the wise man, in so far as he is considered as such, is scarcely ever moved in his mind, but being conscious, by a certain external necessity, of himself, of God, and of things, never ceases to be, and always enjoys true peace of soul. If the way which, as I have shown, leads hither, be very difficult, it can nevertheless be found. It must indeed be difficult, since it is so seldom discovered; for if salvation lay ready to hand, and could be discovered without great labour, how could it be possible that it should be neglected almost by everybody! *Sed omnia præclara tam difficilia quam rara sunt*; but all noble things are as difficult as they are rare.”

INDEX

- Appearance and Reality*, Mr Bradley's, 267.
 Apprehension and Comprehension, 62, 63, 88.
 Aristotle, 4, 7, 47, 121, 146, 153, 156.
 Art, 32, 35, 147, 192, 193, 199, 201, 203, 207, 235, 251, 255.
 Athanasian Creed, 166, 167.
 Athanasius, 165.
 Atonement, the, 128, 169.
- BACON, 219.
 Beauty, 25, 176, 177.
 Beethoven, 181.
 Being and Not-being, 57, 61.
 Berkeley, 4, 40, 86, 143.
 Body, the, 52, 54, 55, 144, 217.
 Boland, 145.
 Bonitz, 121.
 Bosanquet, 57, 75, 138, 141.
 Bradley, Professor A. C., 187, 188.
 Bradley, F. H., xiii., 72, 74, 79, 80, 265.
 Browning, 104, 192, 209.
 Burnet, Professor, 121.
 Byron, 191.
- CAIRD, Professor Edward, *The Evolution of Religion*, 223.
 Carlyle, 45, 49, 139, 199.
 Category, 6.
 Cause and Effect, 66.
- Childhood, 55, 56, 136.
 Christianity, 16.
Commentary on the Book of Daniel, Luther's, 127.
 Comprehension, 62, 89.
 Conduct, 33.
Conversations of Goethe, Eckermann's, 188, 189, 190.
 Cousin, 19.
Critique of Judgment, Kant's, 195, 198.
Critique of Pure Reason, Kant's, 194, 195.
- DEATH, 209, 213, 219, 245.
 Dedekind, 77.
 Dialectic, 21, 67.
Dogmatik, Strauss's, 59.
 Donaldson, Principal, 121, 164.
 Dutch landscape, 184.
- ECKERMANN, 188.
Encyclopædie, Hegel's, 18.
 Ends, 4, 5, 24.
 Erdmann, 15, 57, 145.
 Eternal Life, 225, 227.
Ethics, Spinoza's, 95.
 Evil, origin of, 129.
 Evolution, 110.
 Experience, 4.
- FAITH, 33, 169.
 Fall, the, 128.

Faust, Goethe's, 46, 84, 123.

Feeling, 48.

Fichte, 19.

Finitude, 69, 97, 108, 116, 117, 118, 171.

Fitzgerald, *Omar Khayyàm*, 208, 209.

GEOMETRY, 9.

Gifford, Lord, 3.

Gladstone, 123.

God, 8, 13, 26, 36, 58, 81, 98, 115, 120, 155, 157, 170, 237; definition of His nature, 117; as mind, 13, 81; His relation to man, 130, 237; His relation to nature and evil, 132, 133; His relation to reality, 3.

Goethe, xv., 8, 50, 84, 123, 125, 126, 127, 188, 197, 217.

Goethe's *Faust*, 46, 84; Goethe's *Gott und Welt*, 123, 124; Goethe's *Eins und Alles*, 50, 240; Goethe's *Vermächtniss*, 240.

Green, T. H., xiv.

Gurney, Edmund, 258.

HARNACK, *History of Dogma*, 166.

Hegel, xiii., 7, 12, 17, 25, 48, 56, 57, 59, 61, 69, 73, 83, 88, 99, 101, 112, 133, 149, 163, 167, 169, 178, 196, 198, 251, 252, 256.

Heraclitus, 24, 112.

History, 120.

Holy Ghost, sin against the, 129.

Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death, 260.

Hume, 40, 73.

Intimations of Immortality, Wordsworth's, 37.

JOHN, Gospel of, 161, 164.

Jowett, 83.

Judgment, 23.

Justin Martyr, 165.

KANT, 4, 65, 71, 194; his Critique of Judgment, 195; his Critique of Pure Reason, 194, 195.

Knowledge, 22, 42.

LAWS OF NATURE, 34.

Leib und Seele, Erdmann's, 57, 145.

Lessing, 190.

Locke, 101.

Lodge, Sir Oliver, 258.

Logic, 153.

Logos, 161, 162, 164.

Long, *The School of the Woods*, 215, 216.

Luther, 126, 127.

MANHOOD, 56.

Materialism, 39.

Maya, the Veil of, 245.

Metaphors, 5, 17.

Mill, 4, 143.

Mind, 13, 14, 38, 39, 44, 48, 49, 52, 70, 81, 87, 135, 156, 159.

Montaigne, 63.

Morality, 32, 35.

Münsterberg, 48, 131, 153.

Music, 64, 180, 181.

Myers, F. H., 258, 260.

NATURE, 69, 91, 92, 93, 94, 132.

Natur-Philosophie, Hegel's, 57, 112.

Neoplatonism, 160, 164, 165.

Newman, Cardinal, his "Lead Kindly Light," 186.

OLD AGE, 57.

PARODY, 185, 186.

Personality, 81.

Philo, 160.

Philosophy, 32.

Philosophical Theory of the State, Bosanquet's, 141.

Philosophy of Fine Art, Hegel's, 149, 152, 178, 179, 198.

Philosophy of Mind, Hegel's, 57, 256.

- Philosophy of Religion*, Hegel's, 133, 135, 169, 252.
- Plato, 4; his *Republic*, 19; his *Parmenides*, 67.
- Plotinus, 160.
- Poetry, 183, 185, 187.
- Poetry for Poetry's Sake*, A. C. Bradley's, 188.
- Presentationism, 10, 48, 131.
- Principles of Psychology*, James', 43.
- Proofs of the Existence of God*, Hegel's, 167, 169.
- Psychology, 10.
- Psychology of the Moral Self*, Bosanquet's, 57.
- REALITY, 10, 23, 39, 71.
- Relativity, 5, 42, 43.
- Religion, 32, 36, 130, 202, 203, 207, 237.
- Ring and the Book*, Browning's, 192.
- Royce, 58, 75, 79, 80.
- Sartor Resartus*, Carlyle's, 45, 139, 199.
- Schiller, 124, 197.
- Schopenhauer, 75.
- Schwegler, 121.
- Self, 52, 69, 75, 81, 131, 132, 265, 267.
- Self-comprehension, 47, 174.
- Self-consciousness, 10, 11, 53, 87, 106.
- Series, 76, 77, 78, 79, 88, 113, 157; self-representative, 78, 80, 113.
- Shakespeare, 206.
- Simultaneum*, idea of a, 115.
- Socrates, 19.
- Solipsism, 60.
- Sophist*, Jowett's Introduction to the, 83.
- Soul, 52, 53, 54, 55, 217.
- Space, 46, 64, 65.
- Spencer, Herbert, 143.
- Spinoza, 95, 204, 272.
- Spiritualism, 258, 259.
- Stäel, Madame de, 19.
- Stout, Professor, 264.
- Strauss, 59.
- Substance, 60.
- TAIT, Professor, *Unseen Universe*, 259.
- Tennyson, 155.
- Thing, 5, 7, 11, 39.
- Thought, 33, 48, 62, 69, 87; its relation to Beauty, 25; its relation to Things, 7.
- Time, 41, 43, 44, 46, 64, 65, 80, 111, 112.
- Trinity, Doctrine of the, 160, 163, 167.
- Turner, 35, 178.
- VITALISM, 234
- Von Baer, 43.
- WARD, Professor, 137.
- Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen*, Dedekind's, 77.
- Wordsworth, 50, 104, 248; "Intimations of Immortality," 37, 248.
- World, 4.
- World and Individual*, Royce's, 78.
- World as Will and Idea*, Schopenhauer's, 180.
- YOUTH, 56.

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